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I believe there is a fundamental incompatibility be­
tween a developmental perspective of education and certain 
instrumental and scientific conceptions of rationality that 
dominate much of educational thought, practice and inquiry. 
In the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas I have found an 
expanded conception of rationality that is consistent with 
a developmental perspective. In this study I draw on 
Habermas' work to present a theory of inquiry--an integrated 
theory of knowledge, value and action— for educational 
development.
1
The Personal and Interpersonal Dimensions of Human 
Unders tanding^
I'll begin by asking you to imagine three ellipses 
joined together at their bases and radiating upward and out­
ward like the petals of a tulip. Let each petal or ellipse 
stand for a different realm of being. Let the sphere on the 
left stand for the objective material world of nature, the 
sphere on the right for the intersubjective interpersonal 
world of society, and the sphere in the center for the sub­
jective personal world of each individual. From the earliest 
recorded thought in ancient Greece to the modern present, 
people have pleaded a case for three such realms of being 
and have tried to explain their relations to each other or 
to reduce them to just one of the three. In particular, I 
believe that prevailing conceptions of rationality tend to 
reduce individual and social experience to the objective 
material sphere.
Under these conceptions rational beliefs are those that
can be ultimately grounded in sense certainty. Knowledge
is defined as justified true belief and both justification
and truth are based on perceptual certainty.^ These concep-
2tions also obj ectify all experience by making experience 
an object of natural science and instrumental action sepa­
rate from and external to the experiencing subject. To make 
something an object of instrumental action is to treat it 
as means for our own ends, as instrument for the creation
of a desired state of affairs. Inquiry based on these con­
ceptions seeks justified beliefs concerning objective states 
and processes of nature that are technically exploitable.
In this objectivistic framework human action is 
rational when it is guided by true beliefs and effective 
means to desired ends. We are limited to a technical 
rationality. Our experience of persons and human interac­
tion can be objectified in this way--we can treat people and 
their actions as objects--but not without loss of critical 
personal and interpersonal dimensions. Our experience can­
not be completely reduced to the objective material realm.
An adequate conception of rationality must provide theories 
for justifying our beliefs and actions that go beyond sen­
sory perception and technical effectiveness to include this 
personal and interpersonal dimension.
I find these objectivistic and instrumental conceptions 
of rationality to be incompatible with a developmental per­
spective of education because these conceptions limit 
rationality in ways that deprive people of both their 
autonomy and their community, and divest their actions of 
ethical significance. I will systematically consider 
development in Chapter VI, but briefly, my argument is that 
a developmental perspective of education includes a personal 
and an interpersonal dimension that a strictly objectivistic 
and instrumental rationality cannot encompass. I believe 
we grow, develop and evolve individually and in relation to
others. We are individuated members of the community-- 
autonomous and yet integrated into the collective. On the 
one hand, we are inalienably social beings. Our experience 
is mediated through an intersubjectivity of common symbols; 
our needs, values, and knowledge grow out of and, in turn, 
inform this symbolic structure. On the other hand, we are 
inalienably individual beings. Our experience includes a 
singular aspect so that the things we experience acquire 
meaning and significance relative to our unique life his­
tories . Yet prevailing conceptions of rationality in edu­
cational inquiry do not adequately account for these social 
and individual dimensions of human experience and under­
standing .
A rationality limited to a purely objectivistic and 
instrumental perspective must treat the educational process 
as a state of nature to be studied and manipulated for the 
efficient realization of educational goals. This kind of 
rationality ultimately assumes that the learner is a 
mechanism of nature that can be controlled and organized 
within certain limits, and that through the application of 
empirical laws the learner can be manipulated so as to ex­
hibit specified characteristics defined as learning outcomes. 
However, unlike inanimate objects in our experience, human 
behavior has dimensions that preclude this kind of predic­
tive stability. Inanimate objects have no individual will,
5nor do they share our intersubjectivity of mutual under­
standing .
Such an objectivistic and instrumental approach to 
inquiry is incompatible with a developmental orientation to 
education because it excludes dimensions of human experience 
and understanding that are critical to human development. 
Conceived developmentally, the learner is in dynamic inter­
action with a social as well as physical environment that in­
cludes a rich and complex organization of materials , energies , 
people, ideas, and culture. The individual must not only 
become integrated into this world, but must build and main­
tain an identity secured against either disintegration or 
absorption. In other words, the learner must become an 
individuated part of the social world, and must ultimately 
share in the responsibility for this process.
The individual literally comes into being, learns, and 
matures in a process of dynamic interaction that involves 
three moments: the emerging ego, the objective material
world, and the intersubjective social world. From this per­
spective, inquiry in education must attend equally to the 
individual, social, and material aspects of the educational 
process. Yet it seems to me that the logic of inquiry in 
education lacks a systematic theoretical perspective on the 
dynamic interplay of these three realms in the experience of 
the learner.
6I believe this deficiency is partly due to the pre­
dominant positivistic conception of the inquiry process, 
positivistic not so much in the more restricted and now 
abandoned form of logical positivism but rather in the 
broader form of classical positivism with its reduction of 
objectivity to measurable facts and their correlations, and 
its separation of knowledge from values.
Consider, for example, the role in empirical-analytic 
science of practical interests (practical in the philosophi­
cal sense of relating to human conduct.) Practical interests 
are systematically excluded from the logic of inquiry. They 
serve only as the unproblematic context which guides inquiry 
from outside the inquiry process itself. When practical in­
terests are considered problematic, then political processes 
outside of formal inquiry are expected to resolve the situation.
More generally, I believe that the implicit and 
explicit theories of knowledge and theories of value inher­
ent in prevailing theory and practice are important factors 
contributing to many problems that beset educational re­
search and evaluation today. A logic of inquiry that is 
concerned with the developmental processes of education must 
provide for the autonomy of the learner and the ethical 
nature of human conduct, and not only the justification of 
knowledge claims concerning empirical regularities. What is 
needed is an expanded conception of rationality that takes 
into account both the personal and interpersonal dimensions
7of human understanding. This study is an attempt to articu­
late these dimensions and to incorporate them into a 
theory of inquiry.
A Personal Dimension to This Inquiry
My goal of articulating an expanded conception of 
rationality can be better understood within the context of 
my own professional experience. This dissertation repre­
sents a bridge between two sides of my professional develop­
ment. Throughout my career, I have been concerned almost 
simultaneously with both empirical inquiry and with the 
development and self-actualization of people.
On the side of empirical inquiry, it is clear that the 
sciences have held a dominant place in my education and 
represent a major influence in my professional life.
While my experience and training in science was a unique 
constellation of my own teachers, texts and learning experi­
ences, I believe that experience was very similar to 
many others of my generation. I emerged with a particular, 
if implicit, view of science that I attempted to apply in my 
early professional life. Much of my formal academic train­
ing was in the t.i.-'ory and methods of educational research and 
evaluation: statistics, experimental design, sampling,
problem formation, hypothesis testing and measurement. I 
learned the technology of instructional development as well: 
needs assessments, product formulation, specification of
objectives, performance specifications, product development 
and data collection, reduction, analysis and reporting.3 
This was the curriculum for those who studied educational 
research and evaluation. It was a curriculum based on 
recommendations from professional associations, by leaders 
in the profession, and even on mandates from the National 
Institute of Education.
I learned early that application of the scientific 
method is undoubtedly the most efficient and reliable means 
tQ knowledge, and that the object of scientific inquiry is 
to explain, predict and control phenomena.^- Educational 
research, the scientific method applied to education, is the 
explanation, prediction and control of educational phenom­
ena .
I have a somewhat idealized image of myself at that 
time. I was one of a community of educators and researchers 
with different but overlapping goals and points of view.
We all shared the overarching common way of science, a way 
I imperfectly understood but tried to clarify in concert 
with my co-workers. I continued to study and learn the 
methods of my discipline, to teach and share them with my 
colleagues. Together we tried to discover the methods that 
made the most sense for what we were trying to do. So the 
view of science I acquired was unique to me and yet shared 
in varying degrees with the whole broad educational research 
and evaluation community,
In retrospect, although the characterization is some­
what artificial in oversimplification, I see that the view 
of science I received was one of a search for the nature of 
an objective reality. It was objective at least in the 
sense that while I was to be considered a part of nature,
I could not find that reality by looking within myself. It 
was an objective search for an external reality, the regu­
larities and laws of nature that might be put to use in 
solving problems and reaching goals. Of course we never had 
the final picture. There was always controversy, disagree­
ment and progress. New, more accurate and comprehensive 
theories and explanations replaced older less adequate views, 
only to be revised and replaced by yet more complete ones.
But the search was still for the truth, the way things 
really are. In relation to specified problems and goals 
the search was for the best solution, the way to go. I took 
these things for granted, so thoroughly assumed as to receive 
no special attention. I knew no alternative.
The image I have portrayed seems true of a period of my 
life that was followed by a disintegration of this confident 
outlook and the transformation of my personal and profes­
sional life. The disintegration happened gradually as the 
outlook and methods I had learned failed to yield their 
promise and as differences with and among colleagues grew 
into conflicts and even battles. It became increasingly 
clear that more was at stake than the most appropriate
10
methods of unveiling an objective reality. Here was 
obviously a very social and political process of gaining 
control of scarce resources and the power to influence and 
define the scope and direction of work. I came to see con­
flicts among the administrators, developers and evaluators 
between fundamental assumptions underlying their positions. 
While these conflicts centered around methodological issues, 
the process for coping with them was very clearly a politi­
cal and not a scientific one. This fact was seldom, if ever, 
acknowledged. Instead, appeal was generally made to 
theoretical considerations underlying the methods of 
research; the political and ethical choices implicit in 
these theories were neglected.
This gradual transformation, in my view of scientific 
inquiry, also took place under the influence of a wide 
variety of experiences associated with humanistic psychology. 
Throughout the period of my formal education and course work 
I found myself drawn to projects and professional interests 
that focused on the development arid self-actualization of 
people. However, the methods of scientific research from 
my formal training seemed to play an unclear and limited 
role in relation to these activities. I found the theories, 
models, methods and activities of these humanistic and 
developmental efforts exciting and compelling but somehow 
at the edge of scientific and academic legitimacy. I was 
energized and animated by the power of their goals and the
11
excitement in their ideas, but I was skeptical and pessi­
mistic because they seemed to be taken seriously only by 
those disaffected with mainstream science and academics.
They were also relatively unknown or lacked scientific 
respectability within professional circles with which I was 
acquainted. I naively assumed that these theories and 
methods had to be tested with the inquiry processes I had 
learned. I could see the difficulty of doing so, but it 
seemed the only way to confirm them and to gain respecta­
bility. I seriously tried to apply these inquiry methods 
to some of the ideas, but increasingly, I felt that something 
was wrong. Slowly the idea emerged and grew within me that 
there was a fundamental incompatibility between the models 
of research I had learned and the theories and models of 
development I pursued. I could not see how to bring the 
two realms together.
Let me illustrate with an example. The difficulty I 
encountered was in reconciling the methods and logic of 
empirical inquiry with my experience of how people grow and 
develop. This difficulty was especially evident in certain 
non-standard learning situations such as therapy and ex­
periential learning programs. In one professional setting,
I helped develop and evaluate a number of workshops for edu­
cators on a variety of process skills in such areas as inter­
personal communication, problem solving, and conflict resolu­
tion. Let us consider the workshop on coping with conflict.
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The conflict workshop was designed to help participants 
conceptualize and integrate their own experience about con­
flict so as to enable them to respond more successfully 
to real conflict situations in their lives. I discovered 
that the technological mentality of my early professional 
development was a barrier to my contribution in creating 
and evaluating this personal-integration kind of learning 
experience.
The theories and models I had learned called for the 
specification of behavioral objectives in cognitive, affec­
tive and psychomotor domains. Instructional sequences were 
to be designed to enable participants to master these objec­
tives . Evaluation designs were to provide tests of mastery 
so that discrepancies between actual and expected perfor­
mance could be used in revising the instructional sequences.
A'gainst this orientation, the people developing the 
workshops considered the cognitive content of the training 
as merely an initial framework to aid participants in con­
ceptualizing their own experience. Cognitive mastery of 
their models was considered by the developers to be the 
least important of outcomes. In fact, by itself, it was 
considered evidence of a failure at the level that was most 
important. Simply feeding back the models we gave them was 
incompatible with our goal that participants reorganize and 
integrate their workshop experience in such a way that they 
can better fit their actions, motives, and environment as
13
they confront new conflict situations.
The individual participants' intentions, goals, dis­
positions and conceptual structures were considered to be 
the focal starting point and the contextual framework for 
the training. The workshops were intended to facilitate 
participants1 own reconstruction of their initial states 
and dispositions in the light of their workshop experience. 
There was, however, no place in the inquiry logic and pro­
cesses I had learned, for the participants’ intentions, 
motives, goals, dispositions and conceptual frameworks. 
There was no place for the social norms and values that 
play at least as important a role as empirical regularities 
do in the process of human development and individuation.
I experienced the frustration of being unable to find 
a way to evaluate these workshops that remained consistent 
with their personal focus and developmental orientation, 
and yet still spoke to the issues of the justification of 
konwledge and truth claims raised by the tradition of 
empirical research and by my professional peers.
There were times when my confusion seemed to resolve 
into two main stances--a scientific and technical empirical 
research side on the one hand, and a personally focused 
search for meaning and understanding in one’s life on the 
other. Both were searches for understanding. They were 
like James' tough and tender minded temperaments.^ One was 
an objective search in an external world for scientific
14
truth--the unveiling of an objective reality. The other was 
a personal search for meaning and understanding. Yet, as 
X tried to focus on the distinction, it seemed to slide 
around and even to evaporate. Just as James, I wanted both.
I was learning to see all inquiry as personal, creative 
and developmental— social and political as well as theoreti­
cal and technical. 1 was also coming to see the general 
view of science X had acquired as more than just a philoso­
phy of science, but as a standpoint reflecting an entire 
world view with ramifications in perhaps all aspects of life. 
Furthermore X was coming to see an alternative to this 
received view. My dissertation represents an attempt at a 
reconstruction of inquiry based on the transformation that 
has taken place in my own world view.
What I'm suggesting is that professionally I (along 
with many others) am the embodiment of a conflict between 
the prevailing paradigm of scientific rationality, on the 
one hand, and the concern of many in our culture with the 
humanistic self-actualization of persons, on the other.
My problem is one of integrating the experience and 
perspectives gained from my own personal explorations and 
transformation with my experience and training in main­
stream science. My dissertation is both the medium and 
culmination of this synthesizing effort to this point in my 
life. Thus, I see my dissertation as a part of my own inte­
gration and development; and as I reflect the institutional
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and socializing processes of our culture, so an integration 
of my experience can contribute to a synthesis in the larger 
culture. The healing and bridging of these fragmented parts 
of myself can contribute to an integration of these same 
incongruities in our society.
In offering this account of the genesis of my disser­
tation, I am aware of motives I would like to acknowledge 
but minimize in some euphemistic manner. Yet I think their 
presence is felt in the tone and style of some of my writ­
ing, The disorientation of a disintegrating intellectual 
foundation, the sense of powerlessness at not having an 
adequate response to the evaluation problems I faced, the 
embarrassment over my inability to back up my seemingly 
empty claim of an incompatibility between research assump­
tions and developmental assumptions were difficult to bear 
at times.
Let me balance my motives for vindication and retribu­
tion with a more intentional motive of reconciliation. The 
models and methods underlying my earlier work represented 
the best solution that fine minds could generate to prob­
lems and issues they considered very real. How can we 
ground our knowledge with some reasonable measure of 
certainty? How can we differentiate what is of value among 
the plethora of theories and claims made by educators. My 
effort has been to attempt to get below the answers I 
learned to these questions and to gain a clearer
16
understanding of the questions themselves. For, at that 
level, I share with my colleagues the concern for rational­
ity and the justification of our beliefs and action.
I also realize now that my understanding of the under­
lying philosophy of inquiry was superficial and fragmented. 
However, I feel that even this result was partly due to the 
technological mentality I criticize. Foundational and 
historical concerns were minimized in my professional train­
ing. The theoretical and technical ones were considered 
sufficient. Nevertheless, the difficulties I encountered 
then have defined my cause and my project and perhaps given 
rise to a tendency to oversimplify or overemphasize. If I 
do not completely avoid polemics, I hope you will take this 
failure as an indication of the strength of my convictions 
concerning the importance of the issues.
This recapitulation of my personal experience is in­
tended to provide a context for my dissertation. It gives 
an account of my perceptions of the need for an expanded 
conception of rationality. In my investigations of the 
theoretical underpinnings of educational research and evalu­
ation I have been impressed with the work of Jurgen 
Habermas. I wish to present Habermas’ theoretical formula­
tions as a framework for a more adequate theory of inquiry 
for education seen from a developmental perspective.
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Jurgen Habermas: A Biographical Sketch
Jurgen Habermas was born in 1929 and studied at the 
universities of Gbttingen, Zurich and Bonn. He has been 
professor of sociology and philosophy at the universities 
of Frankfurt am Main, Marburg and Heidelberg, and is 
presently director of the Max Planck Institute for Social 
Research in Starnberg, West Germany.
Habermas has been called the most influential thinker
£
in Germany today. He has developed an amazingly compre­
hensive social theory which integrates much in the philoso­
phies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Dilthey and Marx in the 
German philosophical tradition. He has incorporated 
Husserl, Weber, Schutz, Gadamer and others in the phenomeno­
logical and hermeneutical traditions. He has provided a 
critique of the positivism of Comte and Mach and examined 
the continuing influence of positivism in contemporary 
philosophy. The major American pragmatists, Peirce, Dewey 
and Mead have been critically interpreted and integrated 
into his work. The psychodynamics of Freud, the theories 
of cognitive and moral development of Piaget, Kohlberg 
and Loevinger, as well as the linguistics of Chomsky, and 
language philosophy of Austin and Searle, along with others 
such as Wittgenstein, Popper and Parsons all find a place 
in his systematic social theory, I certainly agree with 
Thomas McCarthy that "Habermas1 work represents a rarely 
equaled combination of range and depth, synthetic power,
18
and moral-political vision."^ His capacity for comprehen­
sive synthesis and integration and the depth of his analysis 
have prompted this comment by George Lichtheim in a review 
of Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests in the Times 
Literary Supplement, June 5, 1969:
The baffling thing about Habermas is that, at an 
age when most of his colleagues have painfully 
established control over one comer of the field, 
he has made himself master of the whole, in depth 
and breadth alike. There is no corner-cutting, no 
facile evasion of difficulties or spurious enunci­
ation of conclusions unsupported by research: 
whether he is refuting Popper, dissecting the 
pragmatism of Charles Peirce, delving into the 
medieval antecedents of Schelling's metaphysics, 
or bringing Marxist sociology up to date, there 
is always the same uncanny mastery of sources, 
joined to an enviable talent for clarifying intri­
cate logical puzzles. He seems to have been born 
with a faculty for digesting the toughest kind 
of material and then refashioning it into orderly 
wholes. Hegel, whom he resembles at least in his 
appetite for encyclopedic knowledge, possessed 
this capacity in the highest degree, but he was 
cursed with an abominable style and a perverse 
fondness for obscurity, whereas Habermas writes 
as clearly and precisely as any empiricist.8
As McCarthy warns, the last statement is an exaggera­
tion; Habermas' writings can be very difficult to read.
They assume the readers' knowledge of a fairly wide range 
of ideas and literature. His work is filled with unfamiliar 
approaches to problems and expressions that resist easy 
translation and explanation.
These difficulties not withstanding, I have found that 
once I gained some familiarity with the scope of Habermas' 
work and the individual theorists he integrates, his style 
and way of putting things took on a clarity and precision
19
that is difficult to paraphrase or simplify with any 
justice. The investment in time and energy to gain this 
familiarity has been very large but has provided rich 
dividends. Through Habermas, I have begun to formulate my 
own comprehensive social theory. This structure provides 
an extremely useful framework for understanding and inte­
grating the other theorists I confront.
The overall thrust of Habermas’ work can be seen as a 
systematic critique of contemporary theories of inquiry 
and their philosophical roots, and an articulation of 
an expanded conception of rationality that can serve as a 
foundation for social theory.
In this study, I draw on a fairly small proportion of 
Habermas’ work. Much of it has not been translated into 
English and many of his pursuits are beyond the scope of 
my own endeavors. I have attempted to draw together those 
basic ideas that seem to have the most relevance and promise 
for the formulation of a theory of inquiry for educational 
development.
Scope of the Dissertation
My task is, first, to articulate an expanded conception 
of rationality, providing theories for justifying our 
beliefs and actions which explicitly incorporate the per­
sonal and interpersonal dimensions of human experience and 
understanding. Then, using this conception as a foundation,
20
I lay out a theory of inquiry for educational development.
It may be helpful to see these two aspects of my task as 
proceeding at two levels, the level of ordinary experience, 
and the level of inquiry as a specialized extension of 
ordinary experience.
At the level of ordinary experience, I begin Chapter
II by considering traditional and modern conceptions of 
rationality in a brief historical overview of the way that 
reason has been seen to relate to and guide human action.
This review of reason and action serves as a context 
for better understanding Habermas T account of the three 
realms of human experience, the material, the interpersonal, 
and the personal. This account is presented in Chapter III 
as Habermas' theory of cognitive interests. In this 
Chapter, I show how three fundamental human interests, the 
technical, the practical, and the emancipatory, prefigure 
and guide our experience in the material, interpersonal 
and personal realms, respectively.
In ordinary experience, the three cognitive interests 
function together. The three realms of experience are 
completely integrated and constantly interact with each 
other.
Moving to the level of inquiry, I represent inquiry 
processes as historically evolved specialized extensions 
of life processes in ordinary experience in the three realms. 
As the technical, practical and emancipatory cognitive
21
interests are the basis for objective, intersubjective 
and personal experience, so are they the bases for three 
corresponding forms of inquiry that are extensions of these 
three realms of experience. The three forms of inquiry- are 
empirical-analytic, hermeneutic and critical, respectively.
I give a brief overview of each of these forms of inquiry 
that shows, first, their derivation from their respective 
experiential realms, and then indicates the logic of inquiry, 
the object domain, and the kind of knowledge gained from 
each.
Habermas looks to language for a foundation to a more 
adequate conception of rationality. He believes that an 
examination of language and communication provides an account 
of the inter-personal dimension of human experiences that 
allows us to move beyond the inadequate theories of experi­
ence based on individual consciousness. Furthermore, 
language provides a medium through which we represent and 
communicate about our experience in the three realms. An 
analysis of the structure of language reveals an important 
relationship between objective, intersubjective and subjec­
tive experience and the justification of our beliefs and 
actions. Chapter III continues with ar. examination of this 
relationship and an examination of the role of language in 
representing our experience in the three realms in Habermas1 
theory of communication,
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An expanded conception of rationality must provide an 
account of how we can rationally justify our beliefs and 
actions. In this regard Habermas' theory of cognitive 
interests and theory of communication serve as a foundation 
for his account of the justification of truth claims con­
cerning our beliefs, and the justification of rightness or 
moral claims concerning our actions. The justification of 
truth claims is considered in Chapter IV which presents 
Habermas1 consensus theory of truth. Then the justification 
of moral claims is considered in Chapter V which presents 
Habermas' theory of communicative ethics. As inquiry 
processes are derived from ordinary experience, so they feed 
back into ordinary life. Inquiry processes generate beliefs, 
self-understanding and implications for action that are sub­
ject to the same processes of justification that are devel­
oped in Chapter IV and V.
Inquiry processes are born out of and in turn transform 
human development. In Chapter VI, I explore this relation­
ship by tracing the genesis of experience in the three 
realms from a developmental perspective. By integrating 
the work of Piaget, Mead and Freud into Habermas' theory of 
cognitive Interests and theory of communication we derive 
a theory of human development that provides a foundation for 
both a developmental orientation to education and a theory 
of inquiry for educational development.9
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Finally, Chapter III consists of an examination of the 
relation between the theory of inquiry developed in this 
study and the current theory and practice of inquiry in 
education. Specifically, I focus on educational evaluation 
because of my greater familiarity with evaluation inquiry 
and because the difficulties X had in using standard 
approaches to evaluation led me to the focus of this disser­
tation .
I begin Chapter VII with a review of eight prevailing 
models of evaluation and consider their relation to empiri­
cal-analytic, hermeneutic, and critical inquiry. I go on 
to briefly discuss the contributions of each form of inquiry. 
Then, I conclude with an illustration of the application of 
the theory to the development and evaluation of the conflict 
workshop which I used to illustrate my difficulties with 
prevailing conceptions in Chapter I.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I
■1-See, for example, The Encylopedia of Philosophy, 1967 
ed. , s.v. "Knowledge and Belief," by’"Anthony Quinton.
2 In this text, I follow the usage of J.J. Shapiro in 
which "objectify" and "objectivate" refer to different 
concepts:
"To objectify (ver^egenstandlichen) means to make 
into an object of Instrumental action or of natural 
science separate from and external to the subject-- 
in other words, to constitute in the Kantian sense.
To objectivate (chiefly obj ektivieren) means to give 
form in a symbolic system] that is to make into a 
vehicle of communicative action. The latter may 
become external to the subject in the sense that 
others can participate in it, but it is at the same 
time that in which the subject exists." (J.J.
Shapiro, translator's note in Jurgen Habermas,
Knowledge and Human Interests [Boston: Beacon
Press, iy /1J: footnote 23 to Chapter 2, p. 323).
^See, for example, Eva L. Baker, "The Technology of 
Instructional Development," in Second Handbook of Research 
on Teaching, ed. Robert M.W. Travers (Chicago: Rand McNally
6c Company, 1973), pp. 245-285, especially, pp. 252-267.
4-See, for example, L.R, Gay, Educational Research: 
Competencies for Analysis and Application (Columbus, Ohio: 
1976) p[ ZT]
^William James, Pragmatism and Other Essays (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1963) pp. 7-14”
^Thomas McCarthy, Translator's Introduction to Legiti­
mation Crisis, by Jurgen Habermas (Boston: Beacon Press,
19737 pT viiT
^Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Haber­
mas (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978) inside
front of dust jacket.
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By providing educational development with a philo­
sophical foundation on the one hand, and a theory of inquiry 
on the other, I hope to give the Educational Development 
Program Area at The Ohio State University a theoretical 




One of the central features of Habermas' work is his 
attempt to articulate and defend an expanded conception of 
rationality. As part of this effort he examines the role 
of reason and the relation between reason and action in the 
philosophies of most of the great philosophers from ancient 
Greece to the present. To understand his position in detail, 
it would be necessary to follow his analysis of reason and 
action in its early formulation with the Greeks, through 
Roman and Medieval philosophy, the Renaissance, Enlighten­
ment and finally nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy. 
X find both the scope and depth of this analysis to be truly 
amazing. It is a richly rewarding journey through the his­
tory of philosophy. While it is beyond the scope of this 
work to review Habermas! analysis in detail, I would like to 
present some of the highlights in order tc, illustrate the 
meaning of theoretical, practical and technical knowledge 
for Habermas and to provide a context for the theory of 
knowledge and theory of value that comprise Habermas 1 
expanded conception of rationality.
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The Classical Relation Between Theoretical and Practical 
Reason and Human Action
For Aristotle, human action aims at the good and just 
life and is guided by both reason and desire. "What 
affirmation and negation are in the realm of thought, pur­
suit and avoidance are in the realm of desire."I For action 
to qualify as moral, these two faculties must come together 
in a particular relationship: "reason must affirm what
desire pursues."^ Only that desire which operates through 
reason is rational.
Reason, the human rational faculty, is central in 
Aristotle's philosophy. Its function as a whole is the 
attainment of truth. In the realm of moral action, for 
example, reason aims at "truth in harmony with correct 
desire.
The rational faculty has application in three major 
arenas of human activity which define Aristotle's three 
forms of knowledge; theoretical, practical and productive. 
The highest is theoretical knowledge, involving the use of 
reason in its purest form: the attainment of truth for its
own sake. Theoria, detached contemplation of the universal 
truths of nature to see things as they really are without 
desire to change them, apprehends realities whose fundamen­
tal principles "do not admit of being other than they are."^ 
Theoria yields episteme, apodictic knowledge of the unchang­
ing and eternal order and nature of the cosmos. The
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rigorous practice of theoria develops the capacity of sophia, 
theoretical knowledge or wisdom, the highest intellectual 
and philosophical excellence of the human mind.
While the human theoretical faculty is concerned with 
the universal and unchanging order and nature of the cosmos, 
the practical and productive faculties bring reason to bear 
on the changing realm of human kind and its activities, on 
that which does admit of being other than it is. In the 
practical sphere reason guides changing human activity as 
such; in the productive sphere, the realm of coming-to-be, 
reason guides the production of a given product or state of 
affairs.
The practical realm concerns humans as moral agents 
and refers to the sphere of praxis, or human action, the 
pursuit of the good and just life for its own sake. Praxis 
signifies the realm of human ethical and political life.
The search for principles of moral conduct on which one can 
base right action, and the cultivation of a virtuous charac­
ter develops the rational capacity of phronesis, practical 
or prudential knowledge or wisdom. Aristotle considered 
ethics, the doctrine of the good and just life to be in­
separable from the master science of politics. This is be­
cause the human person is a zoon politikon, a social and 
political being who realizes a truly human nature only in 
the polis or state. Moral action is impossible outside of 
human society, for it is only in relation to other persons
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that actions can be morally right or wrong. Ethics, politics 
and phronesis, the capacity for moral judgment, are directed 
toward achieving social praxis and maintaining order of 
virtuous conduct among the citizens of the polis.
The third form of knowledge, productive, is desired 
for the sake of making. The productive sphere concerns the 
person as producer, whose task is completed with the achieve­
ment of the desired result. The telos, or goal, for the 
employment of reason in this realm is the production of 
a desired product or outcome which, in turn, serves a higher 
human purpose. The rational capacity applied to production 
is techne. the art, craft or skill of the producer. The 
possession of techne enables one to produce a particular 
state of affairs. For example, it is the capacity of the 
shoemaker to produce a pair of shoes, the composer to create 
a symphony, or the physician to bring about a state of 
health. Poesis, the production of useful and beautiful 
artifacts or outcomes, has the quality of producing guided 
by true reason; lack of art, of producing guided by false 
reason.
It is important for our purpose to note that theoreti­
cal, practical and productive ultimately referred to dif­
ferent spheres of being. The telos of each was different: 
knowledge for its own sake, knowledge for right action, and 
knowledge for artful creation, respectively. In particular, 
as a guide to social praxis, neither theoretical nor
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productive knowledge had concrete relevance, Theoria was 
directed to the universal truths of the cosmos, to an order 
of realty that could not be other than it is, could be 
neither changed nor made. And techne, used only in the 
sphere of coming-to-be, provided no useful understanding of 
how to act in relation to one's peers, of what products or 
states of affairs to create, nor even of the ends to which 
an artistic creation might be put once completed.
While theoretical reason provided no precepts for 
action in either the practical or productive realms, it 
did have the potential for entering the conduct of a few 
individuals, and through them, the life of the polis. An 
individual who had the leisure and the capacity for the 
contemplative life, through strenuous mental effort in the 
practice of theoria, could be brought sympathetically into 
accord with the harmony and proportion of the cosmos, 
reproducing them internally. Through the soul's tuning 
itself to the order of the cosmos, sophia entered the con­
duct of the person. In turn, through the teachings and 
administerings of such individuals, sophia entered the 
praxis of the polis, bringing the ethos or character of the 
polis into harmony with its own order. Finally, the 
citizens of the polis, through participation in its ethos 
and socialization in the healthy social climate, incorpora­
ted this order into the conduct of their own lives.
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Nevertheless, theoretical knowlege, per se, did not pro­
vide a basis for right action. That function remains with 
phronesis, or practical knowledge, which was gained not through 
contemplation but pedagogically through a teacher and through 
practice and cultivation of a virtuous character in real social 
praxis. Theoria addressed none of the things that make people 
happy, nor was it to be done with a view to any action. But unlike 
theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge issues commands ; its 
function was to tell us what we ought to do and what we ought not to 
do. It was concerned with what is just, noble and good. Its telos 
was right action. Aristotle made it clear that it is better 
to have practical knowledge based on experience that results 
in right action, than knowledge of universal principles.^
Neither was right action a part of the realm of posesis, 
or artistic creation; right action could not be guided by 
technical knowledge. Techne, the logic of method, was 
cleverness of appropriate means to a given end. It could 
not guide the choice of ends. Such choice required virtue 
and moral insight. For, as Aristotle said, "If the goal is 
noble, cleverness deserves praise; if the goal is base,
g
cleverness is knavery." While cleverness was necessary for 
leading the good and just life, practical wisdom could not 
be reduced to cleverness. Neither could it be reduced to 
methodological competence, to skill or techne.
In summary, the classical conception called for three 
realms of being and three kinds of knowledge, theoretical,
practical and technical, each with its own telos, and none 
reducible to the others.
Transformation of the Classical Relation Between Theoretical, 
Practical and Productive Reason.
The classical constellation of theoretical, practical
and productive knowledge has changed radically with the rise
of positivism and modern science. Social, behavioral and
political sciences now search for universal laws of social
relations (in the theoretical realm) that can be used as a
basis for the development of a technology (the productive
realm) for social regulation and control (in the practical
realm). Praxis has been reduced to techne guided by
theoria.
The meaning of each realm has been transformed, as well. 
Theoretical knowledge, episteme, which once referred to the 
unchanging and perfect order of the cosmos, desired for its 
own sake, has become the quantitatively expressed, empiri­
cally grounded, analytically integrated theories found in 
the most advanced natural sciences. In the words of Carl 
Hemp el,
A scientific theory might therefore be likened 
to a complex spatial network: Its terms are repre­
sented by the knots, while the threads connecting 
the latter correspond, in part, to the definitions 
and, in part, to the fundamental and derivative 
hypotheses included in the theory. The whole sys­
tem floats, as it were, by rules of interpretation.
These might be viewed as strings which are not part 
of the network but link certain points of the latter 
with specific places in the plane of observation.
By virtue of those interpretive connections, the
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network can function as a scientific theory: from
certain observational data, we may ascend, via an 
interpretive string, to some point in the theoreti­
cal network, thence proceed, via defintions and 
hypotheses, to Other points, from which another 
interpretive string permits a descent to the 
plane of observation,7
The aim of this complex hypothetico-deductive network is 
to enable us to begin at the level of observation with a 
description of an initial state of nature, then to proceed 
to the level of theory in order to derive principles we 
can use at the level of observation to predict or produce 
a future (desirable) state.
The meaning of the productive and practical realms 
have changed too. Techne, artistic skill and craftsmanship, 
has become our modern theoretically ground technology-- 
applied science which bears little resemblance to the 
classical concept of craftsmanship. Finally, phronesis, 
practical knowledge regarding moral and ethical conduct has 
become absorbed into the technical realm by way of scientifi­
cally grounded social theory which aims at regulating social 
interaction for the welfare and order of the state.
Such regulation does ultimately influence the welfare 
of individuals, although this usually occurs ’’behind their 
backs,” that is, without the need for awareness of, or con­
scious cooperation with, the larger processes of social in­
teraction. This contrasts with Aristotle's view of theoria 
penetrating the social realm through the action and interac­
tion of enlightened individuals.
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In Theory and Practice,8 Habermas traces the evolution 
of this transition in the classical constellation of 
theoretical, practical and technical reason through an 
examination of the social philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 
Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas More and Thomas Hobbes. His 
concern is with showing that the loss of the ethical dimen­
sion in the practical realm renders the modern conceptions 
inadequate.
Beginning with St, Thomas, he shows how the function of 
social orientation once provided by phronesis, and through 
participation in the polis, has been assumed by the system 
of lex naturae, or natural law. The concept of natural law 
was grounded in the metaphysical premise of the Greeks that 
the universe is a rational whole governed by a universal 
principle of reason. Thus natural law could provide norms 
for action derived from the nature and telos of human kind. 
While St. Thomas remained within the Aristotelian tradition 
in recognizing that a state can only gain the right to be 
called a state by rendering its citizens capable of virtuous 
action, the guiding force for such action was no longer the 
citizens' capacity for moral conduct, but the administrations 
of the prince in accord with natural law. This shift repre­
sents a move away from Aristotle's critiria for a Polis.
For St, Thomas, the criterion of social order became the 
peace and welfare of the citizens rather than virtuous con­
duct and the freedom of the citizens.
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Yet, Aristotle had made a distinction between a mere 
association of citizens, a koinonia symmachia, and the polis, 
maintaining that a legal community founded merely for safe­
ty and the orderly exchange of commerce is not, in itself, 
a polis. The ethical dimension is missing. Therefore, in 
the social philosophy of St. Thomas, social order was no 
longer anchored in the practical knowledge and praxis of 
free citizens but was maintained in accord with natural law 
by the legitimate power of the prince or monarch.
However, when the teleological metaphysics of Aristotle 
and St. Thomas declined under the critique of the nom­
inalists, the ontological basis of natural law was criti­
cally weakened.^ From the Greek philosophical tradition 
to the thirteenth century, only universals were considered 
to be the objects of thought. William of Ockham refuted 
this conception, claiming that there was nothing general 
in the world, but only particulars. All knowledge was 
based on empirical evidence from experience of individual 
things and events. From such experience we cannot deduce 
any final causes or telos for human kind that could ground 
a natural theology. If appeal to the divine order of nature 
could not provide a basis for social regulation, then by 
what means was society to be ordered?
Habermas discusses the works of Machiavelli and More to 
show how their proposals continued to empty political theory 
of its moral force and contribute to the divorce of politics
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and ethics once united for Aristotle, Both philosophers 
dealt with the organization of society through technical, 
rather than practical means. Social institutions were re­
duced to their instrumental significance. Gone was the 
telos of right action for its own sake.
Machiavelli and More had thus broken through the class­
ical barrier between praxis and poesis by suggesting social 
organization through the use of techne, through "acting 
in the mode of producing."10 However, this endeavor could 
not be carried out until a theoretical foundation for tech­
nical knowledge could be produced. This, in turn, required 
a change in emphasis from the classical premium on contem­
plation to the value of action, from the vita contemplativa, 
to the vita activa. In classical philosophy both techne and 
and phronsis were considered lower cognitive faculties whose 
ultimate function was to create the conditions for theoria; 
they themselves could never be derived nor justified through 
theory. In this sense praxis was theory free. With the 
rise of science in the seventeenth century, however, this 
perspective began to change. Through scientific inquiry, 
theory, in the form of universal truths of nature, was pur­
sued in the manner of the technician: discovery for the
purposes of prediction and control. Classical theoretical 
knowledge, episteme, however, was desired for its own sake 
and was explicitly contrasted with the pragmatic knowledge 
of the artisan and technician. Under the new scientific
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perspective, theory took on the pragmatic function of arti­
ficially reproducing natural processes and thereby gained 
a new criterion for its truth: successful prediction of
experience in a given context,
It only remained for Thomas Hobbes to focus this new 
science on the universal laws of society in order to develop 
a scientific basis for St. Thomas' natural law. Rational 
natural law represented an attempt to find a theory...
by which one can produce, with scientific precision, 
political institutions which will regulate the 
affairs of men with the reliability with which a 
clock regulates the motions of time, or creation 
understood in terms of a clock, regulates the 
processes of nature. 1*1
Hobbes believed that he could show a causal connection be­
tween man’s asocial instinctual nature and a normative 
system of social control. Man’s instinctual fear of violent 
death impels him toward establishing conditions for survival 
in peace and order through a system of social contracts and 
the necessity of having this system of contracts enforced 
empowers the state with its sovereignty. Justice becomes 
obedience to the law and now is justified in the "nexus 
of causality. In this way, by using the mechanistic 
assumptions of the theory of science of his time, Hobbes 
was able to derive norms of practical reason (in the civil 
Natural Law) from the mechanics of natural desire:
And I found the reason was, that from a com­
munity of goods there must needs arise contention, 
whose enjoyment should be greatest. And from that 
contention all kinds of calamities must unavoidably
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ensue, which by the instinct of nature every man 
is taught to shun, .,.which principles being laid 
down, I seem from them to have demonstrated by a 
most evident connexion, in this little work of 
mine, the absolute necessity of leagues and con­
tracts , and thence the rudiments necessary of 
leagues and contracts, and thence the rudiments 
both of moral and civil p r u d e n c e . - ^
Here, in Hobbes' political theory, the moral and ethi­
cal concerns of the good life in the classical tradition 
were no longer present. The power of the sovereign was 
based on and directed to preserving life and making it as 
pleasant as possible.
Sovereign normative laws for the care and welfare of 
the citizens, by their mechanistic derivation from natural 
desire had the sanctioning force of universal laws of 
nature but their moral content was lost. In place of 
sophia infused praxis, Hobbes directs his readers to seek a 
less elevated goal:
I persuaded myself... that you will esteem it 
better to enjoy yourselves in the present state, 
though perhaps not the best, than by waging war 
endeavor to procure a reformation for bther men 
in another age, yourselves in the meanwhile 
either killed or consumed with age.^
Furthermore, Hobbes' inquiry into social relations par­
alleled the methods of scientific inquiry into the motion 
of bodies in nature:
For as in a watch, or some such small machine, 
the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot 
well be known, except it be taken insunder and viewed 
in parts; so to make a more curious search into the 
rights of states and duties of subjects, ...that we 
rightly understand what the quality of human nature 
is, in what matters it is, in what not, fit to make
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up civil government, and how men must be agreed 
among themselves thatintend to grow up into a 
well-grounded state, 1~)
Habermas points out that the relationship of theoria 
to praxis was now conceived in terms of the model of clas­
sical mechanics. The social relations of life became 
objectified as objects of nature which could be investigated 
scientifically in the search for causal laws that would per­
mit the derivation of norms for an orderly functioning 
society. The development of natural law became a "physics 
of sociation. n1^
However, the technical regulation of society under the 
guidance of natural laws fails to include the dimension of 
social praxis that was the basis of moral conduct in tra­
ditional philosophy. It cannot enter into the consciousness 
and convictions of acting human beings. Habermas maintains 
that
control over the processes of nature is 
essentially different from control over social 
processes.The  act of the technical domina­
tion of nature is in principle a solitary and 
silent act--free form any negotiated agreement 
among active subjects who wish to control their 
social relations practically.1'
Methodological certainty does not obviate the need for pub­
lic discussion: even if control of social proceses con­
verged with control of natural processes "a prior mediation 
through the consciousness of the citizens who discuss and 
act still is needed."1® In the practical sphere, the cost
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of a gain in methodological rigor is too high if access to 
praxis is lost in the process.
For Aristotle, action was guided, not by the universal 
laws of nature, but by accumulated traditional precepts and 
rules, which were in turn legitimated in their successful 
application to particular practical affairs. Traditional 
rules and social norms arise inductively as schemata gained 
from the previous experience of the community--dialectically 
creating and being created by concrete social interaction. 
These norms exist within the consciousness and conduct of 
the citizens, and thereby serve to orient the citizens into 
a community.
The legitimating function of conventional wisdom cannot 
be provided by technical knowledge itself, for technology 
does not release us from decision and judgment. We must 
still resolve conflict and seek fulfillment of our needs and 
interests through language mediated interaction. Technical 
knowledge itself is in part legitimated through social 
interaction regarding the needs and interests of the com­
munity and the relevance of existing techniques or the need 
for new ones,
The Need for an Expanded Conception of Rationality
In tracing the transition in the relationshp between 
the theoretical, practical and technical (productive) realms 
I have tried to illustrate the difference between practical
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and technical questions. There is a fundamental difference 
in the way reason guides action in the social and natural 
realms. In the social world, action is irreducably communi­
cative and is guided by reciprocally acknowledged norms 
embedded in the language and institutions of the culture. 
Practical questions involve the acceptance or rejection of 
norms for action based on valid reasons. In the natural 
world, action is instrumental and is guided by knowledge of 
empirical regularities in nature.
Technical questions involve the rational selection of 
instrumental alternatives and organization of means once 
the goals have been given. The discovery and efficient use 
of means appropriate to a given end seems the defining 
characteristic of rationality. Yet to treat persons instru- 
mentally in this way is to ignore the moral and ethical 
character of interpersonal social action and to violate the 
humanity of those involved. Nor, as I argue in Chapter IV, 
can language-mediated social interaction in the practical 
sphere be properly understood in the same way we understand 
objects in nature. That is, actions cannot be understood 
without recourse to the intersubjective meaning of the 
actions to the people themselves.
With Habermas, I maintain that practical questions, 
questions concerning the normative orientation and regula­
tion of human action, cannot be reduced to the instrumental 
logic of empirical-analytic inquiry and treated technically.
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Yet, as I have tried to show in the transition from classi­
cal thought, there has been an effort to bring about just 
such a reduction. Consider, for example, the following 
statement by Michael Scriven, a philosopher who has had 
considerable influence on the practitioners' understanding 
of the inquiry process in educational research and evalua­
tion:
The most powerful way to prove that value 
judgments have a place in science is to prove 
that ethics is a science. I believe it is, po­
tentially at least, though not for the usual 
reasons. Given the preceding arguments, it is 
clear that one can construct a type of ethics by 
addressing the applied social science problem of 
determining the optimal set of social rules and 
attitudes for a society facing given economic, 
psychological, and environmental constraints, 
where "optimal" is defined pre-morally, that is 
only with regard to the value-bases of the ele­
ments in the society. Since the system resulting 
will probably cover about the same domain of be­
havior as what is traditionally called ethics and 
will involve about as many of the traditional 
moral precepts as any two traditional ethical 
systems share, and since it will not involve any­
thing notably different, it is entitled to be 
called ethics. And since it can be scientifically 
justified, it is entitled to be viewed as the only 
defensible system of ethics, alternative justifi­
cations for ethics having been long since exposed 
as untenable.
Scriven's recommendation reduces ethics to an applied social 
science which seeks to generate optimal rules for maximiz­
ing premoral values of social elements (people and institu­
tions?) . He simply continues in a more sophisticated manner 
the attempt since St. Thomas, through Hobbes to the present, to 
guide human conduct by principles removed from human error,
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By removing the burden of justification from public dis­
course in the community of enlightened citizens to the 
scientific procedures of technical specialists, Scriven 
claims to give us the only defensible system of ethics; but 
I think he removes the moral dimension itself from ethics.
Prevailing conceptions of rationality in this century 
have been formulated within the natural and technical sphere 
and the empirical-analytic framework of inquiry. As Kurt 
Baier shows, rationality has been conceived as the exercise 
of the faculty or power of reasoning which involves,
a kind of non-sensory perception of logical 
relations, and the imaginative conjoining of them 
in chains of reasoning, arguments, inferences, or 
deductions. Reasons, the links in these chains, 
are thought of as known propositions entailing 
others for which they are reasons.20
Under this conception., rational action requires only consis­
tency of belief and the pursuance of appropriate (and 
avoidance of inappropriate) means to one's irrationally 
adopted ends. The ends are considered irrational because 
reason cannot guide the choice of ends; reason is the slave 
of the passions. With rationality limited to logical 
entailment, reasons for something (for example actions) 
are limited to facts that entail the thing or action. Yet 
no fact can logically entail an action; one cannot logically 
deduce action consequences from a given state of affairs. 
Rationality is thus limited to the rational choice of means 
and knowledge is limited to the sphere of technical
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knowledge of empirical regularities that we can use for pre­
dicting and controlling nature to bring about pre-given ends.
More generally, knowledge has been held to be justified 
true belief with both the theories of justification and the 
theories of truth falling within the technical and instru­
mental realm. Yet these theories of action, knowledge, 
justification and truth are not adequate for a conception 
of rationality for the practical realm. They lack the moral 
dimension.
While I believe that practical question cannot be 
reduced to technical questions, I see no reason to denigrate 
the contribution that empirical-analytic science can make 
to the quality of social life. I do not support a romantic 
rejection of science and technology as such. The problem 
is not technical reason per se but its universalization, the 
loss of the distinction between practical and technical 
questions. The problem is to articulate and defend a 
distinction between them and yet to show their relation to 
each other by locating both forms of reason in a comprehen­
sive theory of rationality. I will now turn to Habermas’ 
attempt to formulate such an expanded conception of 
rationality.
In Chapter III, I examine Habermas’ theory of cognitive 
interests and his theory of communication. These theories 
form a foundation for his theory of justification. The 
justification of problematic knowledge claims in the
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technical realm form Habermas’ theory of truth, while 
justification of problematic knowledge claims in the 
practical realm forms his theory of ethics. I examine the 
theory of truth in Chapter IV and the theory of ethics in 
Chapter V.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II
^Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald 




^Tbid. , p . 147
5Ibid., pp. 157-158.
6Ibid., pp. 169-170.
?Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in 
Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, vol. I~& II: Foundations of the Unity of Science,
vol. II, no. 7 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1952) p. 36.
3Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973).
^See, for example, The Encylopedia of Philosophy, s.v. 
"Epistemology, History of," by D.W, Hamlyn, pp^ I5-To, and 
"William of Ockham," by Ernest A. Moody.
^Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa (Stuttgart: 1961) p. 293
cited by Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 60.
H-Ibid., p. 61.
^Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 64.
■^Thomas Hobbes, De Cive in English Works, ed. Sir Wil­
liam Molesworth (London”: T538) Epistle Dedicatory, p. vi, 
cited by Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 66.
14Ibid., p. 70.
^Ibid. , pp. 70-71.





l^Michael Scriven, "The Exact Role of Value Judgments 
in Science," in Program Development in Education, (Van­
couver, B.C.: Centre-for Continuing Education, University 
of British Columbia, 1974) p. 50.
20Kurt Baier, "The Social Source of Reason," Proceedings 
and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 51 
(August 1978): 708.
CHAPTER III
HABERMAS' THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS
In Chapter II, the role of reason i .1 guiding human 
action was examined in relation to three kinds of reason 
and knowledge, theoretical, technical and practical. In 
classical thought, these three realms remained autonomous, 
but their relationships to each other were problematic.
In modem thought practical knowledge has been reduced to 
technical knowledge guided by theoretical knowledge, but 
the moral and ethical dimension of practical knowledge is 
lost. That critical interpersonal dimension must be re­
established in an adequate conception of rationality.
While modem conceptions neglect the interpersonal 
dimension, neither classical nor modem conceptions provide 
an adequate account of the personal dimension of human 
experience and understanding. In Knowledge and Human 
Interests,  ^Habermas has formulated a social theory of 
knowledge which articulates three realms of human experience. 
First, he collapses the theoretical and technical dimensions 
into one realm of objective experience. Second, he expli­
citly provides for an interpersonal dimension of intersub- 




This chapter presents an account of these three realms 
of experience. I briefly outline the three cognitive 
interests that constitute experience in each realm, derive 
three corresponding forms of inquiry, consider two kinds of 
human action, and examine the role of language in represent­
ing experience in the three realms.
The chapter begins with Habermas1 theory of cognitive 
interests, the technical, practical and emancipatory.
These "semi-transcendental11 cognitive interests prefigure 
and guide our experience in the objective, intersubjective, 
and subjective realms, respectively.
From this framework I develop a theory of inquiry in 
which inquiry processes are seen as historically evolved 
specialized extensions of life processes in the three realms 
of experience. Three forms of inquiry--empirical-analytic, 
hermeneutic, and critical--are derived from the three cog­
nitive interests and realms of experience. In this account, I 
describe the logic of inquiry, the object domain, and the 
kind of knowledge gained from each form of inquiry.
Based on the theory of cognitive interests, we can 
distinguish two kinds of human action. Chapter III con­
tinues with a brief consideration of instrumental and commun­
icative action.
Chapter III concludes with an examination of Habermas' 
theory of communication. Here, I consider the role of lang­
uage in representing our experience in the three realms.
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Furthermore, this analysis of language provides a basis for 
justification of our beliefs and actions in an expanded 
conception of rationality.
The Theory of Cognitive Interests
The penchant for comprehensive systems is common among 
German philosophers and Habermas is no exception. He dis­
tinguishes three fundamental human interests, or human needs, 
that define the conditions for human evolution. These 
interests also designate three frames of reference from 
which we apprehend reality, three classes of human action, 
three categories of knowledge, and three corresponding 
forms of inquiry. The three interests include the technical:, 
the practical and the emancipatory. Habermas calls them 
cognitive interests because they guide the development of 
perceptual and cognitive processes. They each characterize 
a particular frame of reference from which we apprehend 
reality and they guide the generation of three corresponding 
categories of knowledge; thus they are interests that deter­
mine what we know. In Habermas 1 terms, they are knowledge 
constitutive interests. Each cognitive interest unites a 
particular configuration of experience, action, knowledge, 
language use, human development, species evolution, social 
organization and specialized form of inquiry. While a com­
prehensive account of these configurations is beyond the 
scope of this study, I will outline them briefly.
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In Table 1, I provide a heuristic summary of the 
various dimensions of these three knowledge constitutive, 
or cognitive interests. I do not mean to draw hard and 
fast distinctions among these dimensions, but making the 
chart seemed to require that I give names for the dimensions 
and in some cases the words I chose seemed not to be com­
pletely satisfactory. I had similar difficulties in 
filling in some cells of the table. Nevertheless, the 
summary may be useful as a reference in helping you keep 
track of the large number of terms and ideas the theory 
attempts to integrate. Experiment with your own terms and 
try to get at the underlying ideas.
It will be advantageous to begin our description of 
the cognitive interests by considering three domains of 
experience. Intuitively, we can distinguish the experience 
of an objective external nature, an inter-subjective social 
reality and our own subjective internal reality. These 
modes of experience represent frames of reference, or points 
of view, from which reality is apprehended. While we can 
focus on our experience from any of these three points of 
view, experience is not completely reducible to any of the 
three. Experience in each domain is mediated or consti­
tuted in relation to a particular cognitive interest, but 
the three kinds of experience are interdependent.
TABLE 1
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The technical cognitive interest designates the need 
to function successfully in nature. We must secure control 
of natural processes if we are to survive and achieve our 
purposes. As a species, we have evolved physical forms and 
cognitive processes that facilitate our interaction with 
nature. With Marx, we can say that the formation of the 
five senses is the work of all of previous history. At the 
same time, it is easy to see that our experience of the 
world is a function of our perceptual and cognitive appara­
tus . Our grasp of reality is determined by cognitive 
processes which themselves evolved to further our control 
over nature.
Not only has the interest in control guided the devel­
opment of our means for knowing the world, it has also 
guided the production of knowledge itself. Through cumula­
tive learning processes we have acquired knowledge and skills 
that expand our power to control and act successfully in 
nature. This knowledge and skill has become organized into 
the social institutions of labor and work, and has evolved 
into the various trades, crafts, industries and technologies 
of our modern world. Habermas suggests that empirical- 
analytic sciences are an extension of these institutions; 
they disclose reality from the same point of view, namely, 
instrumental control over objectified processes. From this 
frame of reference, knowledge is conceived functionally; it
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is an instrument for furthering human adaptation and sur­
vival, and the attainment of human values. Empirical- 
analytic inquiry merely formalizes and lends methodical 
rigor to the cumulative learning processes that occur in 
everyday life. It generates theoretical, technical or 
empirical knowledge.
Practical Orientation
In the same way that cognitive interest in technical 
control concerns successful transactions between social 
beings and nature, so the practical cognitive interest con­
cerns successful transactions among social beings themselves. 
The practical cognitive interest designates the need for 
securing a shared social reality that can orient the action 
of individuals in a community. Habermas calls this kind 
of shared orientation an intersubjectivity of mutual under­
standing. Intersubjectivity refers to the communality 
between individuals who mutually acknowledge the validity of 
certain norms of conduct and who use and understand the 
meaning of certain symbols, as in language or traffic signs. 
As a species we have evolved physical and cognitive capaci­
ties in the form of ordinary language that facilitate inter­
action among individuals in a community. In turn, we recog­
nize the influence that language has in shaping our 
experience of reality.
Reciprocal understanding by means of a common language 
binds a group of individuals into a community. A given
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symbol in this language has an intersubjectively valid 
meaning which is binding for all subjects on penalty of not 
being understood. The experience of individuals in the 
community is mediated through these shared symbols and 
therefore the interest in the formation of an action- 
orienting intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is a 
knowledge constitutive interest. Experience is organized 
into the general categories of ordinary language. Yet 
ordinary language consists in more than its formal symbols 
and their syntax and semantics.
An individual "life history" might be thought of as the 
unit of life processes in the human species. It is an 
experienced unity composed of the accumulated relations 
between the individual and the things and people that enter 
into the individual's world. These accumulated relations, 
called "life relations", establish the significance of 
other people and things for an individual. Significance, in 
this context, is global in that it reflects a fusing of cog­
nitive meaning, action orientation, and affective attitude 
even though these dimensions of meaning can be distinguished 
in descriptive, prescriptive and evaluative or expressive 
terms. The significance that a person or thing acquires for 
individuals is related to their entire developmental history 
and is therefore inalienably individual.
However, meanings are never completely private. On the 
one hand, they have a certain intersubjective validity from
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common life experience and can be expressed symbolically by 
individuals who communicate with each other in the same 
language. Habermas quotes Dilthey:
Every individual expression of life represents 
something common. Each work, each sentence, each 
gesture or civility, each art work and each histori­
cal deed is understandable only because there is 
something common linking him who expresses himself 
in them and him who understands. The individual 
constantly experiences, thinks, and acts in a 
sphere of what is common, and only in it does he 
understand.2
It is only in this sphere of what is common that I can under­
stand another's expressions of life or that I can reflex- 
ively reconstruct and understand my own experience.
On the other hand, individual experience does contain 
an inalienably individual element and is therefore imper­
fectly represented in the general categories of language.
Yet ordinary language has a structure which allows this 
individual element to be communicated indirectly. To show 
how this is possible, Habermas draws on Diltheyrs three 
classes of life expressions: linguistic expressions,
actions, and experiential expressions. Linguistic expres­
sions take place through symbols of the language that can 
be completely abstracted from concrete life context. Under­
standing through these formal categories is "monologic."
That is, dialogue is impossible through formal symbols 
because the speaker's identity is lost in the universal 
forms of language abstracted from any time, place or
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speaker. There is no provision for speakers to retain their 
individuality, their separateness as individual speakers.
But life experience is also expressed in conduct or 
intentional actions that obey general norms. Actions are 
the second form of life expressions. As with linguistic 
expressions, however, individual conditions of life cannot 
be directly expressed through actions that obey general 
norms. The individual is misunderstood when identified 
strictly by his spoken word or by his manifest action.
It is the third class of expressions which show the 
relation between the individual's experience and its explicit 
expression in linguistic terms or intentional actions. This 
is the class of "experiential expressions," such as gestures 
or facial and body expressions like "blushing or turning 
pale, rigidification, nervous glances, relaxation and 
even laughing and cyring." Such expressions are signs of 
unstated intentions and provide a qualifying context for 
more direct and explicit expressions through general cate­
gories or general norms. Through experiential expressions 
individual life experience is communicated indirectly.
However, experience, expressions and understanding are 
never perfectly congruent. Therefore, understanding 
another's expressions always requires interpretation. It 
is just this role of interpretation in mutual understanding 
at the level of ordinary language that has evolved into
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socially-organized systems of interpretation that are the 
prescientific basis for hermeneutic inquiry to which we now 
turn.
For Habermas, cognitive processes are embedded in 
certain life processes, called self formative processes, 
by which the human species evolves and reproduces itself. 
These processes, work and social interaction, are guided, 
respectively, by fundamental interests in technical control 
and social orientation. These interests, therefore, are 
also responsible for the evolution and development of the 
corresponding cognitive processes by which experience is 
organized and knowledge is formed. In this sense, these 
interests in technical control and social orientation are 
knowledge constitutive interests and they aim at successful 
instrumental actions and social interactions respectively. 
Each defines a category of knowledge: information that
expands our power of technical control on the one hand, 
and general interpretations transmitted by traditions that 
make possible the orientation of action within common tra­
ditions .
Work and interaction are processes of cumulative learn­
ing and arriving at mutual understanding. They are self- 
formative processes and, in a sense, they are processes of 
inquiry as well, which have evolved into the specialized 
methodological form of the sciences. Just as the systems of 
socially organized labor are the cumulative learning process
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by which the species reproduces itself from the point of 
view of technical control, so also does the interest in 
a socially orienting intersubjectivity of mutual understand­
ing mediate a system of self-formative processes. These 
include the various sources of traditional practical wisdom: 
the ancient systems of administration of justice and social 
regulation, the systems of philosophy and religion, and the 
humanities such as literature, poetry and art. Hermeneutic 
inquiry lends methodological rigor to the interpretive 
processes inherent in these traditions. As an inquiry 
process it has been developed primarily in the social and 
cultural sciences such as history, sociology, philosophy 
and anthropology.
Not only has the practical cognitive interest governed 
the development of the means of social interaction, it has 
also guided the accumulation of the kind of knowledge that 
successfully orients individuals in a community. The 
common realm of language and social norms reflects the 
accumulated practical wisdom of the culture--the general­
ized, pooled and stored learnings from successful social 
interactions. This accumulated conventional wisdom com­
prises the category of practical knowledge. Through 
ordinary language we establish and regulate interpersonal 
relationships with respect to these mutually acknowledged 
norms and the practical knowledge they reflect. Habermas 
would say that ordinary language is the medium through which
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the practical interest finds expression. Ordinary language 
reflects our norms and practical wisdom, and is the medium 
of social exchange. It is the medium through which we 
orient ourselves with respect to each other.
Ordinary language also enables a social being to appre­
hend the uniqueness of its own experience and still express 
that experience in universal terms that can be understood 
by another. Yet, this expression will always imperfectly 
represent a person's unique experience. There will always 
be the necessity of interpreting verbal expressions both in 
relation to correlative conduct and nonverbal expressions, 
and in the context of a mutually shared social reality. We 
can understand another's life expressions only to the extent 
that we participate in the same intersubjectivity. 
Hermeneutic inquiry is a specialized form of inquiry that 
interprets an inadequately understood life expression. The 
object of inquiry can be any kind of human activity. The 
investigator expands our horizon of understanding, thereby 
bringing the subject and ourselves into the same cultural 
reality or intersubjectivity. Hermeneutic inquiry formal­
izes and gives methodical rigor to the kind of interpretive 
understanding that always takes place in ordinary language 
and social interaction.
Individuated Autonomy
The cognitive processes by which we apprehend reality 
are shaped not only by the cognitive interests in technical
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control and social orientation, they are also the product of 
an emancipatory interest in autonomy, as well. Cognitive 
processes in the form of self-reflection evolved to 
establish and continuously maintain an autonomous ego. The 
emancipatory cognitive interest defines the self-formative 
process of individuation in which individuals must reconcile 
their own interests with those of the community. Individu­
als must construct their identity in the conflict between 
individual and common interests, between their own conscious 
experience and the intersubjectivity of the community.
Common interests are mediated in a normative structure 
which is created and maintained by community members. 
However, there is generally an imbalance in the influence 
that individual members have in the establishment and 
maintenance of social norms. This imbalance is reflected 
in the system of power relations in the community and the 
authority structure that enforces norms. The process of 
individuation toward autonomy and responsibility takes 
place in this system of power relations. Autonomy and 
responsibility mean that the individual is able to freely 
participate in and influence the norms of the group and is 
not unnecessarily restricted by these norms in the expres­
sion of individual interests.
But the institution of power relations in a community 
always restricts communication among its members. Since 
norms are created and maintained in communicative
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interaction, some individuals will be prevented free expres­
sion of their interests in the formation of group norms.
To the extent that communication is not free of systematic 
constraints imposed by power relations, the normative struc­
ture will contain an element of repression and will not 
represent the true needs and interests of community members.
Systematic constraints bring about a distortion in 
communication that prevents formation of what Habermas calls 
a rational will of the group. Yet, to escape negative 
social sanctions, individuals will generally attempt to 
maintain the appearance of an open intersubjectivity. This 
leads individuals to internalize the limits of communication 
and repress their own interests. Repression means that 
motives become cut off from public symbols and norms of 
language and action, and their expression is limited to un­
intentional and nonverbal forms. For example, there are 
times when we conceal our true motives even from ourselves 
by constructing alternative explanations that serve in lieu 
of the real ones. This process of rationalization occurs on 
a social level in the form of ideology. In neither case can 
we act with autonomy and responsibility. Instead we are 
subject to the false consciousness of social patterns that 
appear to have the necessity of natural law or the consent 
of society but in reality are forms of social dependence 
and domination.
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The emancipatory cognitive interest is embedded in and 
arises out of this social medium of power relations. Cog­
nitive processes serve us in both the natural and the 
social world; but in self-reflection reason also turns back 
on itself to free us from what we have become as a 
result of individual and social self-formative processes 
through insight into these processes. Reason, in the form 
of insight, has emancipatory power; through critical reflec­
tion a subject can free itself from false consciousness, 
whether the veil of rationalization or ideologically frozen 
social traditions.
Critical reflection is directed to the self-formative 
process itself so that the subject becomes aware of its 
own development. By analytically reconstructing its own 
genesis the subject gains insight into unconscious inter­
action patterns and repressed motives. As long as these 
patterns and motives remain cut off from awareness they 
retain their power over the subject. Santayana might have 
said those who do not know their own history are doomed to 
repeat it. Insight is the experience of release from false 
consciousness as the subject moves toward autonomy and re­
sponsibility.
Habermas gives psychoanalysis as the only formal 
example of critical reflection in an inquiry process. 
Critical social theory would be another example although it 
is not systematically developed as a method.
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A Theory of Inquiry
In this section I want to describe briefly the three 
forms of inquiry that can be distinguished from Habermas 1 
theory of knowledge. In particular I want to give some 
idea of the logic of inquiry within each form.
Empirical-Analytic Inquiry
The logic of inquiry for the empirical-analytic 
sciences mirrors the cumulative learning process that takes 
place at a prescientific level in the behavioral system of 
instrumental action. This logic illucidates the processes 
for generating valid beliefs in the form of true statements 
about reality. These processes are not concerned with 
analytically deducing true statements from other statements 
but with the logic of methods for obtaining synthetically 
valid statements under the continuous constraints of addi­
tional experience. The function of inquiry is the "fixation 
of belief."
Following Peirce, a belief is a behavioral rule, 
expressing a habit, which remains unproblematic so long as 
the actions it governs'have their anticipated consequences. 
When habitual actions fail, the validity of their guiding 
beliefs is brought into question and this doubt motivates 
the search for new beliefs.
Valid beliefs are universal propositions permitting 
conditional predictions about singular events that will
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occur under specified conditions. These beliefs have the 
form of the major premise of a syllogism whose minor premise 
describes initial conditions and whose conclusion is the 
predicted result. A particular result is "explained” with 
reference to a general law. This is the logic of instru­
mental action in which symbolic processes of inference are 
connected to objectified experience--to external conditions 
of existence, empirical constructs and variables, or ordi­
nary things and events.
These beliefs are tested against the resistance of 
reality. That is, the validity of beliefs is determined 
with reference to the cognitive interest in technical con­
trol. In this framework, understanding assumes the form of 
the prediction and control of objectified phenomena. The 
process is cumulative, yielding empirically based concepts 
in the form of crystallized beliefs, and empirical knowledge 
in the form of sedimented successful habits.
Scientific inquiry formalizes the syllogistic logic of 
instrumental action. It proceeds in the context of dis­
covery by forming explanatory hypotheses (abduction) which, 
in the context of verification, can be tested through 
induction and deduction. Scientific inquiry differs from 
the logic of instrumental action by isolating the inquiry 
process from the context of ordinary life to hypothetically 
test its claims and to provide systematic control over 
experimental variables. Precision and intersubjective
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reliability are provided through formal experiment and 
measurement procedures. Finally, it systematizes the pro­
gression of knowledge by integrating universal propositions 
into theoretical structures of hypothetico-deductive sys­
tems .
The object domain of empirical-analytic inquiry is 
objectified experience--the objects we encounter as moving 
bodies, things, events, behavior, processes and conditions 
capable of being manipulated.
Hermeneutic Inquiry
While empirical inquiry focuses on an external nature 
and man as nature, hermeneutic inquiry focuses on social 
nature and man's symbcl-making activity. The objects of 
hermeneutic inquiry are cultural meaning structures them­
selves and human life expressions couched in these struc­
tures. Hermeneutic inquiry aims at a systematic enrichment 
and expansion of the horizon of our understanding of both 
our own as well as others' expressions of life. It is the 
science of interpretation. The paradigm problematic situa­
tion is a life expression that cannot be adequately under­
stood, such as an ancient text, an eskimo culture or an 
elementary school. The investigator attempts to recon­
struct these life expressions so that the experiences they 
express are generated within the investigator. The idea is 
to grasp the meaning structure of the life expression so
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that the expression can be understood from its own inter- 
subjective frame of reference. The goal is to let one's 
own experience be mediated by the same horizon of under­
standing as the subject. It is not possible to jump one's 
horizon to do this, but instead a mutual intersubjectivity 
is created between the investigator, the subject, and the 
investigator's audience. In this way the investigator 
expands the field of common understanding that binds us into 
a community and that orients our actions in relation to 
each other.
The logic of hermeneutic inquiry tends to follow a 
pattern model of explanation rather than the hierarchical- 
deductive model more frequently found in empirical inquiry. 
The pattern model consists of a "circle of interpretation" 
in which the investigator cycles between a pre-understood 
general interpretation on the one hand, and the initial 
experience of concrete elements of the life expression on 
the other. Each end of the continuum conditions and cor­
rects the other until a coherent, unified pattern emerges. 
The recognition of such a pattern constitutes understanding. 
An individual event is explained by its place in the general 
scheme or its relations to the whole. Coherence and under­
standing emerge from the reciprocal illumination of the 
parts and the whole. As a metaphor consider a constellation 
of jewels in which each gem shines with the light reflected
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from all the others. Or consider the image that suddenly 
"clicks" into place in classical Gestalt figure-ground 
pictures.
While hermeneutic inquiry uses traditional categories 
of meaning and seeks organizing general principles to order 
the phenomena it studies, the emphasis is on understanding 
the individual case in its complexity and richness. We do 
not understand something when we have merely got hold of 
a general principle that has been shown to apply, or a 
general category that it exemplifies. Such abstractions 
are, by logic and function, uncommitted to particular 
characteristics and qualities. Hermeneutic inquiry aims at 
filling out these generalizations with concrete detail and 
context that enriches understanding.
Hermeneutic interpretations are validated by their 
coherence and usefulness. What keeps the circle of inter­
pretation from being a vicious one is its breadth, its 
fruitfulness in illuminating the terrain. An explanation 
falls into place and is accompanied by the "aha" of insight 
that has a self-validating quality. But a valid interpreta­
tion can stand the test of further experience, both one's 
own and that of others. It has the capacity to account pro­
gressively for new elements and must be adjusted on the 
basis of inconsistencies.
Since hermeneutic inquiry considers a life expression 
within a traditional context of meaning, this form of
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inquiry requires that the investigator be well grounded in 
the relevant traditions. These traditions provide direc­
tion and a frame of reference for the inquiry. Otherwise 
the observations would be rudderless. Useful interpreta­
tions require "personal virtuosity" and expert judgment.
Critical Inquiry
The logic of critical inquiry can be illustrated with 
the logic of psychoanalytic interpretations. The structure 
of ordinary language governs the interconnections among 
linguistic expressions, patterns of action and nonverbal 
expressions, so that they normally cohere and reinforce 
each other to express the intentions of the speaker. Under 
ideal conditions of open communication, our underlying 
motives would be expressible in the public symbols of 
language so that motives, actions, and linguistic expres­
sions would coincide. But in all cultures social norms 
restrict the expression of some motives, When needs are 
repressed, they remain severed from public linguistic 
symbols and can find expression only through private incom­
prehensible symbols. They cannot be understood because they 
do not follow the culturally learned patterns of expression 
and socially acknowledged norms of language and action. We 
take care to maintain the intersubjectivity of mutual under­
standing to escape negative social sanction. When we 
internalize these social constraints some need dispositions
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remain inaccessible to ourselves. We cannot act from tin- 
conscious motives in functional ways. Successful transac­
tions in the natural and social worlds are inhibited by 
rationalizations and unconscious and nonfunctional patterns 
of action.
The starting point for critical inquiry is the experi­
ence of resistance against free expression of our interests 
and intentions. Critical inquiry aims at dissolving this 
resistance by reversing the process in which motives are 
cut off from linguistic symbols. Through critical self­
reflection we reconstruct our problematic interactions to 
uncover the repressed motives- and conflicts, With this 
insight into ourselves we gain the freedom to resolve on a 
conscious level the conflicts between public and private 
interests and to pursue our interests in functional and 
rational ways.
The price of community will always be a measure of 
repression. Collective self-preservation, for example, 
involves some degree of repression of individual needs and 
interests. Yet the suffering that we experience under the 
suppression of our interests is the occasion for reflection 
on the sources of our discomfort, and provides the impetus 
for emancipation from suppression. The forces of socializa­
tion, reflecting the practical cognitive interest, are 
countered by the forces of individuation, reflecting the 
emacipatory cognitive interest.
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A Theory of Action
Based on his theory of cognitive interests, Habermas 
makes an analytical distinction between two kinds of human 
action that correspond with the distinction between the 
technical and the practical realms. Instrumental action is 
goverened by technical rules based on empirical knowledge; 
it organizes means that are appropriate or inappropriate 
according to criteria of effective control of experience. 
Communicative action, on the other hand, is governed by 
consensual norms which define reciprocal expectations about 
behavior and which must be mutually understood and recog­
nized. The validity of these norms is grounded in the 
intersubjectivity of reciprocal intentions and the mutual 
recognition of obligations by speaking subjects. The 
meaning of these norms is manifest in ordinary language 
communication.
This is not to say that instrumental action is not 
social, that it is not grounded in intersubjectivity or not 
governed by social norms. It is rather that in acting 
instrumentally, we emphasize the means-end orientation of 
the action and the technical knowledge on which it is based. 
We stress economy and efficiency with which means are 
employed to realize specified ends, With regard to communi­
cative action we emphasize the consensual norms and 
reciprocal expectations in which the intersubjectivity of
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action is grounded. For example, when we act instrumentally 
in relation to others, we treat them as objectives and their 
behavior as effectively controllable— as objectifiable in 
terms of observable regularities. The potential for recipro­
cal communicative relations recedes into the background. 
Action is guided by the standards of efficient realization 
of ends that are not communicatively validated. Communica­
tive action, on the other hand, is guided by the inter­
subjectivity of mutually shared intentions. Habermas 
regards moral action as essentially communicative, as a 
relation between subjects who mutually create their social 
realm. Therefore, social action is also moral action. 
Habermas is trying to avoid, as did Aristotle, the reduc­
tion of praxis to techne.
A Theory of Communication
Until fairly recently in philosophical history, theories 
of human experience have been based on the private conscious­
ness of individual subjects. By construing experience as 
a relation between a perceiving subject and an objective 
reality, these accounts have given inadequate attention to 
the interpersonal dimension of human experience. Because 
theories of experience derived from individual consciousness 
do not appreciate the intersubjective nature of knowledge, 
they mistakenly attempt to justify beliefs on the basis of 
their correspondence with an external and independent
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reality as revealed by sense certainty. Since we cannot 
ground ethical principles for guiding human conduct in this 
way, such principles are considered incapable of rational 
justification.
I believe we cannot adequately justify our beliefs 
and actions by means of theories that do not account for 
intersubjective experience. For an adequate conception of 
rationality, we must look to language, for language is the 
medium of interaction among the three realms of experience. 
that is, between the individual and the social and natural 
world. An analysis of the relation between language and 
experience provides us with a basis for rationally 
justifying our beliefs and actions that does justice to the 
social dimension of human knowledge and experience. Chapter 
III concludes with an examination of this relation in 
Habermas' theory of communication.
The Representation of Experience
Ordinary language has a structure which allows us to 
form expressions that focus on any one of the three experi­
ential domains we identified in section one. These include 
an objective external nature, a normative social reality and 
our own subjective internal reality. When we want to focus 
on external nature, we emphasize the propositional content 
of expressions. For example, we make statements about 
objects of states of affairs in the world. This defines
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the cognitive or descriptive use of language. Besides the 
propositional component of language expressions, there is 
also an illocutionary or performative component by means of 
which we accomplish things interactively in relation to 
other persons. We establish and regulate interpersonal 
relationships through the performative component, as when 
we make promises, give orders or make assertions. When we 
want to focus on this normative social reality we emphasize 
the performative component of expressions. This defines 
the interactive, or prescriptive use of language. When we 
want to focus on our own subjective experience we emphasize 
neither the propositional content nor interpersonal rela­
tionships, but instead we emphasize our own experience and 
intentions. This defines the expressive use of language.
These three modes of communication are always at least 
tacitly involved in any expression. Their importance is 
not so much in serving as a classification scheme for 
expressions. Rather, they delineate three classes of speech 
acts in terms of which a speaker can unambiguously focus on 
a particular experiential domain. That is, the speaker can 
state a propositional content, stress an interpersonal 
relationship or express an intention.
Validity Claims
Each class of expressions presupposes a specific kind 
of validity claim, A proposition expresses a truth claim.
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A performative expression implies a normative claim, that 
is, the rightness or legitimacy of the interpersonal rela­
tionship established with respect to mutually acknowledged 
norms. Finally, self-representative expressions make a 
claim to the authenticity or veracity of the speaker. These 
validity claims are simultaneously presupposed in ordinary 
language interaction. Otherwise there would be no basis for 
attempting communication. Nevertheless, a given validity 
claim may become problematic, and require justification.
Justification and Discourse
Habermas attempts to derive a theory of justification 
from an analysis of the structure of ordinary language. A 
theory of justification must be based on the nature and func­
tion of the claims needing justification, and there is a 
fundamental difference in the nature of what is implicitly 
or explicitly claimed in expressions focused on each of the 
three experiential domains. Expressions representing our 
experience of the external world imply a truth claim. Those 
that create interpersonal relationships imply a claim 
to appropriateness--a normative claim. And those 
expressing our subjective intentions imply a claim to 
authenticity. If, in the normal flow of communication, one 
of these claims becomes seriously questioned, communication 
cannot continue as before. If communication is to continue 
at all, and not break off altogether, it must proceed with 
a different quality of interaction in which we treat the
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problematic validity claim hypothetically and attempt to 
redeem or refute it.
In other words, in communication that takes place in 
the ordinary context of interaction, these three validity 
claims, implicit in every speech act, are more or less taken 
for granted. Minor disturbances in communication that occur 
because one or more of the validity claims is brought into 
question can be resolved in the normal context of interac­
tion. But situations arise in which disturbances are so 
fundamental that the de facto validity of these implicit 
claims is no longer sufficient to warrant continuing as 
before and communication is withdrawn from the normal con­
text of interaction. Communication moves to a different 
level in which we suspend judgment concerning the validity 
claims in an effort to vindicate them through argument.
This kind of language interaction, in which problematic 
validity claims are justified, Habermas refers to as dis­
course . We will have more to say about discourse in Chapter 
IV when we examine the discursive redemption of truth 
claims, and in Chapter V concerning the redemption of 
normative claims. However, we must first look further into 
Habermas' theory of communication, for it is through an 
analysis of the conditions and structure of discourse that 
the theory of justification emerges. The conditions and 
structure of discourse are related to certain universal 
features of language which enable us to represent our
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experience in the three realms of experience. These uni­
versal features of language are explored in Habermas1 
theory of universal pragmatics, to which we now turn.
Universal Pragmatics
Semiotics, or the theory of signs, includes three 
divisions: semantics, syntactics and pragmatics. Semantics
is the theory of the relations between signs and their 
referents, that is, what signs denote or designate. Syn­
tactics refers to the formal relations among signs, that is, 
their logical syntax or the formal rules that govern the 
kinds and order of symbols that make up expressions in a 
language. Pragmatics is the theory of the relations between 
signs and the people who use them, in other words, what 
people who produce, receive and understand signs, do with 
them.
One of the projects of the study of languages has been 
the search for universal patterns of semantics and syntax 
that underly all languages in a search for linguistic 
universals. Noam Chomsky, for example has introduced a 
distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic 
performance. The distinction is analogous to the difference 
between a student’s knowledge of a subject, such as logic, 
and how well the student demonstrates that knowledge on an 
exam: performance reflects competence, but also irrelevant
conditions such as motivation or distractions. It is
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different in that linguistic competence refers to the 
theoretical knowledge an ideal speaker and listener must 
have about language that enables them to engage in their 
real language performance under empirically limited condi­
tions of actual speech. Through an analysis of language 
performance, linguistic theory seeks to abstract and recon­
struct a theory of linguistic universals, that is, formal 
syntactic and semantic features of language that are 
empirically derived yet independent of particular empirical 
conditions. In other words linguistic universals are analy­
tically inferred from the empirically given structure of 
language itself, and in turn can account for empirically 
given linguistic performance.
But the logical analysis of language has been generally 
limited to the syntactical and semantic features of language 
to the exclusion of pragmatic features which are relegated to 
empirical inquiry in the form of psycholinguistics or com­
parative linguistics. Habermas contends that language, as a 
form of human action, also contains universal pragmatic 
features. These pragmatic universals can be theoretically 
reconstructed from an analysis of ordinary language speech 
acts to yield a theory of communicative competence analogous 
to the way linguistic universals are reconstructed from an 
analysis of language performance in sentences to yield a 
theory of linguistic competence.
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^Universal pragmatics!] thematizes the elementary 
units of speech (utterances) in the same attitude 
as linguistics does the elementary units of lang­
uage (sentences). The aim of reconstructive 
linguistic analysis is the explicit decription of 
the rules that a competent speaker must master in 
order to form grammatical sentences and to utter 
them in an acceptable way....The assumption is 
that communicative competence has just as univer­
sal a core as linguistic competence. A general 
theory of speech acts would thus describe exactly 
that system of rules that adult speakers master 
insofar as they can satisfy the conditions for a 
happy employment of sentences in utterances— no 
matter to which particular language the sentences 
belong and which accidential contexts the utter­
ances are embedded.4
Analytic Reconstruction. Habermas attempts to recon­
struct analytically the universal features of language that 
provide it with the capacity to fill certain pragmatic 
functions. To analytically reconstruct is to make systema­
tically explicit the implicit knowledge of language we must 
have to do what we do with it. We are all able to accomplish 
things with language without necessarily being aware of the 
underlying or "deep structure" of language, or the rules, 
criteria and schemata on which our performance is based. 
Rational reconstruction seeks to disclose this underlying 
structure. It is not directed to the particular ways par­
ticular cultures use language under empirical conditions, 
but to universal competencies underlying all languages.
The reconstruction of linguistic competence is not 
itself sufficient for understanding language communication. 
Communication involves more than the mastery of an abstract 
system of linguistic rules of syntax and semantics for
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generating sentences. It includes producing the situation 
of potential communication as a necessary competence. This 
includes a performative^ or illocutionary element--a 
pragmatic element that links utterances to the speech situ­
ation as a whole. John Searle makes a similar point: 
"speaking a language is a matter of performative speech acts 
according to systems of constitutive rules."6 This extra- 
linguistic aspect of communication necessitates extending 
the elementary unit of language analysis beyond the sentence 
to include the entire speech act. Utterances are always 
more than just sentences. An utterance lies embedded in a 
system of norms and constitutive rules that give language 
its illocutionary force and the capacity to fulfill its 
pragmatic function of establishing interpersonal relation­
ships. This is illustrated in an example given by Searle:
Human communication has some extraordinary 
properties, not shared by most other kinds of 
human behavior. One of the most extraordinary 
is this: If I am trying to tell someone something,
then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) 
as soon as he recognizes what it is I am trying 
to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it 
to him. Furthermore, unless he recognizes that 
I am trying to tell him something and what I am 
trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in 
telling it to him. In the case of illocutionary 
acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to 
do by getting our audience to recognize what we 
are trying to do. But the 1 effect on the hearer 
is not a belief or response, it consists simply 
in the hearer understanding the utterance of the 
speaker. It is this effect that I have been 
calling the illocutionary effect. The way the 
reflexive intention works then. . . is : the speaker
S intends to produce an illocutionary effect IE
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in the hearer H by means of getting H to recog­
nize S 1s intention to produce IE.7
Categorial Schemes. These pragmatic language conven­
tions remain empirically contingent in particular cultures. 
But underlying every possible speech situation is a struc­
ture that makes the performative capacity of language pos­
sible. This structure consists in certain universal 
features of language that allow the speaker to form expres­
sions that focus on each of the three experiential domains, 
and to simultaneously situate an uttered sentence in relation 
to each realm. This structure consists of a system of 
reference and predication in which experience is constituted 
in each realm: for possible denotions of objects in exter­
nal nature, for potential speakers and their actions in the 
intersubjective realm, and for the representation of inten­
tions and subjective experience.
Thus, all languages provide a structure through which 
it is possible to reliably identify something in nature--a 
categorial scheme for all possible objects--through which 
experience is objectified. This structure is provided by 
such universal pragmatic features of language as deictic 
(pointing) expressions of space and time, articles and 
demonstrative pronouns.
Similarly, universal pragmatics, such as the personal 
pronouns and performative verbs, form a structure through 
which speaking and acting subjects can establish
82
interpersonal relationships. The personal pronouns make 
possible identity of meaning through reciprocal recognition 
of the meaning of a given symbol. Through simultaneously 
grasping the meaning of a symbol from our own position or 
ego (I), and from the position of another, or alter ego, 
(you) we form a linguistic intersubjectivity through 
which a shared experience is constituted.
Finally, a structure for transparently representing 
our own inner world and subjective intentions is provided 
by such universal pragmatics as intentional verbs and modal 
verbs used in the expression of intentions. (Examples of 
intentional verb: to think, believe, hope, fear, love,
hate, want and desire. Examples modal verb: can, shall,
will, must, might, could, would, may, dare.)
Pragmatic Functions of Language. These universal prag­
matic features provide language with a structure which gives 
it the capacity to fill three pragmatic functions: repre­
sentative, interactive and expressive. The representative 
function is provided by the cognitive or descriptive use of 
language in which we represent our experience of an external 
reality through statements or propositions about objects or 
states of affairs in the world. The interactive function 
is provided by the prescriptive or performative use of 
language in which we establish and regulate interpersonal 
relationships within an intersubjective social reality.
The expressive function is provided by the expressive use
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of language in which we represent our own subjective inten­
tions or inner reality.
While all three functions are implicitly involved in 
any language expression, a particular function can be 
emphasized through the use of particular classes of speech 
acts.
1. The Representative Function and C'on'stative Speech 
Acts. Constative speech acts (from the Latin Constat: "it
is settled, established, undisputed, certain, well known, 
etc."^), such as asserting, reporting, explaining, pre­
dicting, or conversely, denying, contesting, doubting and 
questioning, make explicit the representative function of 
language. The propositional content of expressions is 
topical in constative speech acts and the truth of the 
proposition is implicitly claimed. Thus, constative speech 
acts mark out the distinction between being and illusion 
that is implicit in all speech acts.
All speech acts imply an intended consensus 
on that which really is, as distinct from that 
which subjectively only appears to be. This pre­
supposes a differentiation between a public world 
of intersubjectively acknowledged interpretations 
and a private world of personal feelings and 
impressions.°
Experience of an external reality takes on its objectivity 
by being constituted within the social intersubjectivity 
through the categorial scheme for objects of instrumental 
action. Such experience is constituted in relation to the 
cognitive interest in technical control. As I shall show
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in Chapter VI, the categorial scheme for objectified experi­
ence is itself acquired developmentally through the instru­
mental manipulation of things and events in nature. This 
reference system is institutionalized into the linguistic 
intersubjectivity of a particular culture and provides the 
basis for the representative function of language.
2. The Interactive Function and Regulative Speech Acts. 
The interactive function of language is made explicit in 
regulative speech acts such as commands, requests, pleas, 
warnings, recommendations, advice, orders, demands, refusals, 
violations and submissions. The normative element of 
expressions is topical in regulative speech acts and their 
legitimacy is implicitly claimed. Through regulative 
speech acts we mark the distinction between what is and 
what ought to be that is implicit in every speech act.
All speech exists in a context of actions 
and intentions. The mutual recognition of the 
subjects who communicate with one another 
includes the certainty that they can conduct 
themselves reciprocally towards one another's 
expectations, i.e. act according to valid norms.
This presupposes the differentiation between 
valid rules, which are intentionally followed, 
and regularities of observable events, which can 
be stated empirically.-*-^
This distinction allows us to differentiate between valid
social norms and those that are merely empirically extant
in a given institution. The interactive function of lan- ■
guage, grounded ultimately in the cognitive interest in
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3. The Expressive Function and Representative Speech 
Acts. The expressive function of language is made explicit 
in representative speech acts such as to reveal, expose, 
admit, conceal, pretend, express, present and allude. Our 
intentions are topical in representative speech acts and 
their authenticity is implicity claimed. Through repre­
sentative speech acts we mark the distinction between 
essence (the individuated self) and appearance (the empiri­
cal utterances and actions through which the self appears), 
that is implicit in all speech acts.
In all speech acts the subjects in their 
speech-act performances unavoidably express their 
own selves at the same time as they converse with 
one another on some propositional topic. This 
presupposes a differentiation between a communi­
cation on objects and a meta-communication on the 
level of intersubjectivity.il
As we noted in the discussion of the cognitive interest in
social orientation, communicating persons must represent
their individual experience and intentions in the general
categories of language. They must metacommunicatively
qualify their literal statements so as to indirectly
represent the individual element in their experience or
intentions. This metacommunication takes place within the
intersubjectivity of mutual understanding maintained by
reciprocal self-representation among participants.
The capacity to communicate indirectly at this level
allows one to distinguish essence and appearance. When
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we communicate about objects, perceptions take on objectiv­
ity by being constituted within the linguistic intersubjec­
tivity. Thus, in a sense, we can come to an understanding 
about objects through direct communication. The expression 
"the cat is on the mat" stands by itself. But the meaning 
of "I would like to help you", by itself, does not tell much 
about the speaker's intentions. If we were limited to 
direct communication involving the intentions and subjec­
tivity of others, only appearances, that is, the literal 
utterances and actions, could guide us. It is through 
indirect communication within the linguistic and extra- 
linguistic intersubjectivity that we grasp the indefinable 
individualized aspect of a person's intentions. This 
indirect understanding cannot be captured in the explicit 
terms of the linguistic intersubjectivity.
Summary: The Ideal Speech Situation
Habermas’ theory of communication suggests that under­
lying all empirically contingent languages is a universal 
structure for potential speech. A system of "dialogue con­
stitutive universals" forms the foundation of an intersub­
jectivity that makes it possible for us to mutually 
understand each other and communicate. These universal 
pragmatic features of language are mastered in the acquisi­
tion of communicative competence parallel to the mastery of
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the abstract rules of generative grammar in the acquisition
of linguistic competence.
Above all, communicative competence relates to an 
ideal speech situation in the same way that linguis­
tic competence relates to the abstract system of 
linguistic rules. The dialogue-constitutive 
universals at the same time generate and describe 
the form of intersubjectivity which makes mutuality 
of understanding possible. Communicative com­
petence is defined by the ideal speaker's mastery 
of the dialogue-constitutive universals, irrespec­
tive of actual restrictions under empirical condi­
tions . 12
Every communication aims toward an ideal speech situa­
tion and any consensus achieved under the conditions of 
this ideal speech situation can be considered, ipso facto, 
to be a valid consensus. Any questioned consensus can be 
examined in terms of the conditions of the ideal speech 
situation. These conditions require that communication be 
free of constraints due to external or internal forces or 
distortions, and that there be a symmetry of opportunity 
to take dialogue roles and use various speech acts that 
enable us to distinguish true and false statements, right 
and wrong actions, and authentic and deceptive expressions. 
Only under these conditions does "the peculiarly unforced 
compulsion of a better argument dominate. According to 
Habermas,
Discourse is the last resort for the re-establish- 
ment of a disturbed consensus in cases of doubt 
about justification. In the end the legitimation 
of existing orders lets itself be confirmed only 
in discourse, i.e., is reduced to the basic norms 
of conversation. For when justifications are
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made problematic long enough, we come upon a final 
compulsion for legitimation which we cannot avoid 
and according to which only those norms for action 
are rational and thereby reliable which are capa­
ble of repeatable justification in unlimited and 
unforced discussion.^
Using Habermas' theory of cognitive interests and his 
theory of communication as a foundation, the next two 
chapters take up the question of the rational justifica­
tion of our beliefs and actions. Chapter IV considers 
the discursive justification of truth claims, and Chapter 
V focuses on the discursive justification of rightness 
claims concerning actions.
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THEORETICAL DISCOURSE; THE JUSTIFICATION OF TRUTH CLAIMS
Habermas' theory of truth grows out of the theory of 
communication we considered in Chapter III. There we 
encountered three pragmatic functions of language--repre- 
sentative, interactive and expressive. Each of these 
functions can be a source of breakdown in communication.
Our expressions can fail to represent, or misrepresent, 
our experience of the natural world. They can fail to 
establish the relationships we seek, or establish inappro­
priate ones. They can also fail to express our intentions, 
or express deceptive ones. However, in everyday communica­
tion / these functions are at least implicitly assumed to 
be unproblematically fulfilled. Whenever we initiate 
language communication, we make the implicit claim that the 
propositional contents of our expression are true, that 
interpersonal relationships initiated by means of our 
expression are appropriate, and that the intentions or 
personal experiences represented in the expressions are 
authentic. These validity claims are not only assumed in 
particular speech interaction, they are a presupposition of 
language communication itself. Without assuming, in
principle and in general, that our expressions are true,
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appropriate and veridical, we would have no basis for attempt­
ing to communicate. In principle, to engage in communica­
tion is to seek an authentic understanding. Even efforts 
to deceive must rest on the implicit claim that expressions 
are true, appropriate and authentic.
Discourse and Truth
However, on any particular occasion, these validity 
claims are subject to question. When a disturbance in 
communication occurs, based on a questionable validity 
claim, we generally try to defend our claim in the normal 
context of interaction by, for example, referring to our 
sources of information, to generally accepted norms or to 
past behavior. But when the context of the disturbance is 
important enough, and the threat to validity serious enough, 
then communication either breaks off all together or else 
shifts to another level, that is, to the level of discourse. 
At the level of discourse, we attempt to argumentatively 
vindicate the truth of our propositions and the appropriate­
ness of the norms guiding our interactions. (Problematic 
claims to authenticity are not tested discursively, but 
are confirmed through the consistency of further action and 
interaction.) In discourse, validity claims,(truth claims 
and rightness claims are treated hypothetically and communi­
cation is directed toward their vindication or rejection.
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Habermas suggests that an analysis of the logical 
structure of discourse concerning truth claims can reveal 
a "logic of truth," In other words, a theory of truth 
can be derived from an analysis of the way we establish 
the truth of propositions in language interaction directed 
to the resolution of problematic truth claims,
In this account, it is important to distinguish and 
understand the relation between the objectivity of experi­
ence, on the one hand, and the truth of propositions repre­
senting that experience, on the other hand. This is because 
the objectivity of experience is a matter of the manner in 
which experience is constituted, while truth is a matter of 
human discourse. As we saw above, the discursive resolution 
of validity claims is removed from the context of ordinary
life in which experience is objectified. So, before we
«
consider the formal conditions and structure of discourse 
in deriving Habermas' theory of truth, we must take a closer 
look at how experience is constituted in the realm of every­
day life.
Categorial Schemes: The Constitution of Experience
You will recall in our discussion of Habermas' theory 
of cognitive interests that these interests represent frames 
of reference from which we apprehend reality and that experi­
ence in each domain is mediated or constituted by a particu­
lar cognitive interest. After our review of Habermas'
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theory of universal pragmatics we are now in a position to 
see how universal pragmatics comes together with cognitive 
interests to account for the way that experience is con­
stituted, This is Habermas’ "constitution theory of experi­
ence" which still remains to be developed. However, he 
makes a number of observations that give an idea about what 
such an analysis might look like,
A constitution theory of experience would essentially 
be an analysis of the universal pragmatics of the use of 
fundamental concepts that lie behind every experience. As 
examples of such concepts Habermas gives those suggested 
by Kant and pursued in the work of Piaget: substance,
space, time and causality. These concepts are a kind of 
"minimum content of properties which objects as such 
have. . and they form the content of a frame of reference 
for "objectivating experiencable happenings as happenings,"^ 
that is, for constituting experience. In other words, 
experience is constituted or mediated in terms of a frame 
of reference based on a use of the concepts of substance, 
space, time and causality. Every language includes such a 
reference system which permits us to reliably identify 
objects in experience about which we would like to communi­
cate and act. While each language may differ in the par­
ticular features of such a frame of reference, underlying 
all languages is a universal structure which provides for
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the categorization of all possible objects of experience in 
these terms. This categorical scheme enables us to classify, 
localize, temporalize and serialize in relation to the 
basic categories of substance, space, time and causality.
However, experience is mediated differently in the 
technical and the practical realms and therefore the cate- 
gorial framework is applied differently for objects of 
experience in the two realms.
This is because experience at the level of sensations 
and perceptions is different from experience at the level 
of intersubjective communication. Observations of things 
and events yields an experience that seems to us to be 
objective and can be made the propositional content of an 
expression. The experience can be objectivated in a state­
ment— can enter the linguistic intersubjectivity--with no 
change in categorial meaning; it remains at the level of 
propositional contents. Understanding, on the other hand, 
is the performative constitution of an interpersonal rela­
tionship: "it is tied up with the nonobjectivating
orientation common to speakers during the performance of 
speech acts."^ The intersubjectivity of mutual understand­
ing is shared nonobjectified experience. Once the experi­
ence (what is understood) becomes the content of the propo­
sition it becomes objectivated as, for example, statements 
about persons, actions, institutions or traditions. Yet to
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experience these objects of the communicative objective 
domain, we must understand the performative aspect of the 
expression:
...as we state such an experience, experience itself 
shifts from the level of intersubjectivity where it 
was first encountered to the level of propositional 
contents. In order to be able to understand a 
simple sentence like 'Peter gave Paul an orderT, I 
must at some point in time have participated in 
a communication which enabled me to experience what 
it means to give or receive an order.^
There is no shift when we move from observation of 
sensory experience to statements about them that is compar­
able to the shift from intersubjective understanding to 
propositional statements concerning that understanding, 
"...non objectivated perceptions would be a contradiction in
terms. They would not be perceptions but figments of the
5
imagination, illusions, phantasms, etc." Sensations are 
transformed into perceptions by entering into the linguistic 
intersubjectivity of language. These perceptions derive 
their objectivity from the intersubjectively shared categorial 
structure of objects of possible experience in which they 
are constituted. To paraphrase Austin, the objectivity of 
perceptions remains a matter of the concepts used being the 
ones conventionally appointed for situations of the type 
referred to.^
All this is to say that the categorical reference 
system functions differently for the experience of objects 
of perception (things and events) than it does for the
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objects of communicative experience (acting and speaking 
persons):
...the sense of substance and causality, of space 
and time, is differentiated according to whether 
these categories are applied to the objects 
within a world or to the linguistically consti­
tuted world itself, which allows for the mutuality 
of speaking subjects. The interpretational schema, 
'substance , has a different meaning for the iden­
tity of items which can be clearly categorized 
analytically from that which it has for speaking 
and interacting subjects theriiselves, whose ego 
identity, as has been shown, just cannot be 
grasped by analytically clear-cut operations.
The intepretational schema of causality, when 
applied to observable events, leads to the 
concept of ‘cause1; when it is applied to an asso­
ciation of intentional actions it leads to the 
concept of 'motive'. In the same way 'space' and 
'time' undergo a different schematism when 
viewed in regard to physically measurable proper­
ties of observable events from that which they 
undergo when viewed according to experienced 
interactions. In the first case the categories 
serve as a system of coordinates for observation 
controlled by the success of instrumental action; 
in the latter case the categories serve as a 
frame of reference for the experience of social 
space and historical time from a subjective point 
of view.7
The two object domains are different because of the differ­
ent ways in which the two cognitive interests, technical 
control and social orientation, guide action within these 
categorial frames of reference.
...categories like 'bodies in motion' or 'acting 
and speaking individuals' implies an a priori 
relation to action to the extent that ’observ­
able bodies' are simultaneously 'instrumentally 
manipulable bodies', whereas 'understandable 
persons' are simultaneously 'participants in 
linguistically mediated interaction', hense some­
thing which can be both an object of instrumental 
action and a rival in interactions. We create
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the two fundamental object domains by rendering 
schematic in the same set of categories (or cog­
nitive schemata) in the realms of instrumental 
or communicative action.8
Discourse
In the realm of everyday life, experience expressed in 
a proposition is implicity assumed to be objective, but 
there is the possibility of error or deception. The test 
of objectivity of the experience is its being intersubjec- 
tively shared— its being constituted in the shared cate- 
gorial framework through which experience is interpreted.
In everyday interaction a statement expressing a proposi­
tional content implies a truth claim by presupposing the 
truth of the stated proposition. We naively assume the 
validity of the claim as long as it does not seem inappro­
priate to do so.
But when communication is disturbed because a reported 
state of affairs does not appear to be intersubjectively 
valid, we no longer take the claim of truth at face value. 
Instead of assuming the truth of the proposition, the 
problematic validity claim is isolated from the normal con­
text of instrumental and communicative action and considered 
hypothetically in argumentative discourse. Discourse, that 
is focused on the redemption of problematic truth claims, 
Habermas refers to as theoretical discourse; that focused on 
problematic moral claims is called practical d i s c o u r s e . ^
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For Habermas discursive justification of validity 
claims is a normative concept which implicitly refers to 
conditions which must be met if validity claims are to be 
settled in a rationally justified consensus.
Initiating a process of discourse assumes that genuine 
agreement is possible. In discourse, the questionable 
validity claim is bracketed and becomes the sole topic of 
discussion. All motives are excluded except for the 
cooperative resolution of the problematic claim. The out­
come of deliberation must be the result solely of the force 
of the better argument and not the result of any distortions 
from systematic constrains on communication.
The absence of systematic constraint can be formally 
characterized in terms of the structure of ordinary language 
that permits expressions of the three experiential domains. 
That is, in discourse there must be a symmetrical distribu­
tion among participants of opportunities to represent their 
experience in any domain. Specifically, they first must 
have equal chances to assert and dispute propositions and 
to argue for or against their validity with explanations, 
interpretations and justifications. Second, they must have 
equal opportunity to prescribe norms, and to conform to or 
resist them or question their legitimacy. Finally, they 
must be equally free to express their own intentions, atti­
tudes and feelings, and to question the veracity of others 
self-representative expressions. As long as these symmetries
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exist we have the conditions for a pure intersubjectivity 
and communication will not be distorted by any systematic 
constraints arising from its own structure.
A Consensus Thesis of Truth
Habermas' theory of truth is derived from an examina­
tion of the logic of theoretical discourse. An analysis 
of the logical structure of communication in which we 
rationally decide on the validity of truth claims is, in a 
sense, an analysis of the logic of truth. The meaning of 
truth is grasped through an understanding of the function 
it plays in language and the way that truth claims are 
examined, rejected, revised or accepted.
Habermas proposes a consensus theory of truth similar 
to that proposed by Charles Peirce. Wiener summarizes this 
theory with the statement that whatever beliefs "the com­
munity of minds (in the future as well as the present) 
finds itself constrained to accept and agree upon, after 
continued observation and reflection, will constitute 'the 
truth'."10 Peirce's theory of signs led him to appreciate 
the social nature of human experience and belief and to be ! 
critical of views that "make single individuals absolute 
judges of the truth."H
But Habermas believes that Peirce falls prey to a 
hidden positivism by making beliefs, referring to the con­
nections among empirical events, empirical events themselves.
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This reduction undermines the intersubjective foundation
for beliefs in the community of investigators which is the
basis of Pierce's conception of truth. And it leaves
problematic the relation between this community and the
solitary or monologic character of Peirce's theory of
inquiry and pragmatic theory of meaning and beliefs (which
we considered in Chapter III).
...the ground of intersubjectivity in which investi­
gators are always already situated when they attempt 
to bring about consensus about metatheoretical 
problems is not the ground of purposive-rational 
action, which is in principle solitary. True, sub­
jects acting instrumentally make use of representa­
tional signs, and the technical rules that can be 
sedimented as habits must be capable of formulation 
in statements about relations of events. Neverthe­
less, as we have shown, the symbolic representation 
of matters of fact knowable from the transcendental 
perspective of possible technical control serves 
exclusively for the transformation of expressions 
in processes of reasoning. Deduction, induction 
and abduction establish relations between statements 
that are in principle monologic. It is possible to 
think in syllogisms, but not to conduct a dialogue 
in them. I can use syllogistic reasoning to yield 
arguments for a discussion, but I cannot argue 
syllogistically with an other. Insofar as the 
employment of symbols is constitutive for the behav­
ioral system of instrumental action, the use of 
language involved is monologic. But the communica­
tion of investigators requires the use of language 
that is not confined to the limits of technical 
control over objectified natural processes. It 
arises from symbolic interaction between societal 
subjects who reciprocally know and recognize each 
other as unmistakable individuals. This communi­
cative action is a system of reference that cannot 
be reduced to the framework of instrumental 
action.
To some extent, Peirce anticipated the separation of 
truth from the constitution of experience in his distinction
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between the social process of resolving truth claims in the 
community of investigators (the consensus theory of truth), 
and the instrumental consitution of experience in his prag­
matic theory of meaning. The pragmatic maxim, that the 
meaning of a proposition is its conceivable practical con­
sequences, governs the meaning of expressions concerning 
the objects of experience in the realm of instrumental 
action. There is no comparable account, however, for the 
meaning of expressions concerning the objects of experience 
in the realm of communicative action--the intersubjective 
realm of the community of investigators who must argumenta­
tively resolve disputes regarding truth claims. So while 
experience is constituted and organized in the instrumental 
and practical categorial frameworks, the resolution of 
problematic truth claims must take place within the inter- 
subjectivity of the practical realm. As we saw above, this 
has led Habermas to build on Peirce's separation of the 
problem of the constitution of experience from the problem 
of the resolution of truth claims.
Habermas gives his own view as follows:
I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if 
every other person who could enter into a dialogue 
with me would ascribe the same predicate to the 
same object. In order to distinguish true from 
false statements, I make a reference to the judg­
ments of others,--in fact to the judgment of all 
others with whom I could ever hold a dialogue 
(among whom I counterfactually include all the dia­
logue partners I could find if my life history were
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coextensive with the history of mankind). The con­
ditions of the truth of statements is the potential 
agreement of all o t h e r s .  3
He agrees with Strawson that truth and falsity are 
properly predicated of the asserted propositional content 
of constative speech acts. But this refers only to the 
semantic meaning of truth. As we saw above, all speech 
acts contain both a performative and a propositional 
moment. In a constative speech act, the propositional con­
tent is being asserted; it is declared to be true. Thus, 
in constative speech acts while it is the propositional 
component that is focal, through the performative component 
we make the implicit claim that the asserted statements are 
true. For such speech acts to succeed, they must meet the 
normative conventions that guide the use of constative 
speech acts. In the realm of life praxis, these include 
the universal pragmatics of the conditions for successful 
reference and predication of objects in the technical realm 
we considered in Chapter III. We implicitly claim that the 
propositional contents of constative speech acts are true.
If that validity claim is questioned and radical doubt per­
sists, then communication breaks off or moves to a differ­
ent context--that of theoretical discourse.
We are now in a position to see why it is important 
for Habermas to distinguish the realm of ordinary experience, 
in which experience is objectivated from the realm of
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discourse. This is because he wants to distinguish the 
meaning of the objectivity of statements representing our 
experience from their truth. Truth has for so long been 
equated with sense certainty that the conditions for sense 
certainty must be distinguished from the conditions for 
truth. The conditions for sense certainty relate to the 
categorial meaning of empirical statements. That is, in 
the realm of instrumental action, objects are constituted 
under the cognitive interest in technical control within 
the intersubjective categorial framework for things and 
events.
The categorial meaning of an empirical statement 
is determined by the structure of the object domain 
to which it refers. This meaning constitutes 
itself along with the objects of possible experi­
ence . In other words, it is the material a priori 
of experience which enables us to open up reality 
by objectivating it. This is different from the 
discursive verification of the meaning of a truth 
claim which we imply in all our assertory state­
ments . The meaning of the truth or untruth of 
a statement does not consist in the conditions 
guaranteeing the objectivity of our experience but 
in the possibility of argumentative corroboration 
of a truth claim which is falsifiable in principle. 
The categorial meaning of propositions is connected 
with the existence of states of affairs which we 
render in those statements. In every speech act, 
categorial meaning is contained in the proposi­
tional content, whereas the truth claim is 
contained in the performative part. For the 
categorial meaning always reflects the Way in which 
we experience something in the world--as a thing 
or event, as a person or as that person's utterance 
The truth claim, on the other hand, reflects the 
intersubjective validity, on the basis of which
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something may be predicated of objects of experi­
ence, i.e. that a state of affairs is indeed a 
fact. 14-
In the realm of ordinary experience, the objectivity of 
experience lies in its being intersubjectively shared. This 
objectivity comes from the categorial framework within which 
the experience is constituted. Objectivity is manifest in 
action on the basis of the experience accompanying the action. 
It is, in a sense, the reaction of "reality” that confers 
obj ectivity on experience with the instrumental categorial 
framework. Truth is not conferred in this way by some pro­
cess in nature, but instead through argumentative reasoning 
in discourse. "Objectivity of experience means that every­
body can cound on the success or failure of certain actions; 
the truth of a proposition stated in discourses means that
everybody can be persuaded by reasons to recognize the truth
15claims of the statement as being justified."
If the truth of a statement means that everyone can be 
persuaded that the claim of truth is justified, Habermas 
still holds that truth is not thereby reduced to the de 
facto achievement of a consensus. There can be such a thing 
as a false consensus and so criteria are needed for distin­
guishing discursively realized rational agreement from 
the mere appearance of consensus. But these criteria 
cannot themselves require discursive justification for such 
a necessity would catch us in a circle. At the same time, 
if these criteria are not discursively confirmed, on what
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basis are they to be justified and is not this basis then 
outside the framework for the validation of truth claims?
To escape this problem, Habermas appeals to the universal 
pragmatics of theoretical discourse: he believes that the
criteria for a "rationally motivated consensus" can be 
derived from the structure of communication directed to 
resolving truth claims.
In theoretical discourse, agreement is reached purely 
from the "force of the better argument." Thus we are not 
talking about the syntactical character of logical 
necessity but the pragmatic quality of cogency, the power
of compelling consent. A consensus is rationally motivated
if it is achieved solely by the cogency of the arguments 
and not through external force or internal constraints from 
the structure of the discourse.
This freedom from constraints is given a formal render­
ing in Habermas * characterization of the "ideal speech 
situation."
The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical 
phenomenon nor a mere construct, but rather an 
unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in dis­
course. This supposition can, but need not, be
counterfactual; but even if it is made counter-
factually, it is a fiction that is operatively 
effective in the process of communication. There­
fore I prefer to speak of an anticipation of an 
ideal speech situation...a normative foundation 
of agreement in language... 16
From an analysis of the pragmatic structure of the ideal
speech situation Habermas suggests some general conditions
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that must hold for argumentation to lead to a rationally 
grounded consensus.
The very act of engaging in discourse assumes that 
agreement is possible and that a true consensus can be 
distinguished from a false one. We equally assume that 
the outcome will be the result only of the cogency of 
arguments and not of constraints on communication. This 
freedom from constraints consists in a symmetrical distri­
bution of opportunities to participate verbally in the 
interaction and to assume various dialogue roles. Speci­
fically, as summarized by McCarthy, participants in dis­
course must have:
...the same chance to employ constative speech acts, 
that is, to put forward or call into question, to 
ground or refute statements, explanations, and so 
on, so that in the long run no assertion is exempted 
from critical examination.
...the same chance to employ representative speech 
acts, to express their attitudes, feelings, inten­
tions and so on so that the participants can be 
truthful in their relations to themselves and can 
make their "inner natures" transparent to others;
...the same chance to employ regulative speech acts, 
to command, to oppose, to permit, to forbid, and so 
on, so that privileges in the sense of one-sidedly 
binding norms are excluded and the formal equality 
of chances to initiate and pursue communication 
can in fact be practiced.17
Habermas also is aware that the cogency of an argument 
is related to the conceptual framework in which it is 
embedded and so he maintains that there must also be freedom 
to question the conceptual frame of reference itself, and
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to suggest new ones, that is, to move to a metatheoretical 
level of communication.
If these conditions hold, then discourse can be free 
of any systematic constraints or distortions in the 
communication, and there exists the potential for a rational 
consensus.
In summary, Habermas maintains that truth is a norma­
tive concept and is irreducibly social and that we must, in 
distinguishing true from false statements, make reference 
to the judgments of others. The concept of truth, then, 
refers to a universal pragmatic convention of the unforced 
agreement of an ideal community of inquirers.
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Habermas suggests that the discursive resolution of 
problematic validity claims has historical roots and has 
become institutionalized in a number of important social 
contexts in our culture:
It is only late in history that discourses have 
lost their sporadic character. Only when dis­
courses are institutionalized for certain domains, 
to the extent that under specificable conditions 
there exists a general expectation that discursive 
interchanges will be initiated, can they become a 
systematically relevant learning mechanism for a 
given society. In the course of social evolution, 
such institutionalizations of partial discourses 
specific to certain domains signify innovative 
achievements ... Dramatic examples are, firstly, 
the institutionalization of discourse in which 
the validity claims of mythical and religious 
world-views could be systematically questioned and 
tested; we understand this as the beginning of 
philosophy in the Athens of the classical period. 
Secondly, the institutionalization of discourses 
in which the validity claims of the technically
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CHAPTER V
PRACTICAL DISCOURSE: THE JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL CLAIMS
Habermas’ philosophy, inherited from the German 
rationalist tradition, is deeply grounded in the ideas of 
such philosophers as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. It is useful 
to consider Habermas' ethical theory within this tradition.
Kant: Individual Ethical Formalism
Kant’s eighteenth century Germany was caught up in the 
spirit of the Enlightenment in its celebration of individual 
reason as a restorative against the ignorance, corruption, 
poverty, and carnage brought on by the religious authority 
and tradition of the Reformation. For Kant the Enlighten­
ment was humanity’s coming of age from an infancy in which 
people were incapable of using their own reason without the 
aid of others.
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use 
of his understanding without direction from another. 
Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies 
not in lack of reason but in the lack of resolution. 
and courage to use it without direction from another. 
Sapere audeI 'Have courage to use your own reason.' 
--that is the motto of enlightenment.-**
But whereas reason for the utilitarians was practical 
intelligence in pursuit of happiness, Kant retained the 
rationalists' conception of reason as the intuition of
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abstract truths. In his Critique of Pure Reason, he tried 
to show that the laws of science could be known with cer­
tainty by reflecting on the a priori structure of knowledge 
imposed by the mind on sense perception. Similarly, in his 
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant tried to ground morality 
on a system of a priori laws applied by practical reason in 
the guidance of human conduct.
Thus, Kant distinguished two familiar kinds of knowl­
edge: theoretical and practical. Theoretical knowledge is
limited to the realm of experience--the phenomenal world of 
the senses. Practical knowledge concerns the realm of will and 
feelings--noumenal or intelligible realm that transcends sensuous 
experience but must be postulated to explain the possibility of 
freedom. While theoretical knowledge pertains to the laws of na­
ture according to the principle of causality, practical knowledge 
concerns the laws of freedom imposed by the will on human 
actions. As phenomenal beings, we are subject to the laws 
of nature, but it is our own sense of moral obligation that 
leads us to follow the ethical laws of practical reason.
This division of knowledge is required by Kant's con­
ception of the free and autonomous will. We intuitively 
know that we are capable of moral choice and that duty and 
self-interest are not the same thing. Yet moral choice and 
duty would be impossible if our actions were the necessary 
result of natural laws. So, we must be more than phenomenal 
beings subject to the principle of causality.
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While Kant agreed with the utilitarians concerning 
the generalization that all people seek happiness, this is 
merely a psychological law of nature which, as free and 
autonomous beings, we must be capable of resisting. Against 
the utilitarians, Kant believed that to act out of anything 
but the laws of practical reason, as for example desire in 
the pursuit of happiness or pleasure, is to surrender our 
freedom and rationality. The motive for moral action cannot 
be any subjective interest, for pursuing merely empirical 
interests reduces us to the amoral phenomenal world.
Nor can rational conduct be guided by empirically 
contingent hypothetical principles that must depend on our 
choice of goals. Rational conduct must be guided by a truly 
universal law of reason. Kant found such an imperative 
in the sense of moral duty which we all intuitively feel.
i
Kant believed the sense of obligation to obey ethical prin­
ciples is caused by a demand of reason, operating in the 
noumenal realm, that action follows universal law. Thus, 
he introduced the categorical imperative or principle of 
universalizability: act only on the maxim that you can will
to be a universal law.
But Kant's account leaves us with two problems: the 
relation of the noumenal to the phenomenal realm (how can a 
neumenal practical reason qualify empirical actions as 
moral?), and the monologic character of Kant's ethics.
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How Can Actions Qualify as Moral. First, how it is 
possible for reason to cause us to feel a sense of obliga­
tion, Kant cannot say:
In order to want that for which reason prescribes 
an ought exclusively to rational beings affected 
by the senses, a faculty of reason is required 
that can instill a feeling of pleasure or satis­
faction in the fulfillment of duty, one that thus 
has causality that can determine the senses in 
accordance with its principles. But it is entirely 
impossible to comprehend...how a mere thought that 
in itself contains nothing sensual can produce a 
sensation of pleasure or pain....Yet here pure 
reason is to be the cause, by means of mere Ideas 
(which supply absolutely no object for experience) 
of an effect Cthat is, of pleasure in the fulfil­
ment of dutyH that occurs in experience. Thus it 
is entirely impossible for us humans to explain 
how and why the universality of the maxim as 
law, and thus morality, interests us.2
Thus, we are left with a dichotomy of two realms of 
knowledge. In the theoretical realm, reason informs us that 
freedom and a noumenal realm beyond the senses are not 
impossibilities, but these possibilities cannot be accounted 
for by a theoretical reason which is limited to the phe­
nomenal realm of the senses where everything is determined 
by causal necessity. In the practical realm, on the other 
hand, reason assures us that these practical postulates (of 
freedom and a neumenal world) are indeed valid.
Yet freedom is expressed in actions that take place in 
the empirical world. Just how the principles of freedom 
relate to the principles of nature remains a mystery. We 
do not know how reason operating in a pure practical nou­
menal world can influence us in relation to empirical
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actions and thereby qualify our actions as moral. Somehow 
we know that the idea of freedom and autonomy makes us 
certain that pure reason can be practical; but how this is 
so, theoretical reason, by its very nature, cannot say.
Monologic Ethics, Second, since Kant presupposes 
an autonomous will subject to the categorical imperative as 
the basis for his ethics, Habermas maintains that he removes 
moral action from the realm of morality itself. Kant unwit­
tingly uses the identify of consciousness that is the basis 
of his theoretical philosophy as a model for the self in 
his practical philosophy as well.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant begins his argu­
ment for the transcendental deduction by asserting that 
the manifold of perception is incapable of being thought 
and ordered into objects of knowledge unless self-conscious­
ness (Kant's I think) is capable of accompanying all experi­
ential representations. This presupposes a transcendental 
(vs. empirical) unity of consciousness, a transcendental 
ego within which the manifold of intuition is connected to 
a single permanent self-consciousness. This permanent ego 
is not given in experience but is a condition of all experi­
ence. It belongs to the sphere of noumenal reality purged 
of all empirical contents.
This transcendental ego, derived from the theoretical 
deduction, is, perhaps unwittingly, made the subject of
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the practical deduction. It thereby remains an autonomous 
individual ego and its relation to other subjects becomes 
problematic. When the individual ego encounters the cate­
gorical imperative there results a peculiar form of inter- 
subjective obligation in which it attributes its own maxims 
as equally binding to all individuals. The asserted 
reciprocity of expectations is isolated in the individual 
will cut off from communications with other subjects.
Thus, the autonomous will is an abstraction or limiting 
case of intersubjectively communicating individuals. While 
moral subjects can be assured that they act harmoniously 
in accord with moral principles derived a priori by practical 
reaon, moral action is withdrawn from communication among 
individuals and reduced to monologic status.
Indeed, this was the motto of the Enlightenment:
"have the courage to use your own reason." But problems 
of morality are thereby abstracted from the context and 
intersubjectivity of communicating individuals in which 
they occur. By isolating moral choice in an autonomous will, 
and abstracting it from human welfare, interests, and con­
crete action consequences, practical reason does not confer 
moral significance on human conduct; it dissociates moral 
significance from human conduct.
The price for Kant1s moral autonomy and ethical cer­
tainty is that the moral agent is placed in opposition to 
nature, tradition and human interests.
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Radical freedom seemed only possible at the cost of 
a diremption with nature, a division within myself 
between reason and sensibility more radical than 
anything the materialist, utilitarian Enlighten­
ment had dreamed, and hence a division with external 
nature, from whose causal laws the free self must 
be radically independent, even while phenomenally 
his behaviour appeared to conform. The radically 
free subject was thrown back on himself, and it 
seemed on his individual self, in opposition to 
nature, and external authority, and onto a decision 
in which others could have no share.4
Fichte: Subjective Ethical Formalism
Fichte's solution was to reduce the theoretical realm 
to the practical, the phenomenal world to the noumenal: 
nature became the projection of an absolute will. He 
analytically abstracted the united subject and object of 
consciousness into the conceptually isolated subject- or 
intelligence-in-itself and object- or thing-in-itself, and 
asked which was the ground of all being. Was experience 
the creation of the knowing subject, intelligence-in-itself, 
or was it an effect of. the object, the thing-in-itself?
Obviously if experience is reduced to the effect of 
the thing-in-itself we are on the road to materialism and 
determinism on which we loose our freedom and intelligence. 
With Kant, Fichte, believed in the ultimate primacy of 
practical reason, therefore the experience of causal neces­
sity and the material world must be explained in reference 
to intelligence-in-itself, to the "I" or ego.
But what is this ego? Again, with Kant, Fichte finds 
a pure ego as the condition of all experience. Through the
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act of self-reflection we are intuitively aware of the 
transcendental ego as the self-consciousness of the act of 
reflection itself. Our experience is objectified by a 
"self" that transcends objectification in the same sense.
For Fichte this was no individual ego, however, but 
the supra-individual creator of all phenomena. The absolute 
ego was conceived as pure activity, pure striving which 
posits both the limited ego as intelligence, and the 
limited non-ego as the world of nature— a field for moral 
action. This noumenal will was a universal force that 
creates both the finite "I" or knowing subject, and the 
material world or object. Individual beings can free them­
selves from the illusion of the phenomenal world through a 
simultaneous act of reflection and will. Through an act 
of self-reflection we recognize ourselves as temporary 
embodiments of the absolute will, and in an act of will we 
emancipate ourselves from dogmatic dependence on the material 
world. The world of nature is but the means for the ful­
fillment of one's duty.
For Fichte, in contrast to Kant, the individual is not 
conceptually isolated but exists only as an element in a 
system of rational beings, a manifold of intelligence. We 
are all manifestations of the one absolute ego. In spite 
of this fact, ethical choice is still left to the individual. 
Moral action must meet just one condition: to follow one's
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own best conviction of one's duty. So, as with Kant, moral 
decision is withdrawn from intersubjective dialogue.
Hegel: Dialectical Intersubjectivity
Fichte cannot completely escapte the formalism that 
disabled Kant's ethics. His own ethics succumbs to his 
construction of the self in the dialectic of "I" and 
"not-I" within the subjectivity of an absolute ego. In 
Hegel, Habermas finds the first attempt to construct the 
self in the dialect of "I" and "not-I" within the inter­
subjectivity of communicating subjects.
The self is created within the intersubjectivity of the 
ego in interaction, not with itself as projected non-ego, 
but in interaction with another ego. Hegel called this 
medium for the creation of the self the intersubjectivity 
of spirit, in the sense of the spirit of a nation or team 
spirit, the sense of community that transcends individual 
consciousness. For Hegel, self consciousness is derived 
in the intersection of perspectives on the basis of 
reciprocal recognition.
...spirit is...the medium within which one "I" 
communicates with another "I"” and from which 
as an absolute mediation, the two mutually 
form each other into subjects. Consciousness 
exists as the middle ground on which the sub­
jects encounter each other, so that without 
encountering each other they cannot exist as 
subjects.5
Hegel conceives Kant's individual transcendental ego 
as the limiting moment of the universal general will.
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Applied individually, the "I" is abstracted from the suc­
cession of external and internal experiences of an indi­
vidual. Applied universally, the "I" is a place holder 
for all persons as individuals, for the personal point of 
view. Thus, the "I", as self identity, represents ..an 
identity in difference both of internal and external experi­
ence, and of speaking and acting subjects. The "I" is 
an individuated universal, an abstract category of self 
consciousness for "the inalienably individual and singular 
subject."6
Whereas Fichte saw the ego as the identity of the "I" 
and the "not-I", it is the identity of the universal and 
singular for Hegel, and spirit is the dialectical unfold­
ing of this unity. According to Habermas,
The "I" as the identity of the universal and the 
singular can only be comprehended in terms of the 
unity of a spirit which embraces the identity of 
an "I" with an other not identical with it.
Spirit is the communication of individuals in the 
medium of the universal, which is related to the 
speaking individuals as the grammar of language 
is, and to the acting individuals as the system 
of recognized norms. It does not place the moment 
of universality before that of singularity, but 
instead permits the distinctive links between 
these singularities. Within the medium of this 
universal— which Hegel therefore called a con­
crete universal--the single beings can identify 
with each other and still at the same time main­
tain themselves as nonidentical.7
The contribution of Hegel was his insight that self 
consciousness has to be seen as a moment of collective 
consciousness— an objective intersubjectivity through which
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non-identical subjects reciprocally acknowledge one 
another and themselves. This universal medium is objec­
tive in the sense that it is essentially independent of 
particular individuals; it exists before them, crystallized 
as the particular norms and institutions, objectivated in 
the particular language of the culture. It is a social 
world that faces the individual as an external and coercive 
fact. Yet, it is not something distinct over and above 
the individuals collectively, but rather the common life 
that binds them together as persons. Individuals and the 
social life world dialectically create each other.
While Kant's concept of the ego was derived from the 
theoretical realm, Hegel draws his from the practical realm 
of interacting subjects embedded in an emergent intersub­
jectivity. This change would allow Hegel to ground his 
ethics in tangible human action rather than a transcenden­
tal realm of a priori forms. But Hegel never followed out 
this possibility. Instead he later abandoned the formula­
tion that led to his dialectic of spirit, ultimately reduc­
ing it to the single movement of absolute spirit realizing 
itself in history.
Habermas: Communicative Ethics
Habermas attempts to reconstruct Hegel's dialectic 
of self consciousness in terms of a theory of communication. 
This we considered in Chapter III. Language provides a
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medium through which the sujectivity of human experience is 
tranformed into an interpersonal intersubjectivity and, 
thereby, allows us to form generalizable needs and interests. 
This permits us to ground ethics in human interaction rather 
than isolated individual consciousness.
Symbolically Mediated Human Needs. When impulses, 
need dispositions, and feelings are integrated into the 
linguistic intersubjectivity they become objectivated as 
reciprocally acknowledged needs, interests, and desires.
It is only by being attached to linguistic symbols and 
thereby becoming mutually acknowledged that needs can become 
stable intentions and find intentional expression in our 
language and conduct. In fact, the concept of prelinguistic 
impulse potentials is something we only analytically recon­
struct from incongruities in linguistic expression, actions 
and bodily gestures. For Habermas notes that "we never 
encounter needs that are not already interpreted linguis­
tically and symbolically affixed to potential actions.”®
It is only by taking form in a symbolic system--by becoming 
objectivated into the linguistic intersubjectivity that needs 
can become motives for intentional expression and action. 
Thus, Habermas sees intentional expressions and motives for 
action as linguistically interpreted needs or "subjectively




Norms and Human Need Fulfillment. Human needs must 
find their expression not only within the linguistic inter­
subjectivity, but within the matrix of generally recognized 
norms of a given culture as well. Norms represent the 
historically sedimented means and courses of action avail­
able to individuals in the pursuit of their interests. As 
routinized patterns of action which allow us to interact 
without continually defining everything as we go, norms 
and institutions provide a stable background for social 
intercourse.
Norms are mutually binding expectations for behavior 
that exert a controlling influence on the expression of 
needs, not so much through external sanctions as through 
constituting the only recognized array of options. Thus, 
as reciprocal expectations concerning legitmate, or even 
the only recognized courses of action and behavior, norms 
play a regulating role in the fulfillment of human needs and 
interests. Because of their role in regulating human action, 
norms have the effect of legitimating some endeavors and 
disqualifying others. They dictate what constitutes a 
legitimate need and they govern the expression of that need 
in social activity.
We have also seen that norms are embedded in language. 
Through the performative use of language in its regulative 
function we establish and maintain interpersonal relation­
ships reflecting mutually acknowledged needs.
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Legitimate Norms and Generalizable Needs.. Once inter­
preted linguistically, human needs have the capacity to 
become public through intentional expressions and actions. 
Mutually acknowledged needs constitute generalizable 
interests, interests that can be communicatively shared. 
Generalizable interests are contrasted with particular 
interests that remain subjective within the individual. 
Generalizable interests are the basis of truly legitimate 
norms. Legitimate norms are mutually acknowledged patterns 
of conduct in relation to mutually acknowledged interests. 
They necessarily reflect a general will of those who freely 
participate.
But we also know that norms do not always or even often 
reflect the true interests of all persons constrained by 
their force. It is only when norms reflect the genuine 
needs and interests of all involved that they can represent 
a rational will of the collective. So, while actions carried 
out within the normative field of reciprocally held 
expectations have a de facto claim to legitimacy, the 
validity of these norms is in principle subject to challenge 
on the grounds that they do not reflect a generalizable 
interest.
Moral Action and the Rational General Will. Since norms 
regulate opportunities for the satisfaction of human needs,
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_the legitimacy of any norm must always depend on its con­
sequences in relation to human welfare and generally 
accepted needs. Thus, for Habermas, moral human conduct 
is interaction guided by norms that regulate human needs, 
that is, by norms that embody a rational general will.
At the level of ordinary experience it is possible 
to challenge any proposed interaction as wrong or inappro­
priate in terras of generally accepted norms. Such chal­
lenges are generally met by appeal to the established norm­
ative framework. But if the dispute cannot be resolved 
within established conventions and institutions, because 
the norms themselves are called into question, then, as in 
the case of problematic truth claims, communication is 
removed from the context of ordinary interaction to the 
level of discourse.
Practical Discourse. Practical discourse is simply 
the name applied to the situation in which we withdraw from 
the ongoing unproblematic interaction because we seriously 
question the appropriateness of some interaction, but con­
tinue communication at another level in an effort to come to 
an understanding. We seek a consensus, if possible, con­
cerning the legitimacy of the norm reflected behind the 
problematic interaction. Is this kind of interaction, in 
this kind of context, appropriate, that is, does it speak 
to the genuine needs and welfare of those involved? The
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validity of the claim to appropriateness is treated hypo­
thetically and made the subject of argumentative discus­
sion in which certain conditions must hold if the decision 
is to represent an unconstrained consensus.
The conditions of unconstrained consensus are the 
same as those that must hold for theoretical discourse.
The validity claim is bracketed and becomes the sole topic 
of discussion. All motives are excluded except for the 
cooperative resolution of the problematic claim. The 
outcome of deliberation must be the result solely of the 
force of the better argument and not the result of any 
distortions from systematic constraints on communication. 
There must be a symmetrical distribution among participants 
of opportunities to represent their experience in any 
domain, that is, to freely engage in constative, regula­
tive and representative speech acts. Finally, since needs 
must be interpreted within the linguistic intersubjectivity, 
the ability to adquately represent one's needs will depend 
on the adequacy of the available symbolic structure and 
it must be possible to call into question and modify the 
language system being used. Participants must be able to 
know and say what they really want, and they must have the 
language to do it. There can be no use of force or strategic 
manipulation, nor evidence of deception, self-deception or 
unconscious distortion of communication.
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Univeraalizability, An agreement achieved under these 
conditions can be said to constitute a consensus and to 
represent a rational general will of the group. It is con­
sidered rational because it is the result of no force but 
the cogency of argument. It represents the will of the 
group because it constitutes mutually shared expectations 
concerning reciprocally recognized needs, that is, it re­
flects only generalizable needs and interests.
In practical deliberation, norms are tested for their 
universalizability. Kant's principle of practical reason, 
the categorical imperative, thus becomes grounded in the 
reality of communicatively interacting subjects. Practical 
discourse, the argumentative justification of moral claims, 
is simply the "procedural realization of universalizability."^ 
For Habermas, this principle is inherent in the structure 
of practical discourse and presupposed in all human communi­
cation. It is not necessary to introduce it as a special 
moral principle.
The problematic that arises with the intro­
duction of a moral principle is disposed as soon 
as one sees that the expectation of discursive 
redemption of normative-validity claims is already 
contained in the structure of intersubjectivity 
and makes specially introduced maxims of universal­
ization superfluous. In taking up a practical 
discourse, we unavoidably suppose an ideal speech 
situation that, on the strength of its formal 
properties, allows consensus only through 
generalizable interests. A communicative ethics 
has no need of principles. It is based only on 
fundamental norms of rational speech that we must 
always presuppose if we discourse at all. This,
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if you will, transcendental character of ordinary 
language... can be reconstructed in the framework 
of a universal pragmatic.H
Whereas Kant attempted to ground ethics in the formal laws
of freedom of a transcendental ego, Habermas looks to the
formal properties of human communication. For Kant, moral
autonomy required individual moral deliberation detached
from both other individuals and from empirically given
human needs and interests. Habermas 1 communicative ethics
excludes only non-generalizable needs and interests, that
is, those that remain exclusively private and particular.
Communicative vs. Positivistic Conceptions of Ethics
One of Habermas1 principal concerns is to show that 
interests can be more than particular. More generally, 
he maintains that human needs and interests are more than 
simply irrationally given empirical properties of particular 
individuals. Some ethical systems predominant in this 
century, especially those based on positivistic assumptions 
have held precisely the opposite view. Some forms of 
positivism assert a narrow conception of rationality 
limited to beliefs that can be justified as true by certain 
narrow standards. ^  Because moral claims are held to be 
incapable of truth by these standards, they are declared 
ultimately irrational. Under these positivistic assumptions, 
it is believed that value statements simply express the 
attitudes or needs of the individual, or are intended to
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influence or effect a change in others. Needs and inter­
ests are seen as irrationally given empirical properties 
of individuals. Moral questions are reduced to irrational 
decisions and technical questions concerning the attain­
ment of goals. Justification is limited to the truth of
propositions concerning states of affairs and is excluded
1 ^from moral choice itself. J
For Habermas, the justification of problematic moral 
claims, like that of truth claims, takes place by means of 
the performative aspect of language. It is the pragmatic 
cogency of arguments, rather than the theoretical proof 
of propositions, that is at issue. Practical arguments 
provide rational grounds for the acceptance of a general 
norm. Rather than presupposing that all interests are 
particular, argumentative discourse assumes the possibility 
of distinguishing generalizable interests from those that 
remain particular. Needs and interests are neither empiri­
cally given nor simply decided; rather, they emerge in the 
dialectical interplay of unique individuals interacting in 
a shared social and material world. That is, human needs 
and interests are limited by empirical conditions, by 
intersubjective conventions and by the self-knowledge of the 
person. In particular, human needs are dependent on the 
linguistic intersubjectivity and conceptual structure in 
which they can be potentially objectivated. Therefore,-
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new technologies, new conceptual structures, new forms of 
social interaction, and release from repressive norms and 
reified inner compulsions all interact in the ongoing forma­
tion and discovery of human needs and interests.
If human interests are assumed to be subjective and 
particular, and incapable of being shaped and emerging out 
of dialogue and interaction, then there can be no meaning 
to the existence of a rational will of generalizable 
interests that transcend individuals. In this case, human 
action is reduced to instrumental action and practical ques­
tions are reduced to technical questions. In such a setting, 
there can be nothing more valid than a science of ethics; 
social practice is a matter of empirical analysis and admin­
istration of technological controls.
However, when empirical criteria are used in the norma­
tive selection of courses of action, then the implicit 
standard is the facilitation of instrumental action. This 
standard is implicit because efficiency and economy in the 
selection of means to valued ends seems almost a defining 
characteristic of rationality itself. Under these assump­
tions, however, practical questions that cannot be framed 
in terms of technical problems cannot be taken seriously.
With its strict separation of descriptive and normative 
domains, empirical inquiry can neither acknowledge its 
standard of instrumental efficiency nor reach into the
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practical arena to guide the selection of ends or values 
that guide and orient action.
Action orientation is provided through traditional 
interpretations.formed through practical deliberation.
When empirical inquiry refutes the claim of a traditional 
interpretation, it cannot itself fill the orienting role of 
the refuted idea because the logic of its method does not 
aim at the generation of normative or action-orienting 
knowledge.
The relation of empirical knowledge to practice must 
necessarily come from outside the inquiry process itself. 
Emotivism, noncognitivism and other systems of ethics 
consistent with positivistic conceptions of inquiry reduce 
norms to decisions which cannot be rationally justified. 
Empirical inquiry serves only to limit the domain of possi­
ble decisions: when technological rationality is brought
to bear, then rational consideration is limited to the 
domain of empirical knowledge. We are limited to goals for 
which inquiry can provide appropriate technologies.
Even where appropriate technology exists, there are 
frequently many routes to a given end. The logic of empiri­
cal inquiry can only analyze alternative means in terms of 
their instrumental efficiency.
If standards have not been identified, or are found to 
be in conflict, then a technological rationality resorts to
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needs assessments and other methods for identifying values 
and resolving conflicts through summation and averaging.
The values themselves are considered to be fundamentally 
and irrationally given, to be measured and pooled and used 
as a basis for decision making.
Under positivistic assumptions of rationality, individ­
uals, singly or collected in groups, must simply discover 
(or choose) the appropriate means for the interests they dis­
cover (or choose), and attempt to produce a state of affairs 
that fulfills the given interests. There is no place for 
critical practical discourse.
Norms that cannot find discursive consensus and 
reflect generalizable interests must be based on force.
Under the conditions and assumptions of private interests 
and an instrumental perspective, norms can only serve to 
reflect and stabilize existing power relations. They can 
never claim to meet the genuine needs of those affected.
To the extent that communication is not free of sys­
tematic constraints imposed by power relations, the norma­
tive structure will contain an element of repression and 
will not represent the true needs and interests of the com­
munity. Systematic constraints bring about a distortion 
in communication that prevents the formation of a rational 
collective will. This happens because individuals must 
maintain the appearance of an open intersubjectivity in 
order to escape negative social sanctions. They thereby 
internalize the limits of communication and repress their
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own interests. Their needs, feelings, and emotions become 
cut off from the linguistic intersubjectivity and their 
expression is limited to unintentional forms that show 
up only in the incongruities in linguistic expression, 
action and bodily gestures by which we infer the existence 
of unconscious supressed motives.
Practical deliberation concerning normative validity 
claims, assumes that the linguistically expressed intentions 
of speakers can, in principle at least, correspond to their 
true motives and interests. When the true needs and inter­
ests cannot be expressed because they have been psychologi­
cally or ideologically repressed under the influence of an 
imbalance in power relations, then deliberations will 
depart from the ideal speech situation with a corresponding 
deformity in intersubjectivity. This means that the 
interests, motives and goals of some members of the com­
munity cannot be adequately reflected in the deliberation 
process and in the formation of community standards and 
norms.
When the possibility for symmetrical self-expression 
is inhibited, attempts at clarification of value perspec­
tives may only serve to further supress the interests of 
less powerful constituencies. There is a certain protec­
tion that comes from remaining vague and operating in the 
shadows, so to speak, either consciously or unconsciously.
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To the extent that there is distortion due to systema­
tic constraints in the communication, to that extent self- 
representation is inhibited and decisions cannot reflect 
the rational will of the community.
Positivistic conceptions also limit or distort our 
options in responding to conflicts in interests. In general, 
when there are conflicts over interests, two courses of 
action are available. Conflicting parties can use strategy 
and attempt to coercively force their will on each other; 
or, they can attempt to reach a free agreement among the 
individuals involved. Yet, when interests remain, subjective 
and particular, agreement must ultimately be seen as instru­
mental for one's own will rather than the formation of a 
common will.
Under the conditions of practical discourse, uncon­
strained communication oriented toward consensus aims for 
agreement as an end in itself that cannot be instrumen- 
talized for other ends. Rather than effecting a state of 
affairs through coercive means, the power manifest in com­
municative action is drawn from the convictions of those 
who have come to be of one mind. Their convictions arise 
under the "forceless force with which., insights assert 
themselves. Agreements reached in unconstrained communi­
cation gain their power from their claim to rationality, a 
claim inherent in the structure of communication itself.
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The authenticity of the conviction stands or falls with 
the belief in the rightness of the norm in question.
Rather than trying to satisfy their respective interests, 
participants simply strive for agreement. Their use of 
language is illocutionary--the noncoercive establishment 
of the relationship of understanding, instead of perlocu- 
tionary--to effect others to a desired end.
Summary
In summary, we see that Habermas regards moral action 
as necessarily communicative, as a relation between inter­
acting people. Social interaction is necessarily moral 
interaction. Individual and collective identity are 
reciprocally formed in its process. The idea of an uncon­
strained intersubjectivity that reflects generalized needs 
and interests and grounds moral action is inherent in the 
very structure of human communication.
Moral discourse takes place in a language that has 
evolved in a self formative process of the human species 
based on both empirical transactions in the natural world 
and intersubjective interaction in a community of social 
beings. Thus moral discourse contains at. least implicit 
reference to empirical conditions and intersubjectively 
valid conventions that can be rationally justified by 
appeal both to empirical evidence concerning their contribu­
tion to human welfare, and to analytical interpretations of
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the meaning of terms. Justification is ultimately a 
matter for argumentative discourse in which problematic 
moral claims are tested for the generalizability of the 
interests they mediate.
The use of technological and scientistic methods for 
deciding and justifying solutions to practical questions 
generally removes the issues from communicative interaction 
and thereby divests the ensuing actions of ethical signifi­
cance. A case in point was the process recently used by 
our own faculty to choose a name for itself. This process 
consisted of the Delphi Technique in which individuals 
rated a list of proposed names and added comments and addi­
tional names of their own. The results were tallied and 
recirculated through several cycles. The process finally 
yielded a rank ordered list of names, buttressed with 
appropriate statistics, that supposedly reflected the 
preferences of the members of the faculty. Presented with 
the name at the top, one member observed, "Now that just 
isn't the kind of name I thought we would have come up with 
to name our faculty,” and a process of deliberation was 
initiated which resulted in the choice of a different name.
Such practical deliberation allows those involved to 
form rationally their individual and sometimes conflicting 
interests into a common interest tha;t' expresses the will of 
the group. Norms are reinforced and built in this process.
136
Individuals linked together through such norms have 
created a mutual understanding that guides their conduct 
in relation to each other. More is gained than just the 
name of the faculty. An intersubjectivity is created 
that transforms individuals with conflicting perspectives 
into community. Their actions acquire coherence, purpose 
and ethical significance in relation to each other.
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CHAPTER VI 
INQUIRY AND DEVELOPMENT
In the previous chapters I have argued that the inquiry 
processes we have emphasized in education tend to look at 
our experience from a particular perspective. Empirical- 
analytic inquiry is concerned with phenomena that appear 
within a particular constellating framework. The object 
domain of empirical-analytic science is experience object­
ified from the perspective of instrumental action and tech­
nical control. The very phenomena this science studies 
owe their existence, so to speak, to our processes of 
coping with an external world, to our need for successful 
transactions in nature, to that aspect of ourselves that 
is external nature. Our need to transact successfully in 
nature is one guiding orientation for all our action and 
experience. Empirical-analytic science is just this orien­
tation made into a principle. It is inquiry that carries 
this orientation into a highly sophisticated and refined 
logic. Unfortunately, we have sometimes misled ourselves 
into thinking that this logic constitutes knowing. As 
researchers in education, we have tended to lock ourselves 
into the same orientation that underlies our methods. We
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have tended to equate rationality with a particular and 
limited dimension of itself. Following the empirical- 
analytic model we look to regularities in nature for 
principles that can help us teach better and learn better, 
help us to build educational practices and institutions 
that are more effective.
What does effective mean? "Effective" is simply one 
aspect of the guiding orientation that underlies the logic 
and methods of empirical-analytic inquiry itself. We do 
not want to blind ourselves by our very principles and 
methods for seeing. All our seeing and understanding has 
a personal and inter personal dimension that can never be 
reduced to questions of technical effectiveness. We want 
to try to expand our way of seeing, our logic of inquiry, 
to encompass this personal and interpersonal dimension. We 
want to incorporate these dimensions into our logic of 
inquiry. In our efforts to plead a case for the role of 
empirical-analytic science in education, we do not want to 
reduce education to an objectivating and instrumental ration­
ality and proclaim that it only is worthy of the name of 
science.
Education is a developmental process that must include 
these personal and interpersonal dimensions. Science as 
the logic and method of inquiry must be broad enough to 
encompass these dimensions of human understanding. Inquiry
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processes are an integral part of our developmental process. 
We need inquiry processes that incorporate these personal 
and interpersonal dimensions to carry on our developmental 
process. Although inquiry in education relies mainly on 
empirical-analytic inquiry, we need to add something like 
hermeneutic inquiry and critical inquiry to make education, 
and inquiry in education, a fully self-formative process.
Left to the perspective of empirical-analytic inquiry, 
education, as a self-forming process, is limited to just 
one dimension of this process--the objective dimension based 
on the knowledge constitutive interest in technical control. 
A personal dimension, based on the cognitive interest in 
individuated autonomy, and an interpersonal dimension, 
based on the cognitive interest in social orientation, are 
needed as well. We are social beings as well as natural 
ones, and we are persons as well as objects.
Inquiry processes are b o m  out of and in turn transform 
human development. Inquiry reflects and infuses the 
developmental processes of education. In this chapter I 
want to expand on those developmental processes that 
education partakes in. Using the writings of Habermas, I 
will lay out a framework for human development in the three 
dimensions of experience--the objective, the interpersonal 
and the personal.
I believe that in seeing the developmental processes 
of education in their various dimensions, we can see more
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clearly the three forms of inquiry that prefigure this dis­
sertation. I do not mean to emphasize any one of these 
inquiry processes to the exclusion of the others. This 
whole dissertation can be seen as an act of balancing what 
I see as an over-reliance on one particular form. It is 
through articulation of these perspectives (admittedly 
incompletely achieved) that I wish to avoid the imbalance 
which results from inquiry being reduced to just one 
dimens ion.
Ego Development and Identity Formation
Habermas conceives of ego development and the forma­
tion of individual identity as a process in which the indi­
vidual is progressively integrated into the universal 
structures of cognition, speech, and interaction, and 
learns to interpret individual needs within these structures. 
Ego identity refers to the individual symbolic structure 
which permits a personality system to secure continuity 
and consistency in changes of biographical circumstances 
and position in social space.
The universal structure of cognition refers to the 
categorial framework through which our experience of an exter­
nal world is constituted. Habermas uses Jean Piaget's work 
in genetic psychology as a model for how individuals acquire 
competence in relation to objectified experience.
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The universal structure of interaction refers to a 
parallel categorial framework for interpersonal experience. 
This includes a reference system for speaking and acting 
persons and a social structure of norms, roles and values 
that compose the intersubjectivity of social life. Habermas 
uses the work of George Herbert Mead to suggest the develop­
ment of interactive competence in relation to this social 
dimension of our experience.
The universal structure of speech refers to the lin­
guistic intersubjectivity of language and the systems of 
speech acts we use to represent our experience in each domain. 
This speech structure does not have a relationship with 
experience parallel to cognition and interaction but can be 
seen as an aspect of these two structures which can be ab­
stracted from them as the medium of their development that 
exhibits a structure in its own right. The acquisition of, 
or incorporation into, the speech structure leads to communi­
cative competence in a process which Habermas refers to as 
lingui stic development.
The process of gradually learning to interpret one's 
needs within these three structures is called motivational 
development. Habermas borrows from the work of Sigmund 
Freud to build a model of development in this personal 
dimensino. Freud's work is also used to build a related 
model of systematically distorted communication based on 
suppressed needs.
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The structures of cognition, interaction and speech 
have an existence that is, in a sense, independent of the 
particular individual organism. Ego development and 
identity formation is the process of becoming integrated 
into, or incorporating these structures and ultimately 
differentiating ourselves from them as autonomous individu­
als . An individual experiences his or her inner nature sub­
jectively in relation to "the objectivity of outer nature, the 
normativity of society and the intersubjectivity of 
language." Ego development is the formation of a subjec­
tive self as marked off from, or as contrastable with, (a) 
perceptions of a world that are objective in the sense that 
everyone in the same place would perceive the same thing,
(b) norms that are valid in the sense that everyone in the 
same situation would acknowledge their validity, and (c) 
utterances that are comprehensible by anyone that shares 
the same language.
Through these demarcations, the ego can identify with 
itself in the distinction between its own subjectivity and 
its nonsubjective experience as mediated through the uni­
versal structures of cognition, interaction and speech.
Thus the ego develops in the reciprocal constitution 
of subject and object. In the words of Charles Peirce, "We
3
become aware of our self in becoming aware of the not-self." 
The sense of externality, or non-ego, in dialectical
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interplay with the ego gives rise to the sense of self, to 
the sense of an emergent will. This not-self or non-ego 
includes a material and a social aspect which, at a certain 
stage in development, are both mediated through a third 
element of language. The developing ego internalizes the 
universal structures of cognition, interaction and speech 
and gains a measure of autonomy from experience constituted 
within each. As Piaget noted, "The organism constantly 
assimilates the milieu to its structure while simultaneously, 
it accomodates the structure to its milieu; the adaptation 
can be defined as an equilibrium between such changes.
To become an autonomous and responsible person it is 
necessary to gain the technical and practical skills and the 
language of one's culture. But an equally important dimension 
is Learning to express and pursue one's needs by means of these 
capacities . Through development processes we acquire competen­
cies for (a) coping with the world, (b) interacting with others 
and (c) speaking. At the same time we gain the capacity for (d) 
meeting our needs , goals and aspirations , individually and col­
lectively, within the instrumental means of existing technology, 
within the guiding structure of social norms, and within the 
available linguistic symbols of language. These processes de- 
define cognitive development, interactive development, 
linguistic development and motivational development, respec­
tively. Through these processes the individual is pro­
gressively integrated into the culturally given structures
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of cognition, interaction, and speech and eventually differ­
entiated from these structures' in the process of individu­
ation.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will briefly intro­
duce and follow these developmental processes through three 
sequential stages. Stage I, consisting of approximately 
the first seven years of life, refers to egocentric 
development which results in the formation of a natural 
identity. Stage II, or sociocentric development, includes 
the years from about age seven to about age twelve and 
results in the formation of a role identity. Finally, stage 
III, called universalistic development, begins at about 
the age of twelve years and reaches equalibrium at approxi­
mately age fourteen years and results in the formation of 
an ego identity.
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of cognitive, 
interactive and motivational development traced through 
these three stages. Development is shown as progressing 
within the three experiential realms of nature, society and 
the individual, each portrayed as an ellipse which is joined 
with the others at their bases. This is intended to 
represent the lack of differentiation between the experien­
tial realms at birth and the progressive differentiation 
that takes place as the individual is integrated into the 














































Figure 1* Ego development: Stage I, egocentric;
Stage II, sociocentric; and Stage III, universalistic.
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process. Linguistic development is not depicted as a 
separate realm but can be conceived as an aspect of develop­
ment in the three represented realms that begins at about 
the age of eighteen months.
The model of development begins with the autistic 
infant in which there is no subjective separation between 
the individual and the physical and social environment.
Stage I: Egocentric Development
Cognitive Development. The first stage includes 
Piaget's sensorimotor and preoperational stages of cogni­
tive development. The sensorimotor period precedes speech 
and lasts until about the age of eighteen months. Con- 
structured in this period are the basic structures of cog­
nitive competence: space, substance, time and causality.
For example, let us consider the notions of substance and 
space.
Place an object before an eight month old infant that 
can reach out and grasp something it sees. As the infant 
reaches out, screen the object so that it cannot be seen.
The infant will not try to reach beyond the screen for the 
object. The object has no substantiality, no permanence, 
but simply loses its existence once it disappears from 
view. Two months later, the infant will reach behind the 
screen to take the object. Yet if you remove the once 
grasped object and place it behind a second screen in
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another location (while the infant watches you), it will 
reach behind the first screen: there is semipermanence
but without localization. By the age of eighteen months 
the infant will search for the object localized by the 
series of movements and displacements of the object up to 
the moment of disappearance. The infant will have developed 
the basic structure of substance.
Similarly, for the new b o m  child there is no differ­
entiated sense of space in which to localize objects, for 
there are no objects. The infant will gradually develop 
a sense of tactical, visual, and auditory space all centered 
on the body but not including the body itself as an element 
in space. Rather, it is a series of uncoordinated ego­
centric spaces. Yet by eighteen months the child will have 
developed a notion of a general space for localizing all 
objects, including him or herself. There has been a com­
plete decentralization of the ego which now sees itself as 
an element among others and can differentiate itself from 
them and the environment they comprise. Already the ego 
has begun to emerge in the process of mutual adaptation of 
the organism and environment.
The preoperational phase begins at about eighteen 
months. The child begins to acquire what Piaget calls the 
"symbolic function," the capacity to represent something 
with something else. The symbolic function is acquired by 
differentiating symbols from their significations so
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that objects and situations can be called up that are not 
actually perceived. Objects and actions can be represented 
by gestures, drawings, other objects, mental images, and 
social symbols or words in the form of speech. One has 
implicitly the response one would have to the object in 
the presence only of a symbol representing it.
The symbolic function eventually gives the child the 
capacity to interiorize actions that formerly it could only 
perform materially. For example, we saw above that by age 
eighteen months an infant will have acquired the ability to 
follow and localize an object through a series of displace­
ments in space. By age four years, a child has progressed 
in this capacity to the point that it can repeatedly follow 
a route to and from school. Yet given a set of materials 
to represent the streets and buildings on the way, the 
child will be unable to place them in the order of the 
journey home from school. The child can give only a kind 
of "motory representation." One child said, "I leave the 
house, I go like that (gesture), then like that (gesture), 
then I make a turning like that, then I reach school.11"*
The journey to school can be done materially, but is only 
partially represented. The action is incompletely interi- 
orized.
Through the symbolic function, actions become increas­
ingly capable of being carried out in thought or
151
symbolically. The actions are interiorized. During the 
preoperational phase the child develops emerging represen­
tations of actions involving applications of the schemes 
of time, space, substance and causality. By age seven, 
these representations begin to form into complete structures 
which we will consider in Stage II.
Interactive Development. In the preoperational stage 
of cognitive development the child begins to symbolize 
experience in a clearly explicit way. We noted that some 
symbols the child assimilates are social symbols, including 
speech symbols. Mead develops this social aspect of the 
symbolic, function more systematically than Piaget and we 
can use his analysis as a basis for the acquisition of 
interactive competence.
The individual develops the ability to interact with 
others by learning the system of symbols, the symbolic 
structure, by which members of a culture communicate. A 
symbol is social if it implicitly calls up the same response 
in the one who generates the symbol as it does in the one 
to whom the symbol is addressed. The responses are the 
same in the sense that they are functionally similar. If 
I ask you to close the door I anticipate the response that 
will be invoked in you. My expression has the func­
tionally identical meaning to myself as it does
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to you. Through this functional identity of responses to
*
symbols we can mutually produce, we enter into each others' 
perspective to communicate and interact. We control and 
coordinate social behavior through these social symbols.
They constitute our shared social awareness, the inter­
subjectivity of our social life world. We can see that 
Mead builds on Hegel's construction of the self in the 
intersection of perspectives. Awareness is the response 
to objects in experience and we share awareness through 
social symbols. Individual consciousness is a moment of 
collective consciousness, Individuals in social interac­
tion share a functionally identical perspective by means 
of this collective consciousness. Therefore, then can enter 
into each others1 perspective to control and coordinate 
interaction by means of social symbols. The individuals 
each look at their own actions from the standpoint of the 
others; they share a perspective. In any interaction, 
each participant responds implicitly in the same way as 
the others and thereby anticipates their responses while 
simultaneously carrying out his or her own part. Inter­
subjectivity is this awareness of shared habitual responses 
to corresponding objects evoked by common symbols.
Just as we saw that the self arises out of interaction 
between the ego and the non-ego as nature or the environment,
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so we see that another moment of the emergence of the self 
is in the interaction between ego and non-ego as other 
speaking and acting persons, as society. The self is part 
of a social process and part of a natural process.
The fully developed self cannot be identified with 
the body only, but in Stage I of ego development, the child 
secures identity in the persistence of its body, that is, 
by its temporal continuity and boundary-maintaining proper­
ties . The child thereby develops a natural identity in 
which practical and technical concerns are not clearly dis­
tinguished. As we saw above, the child has learned to per­
ceive permanent objects in the environment but the differ­
entiation between physical and social domains remains 
unclear. Piaget notes that the first objects to acquire 
cognitive permanence are other persons rather than inani-
g
mate objects. While the child can differentiate itself 
from the environment, it retains a body-centered perspective. 
The child cannot understand its experience from a perspec­
tive outside its own standpoint. Ego development is ego­
centric .
In early stages of play, the child cannot consciously 
organize its behavior in terms of the general expectations 
of others. It plays various roles, like doctor, nurse and 
patient, with no reciprocal unity and stability. The child 
does not play according to rules, but impulsively and with­
out hesitation. It cannot leave its own point of view. The
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child forms only individual concrete expectations, incorpo­
rates only individual actions, and responds only to indi­
vidual consequences of its actions.
The acquisition of interactive competence involves the 
mastery of the symbolic structure given in one's culture.
In Stage I, the child incorporates only individual concrete 
expectations, actions and consequences of actions.
Motivational Development. Psychosexually, the child 
is in the preoedipal phase during Stage I . Only concrete 
needs are experienced. These needs are integrated into 
the technical and practical structures solely by means of 
actions reinforced through generalized pleasure and pain. 
The child acquires habits and orientations that are tech­
nically effective in this regard, as well as practically 
successful in relation to expectations it must obey. The 
individual is growing into the symbolic structure of the 
family and learning to express its intentions and needs in 
that structure. The child assimilates actions that tend 
to satisfy concrete needs.
Linguistic Development, or communicative development, 
takes place along two dimensions. The first is the degree 
to which the individual can differentiate speech itself 
from other forms of action and the context of interaction. 
The second dimension is the degree to which the person has 
integrated cognitive structures into the speech structure.
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In Stage I we have seen that the child learns to master
•*
symbolically mediated interaction, to internalize and use 
linguistic symbols to mediate interaction with others. 
However, at this stage, speech and action are not clearly 
differentiated. There is no distinction between the 
semantic content of expressions and the behavioral disposi­
tions of the child. Neither cognitive, nor interactive 
competence has been integrated into speech and therefore 
the performative, representative and expressive functions 
of speech are not distinguished.
Summary. By the end of Stage I, the child has acquired 
the fundamental cognitive structures and the ability to 
carry out symbolically actions organized by these structures. 
Interactions are guided by individual behavior expectations 
and are motivated by generalized pleasure and pain, and 
concrete needs and desires. The child has formed a natural 
identity in which the social and material realms are not 
distinguished. Linguistically the child has acquired the 
symbolic function, but has not integrated speech and cogni­
tion nor distinguished speech and other forms of action and 
interaction.
Stage II: Sociocentric Ego Development
Cognitive Development. By about the age of seven, the 
child begins the stage of concrete operations in the realm 
of cognitive development. In this stage interiorized actions
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become coordinated into total systems which Piaget calls 
operations, The symbolic function begun in Stage I has made 
possible the interiorization of actions. In Stage II, 
these actions now become organized into systems or struc­
tures in such a way that they become reversible. The 
individual thereby gains an additional measure of decenter­
ing from the limited perspective of its own ego. Operations 
are interiorized complete systems of reversable actions.
With the operations organized into an integrated system, 
the child can abstract from the various dimensions of the 
action structure and look at a problem from different 
aspects.
Operations do not become organized into the logic of 
speech or propositions in this stage, but remain a logic of 
concrete object manipulations such as classfications, rela­
tions and numbers. For example addition, at this stage, is 
an interiorized scheme for collecting or combining concrete 
elements. It is reversible in the operation of subtraction.
During the period of concrete operations the child 
gradually develops and internalizes a complete system of 
reference for space, time, substance and causality. An 
example concerning substance: The operation of classifying
substances by including a subcategory within a larger 
category requires an understanding that the part is smaller 
than the whole and the capacity for reversibility in
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moving back and forth from parts to wholes. Before Stage 
IX, a child shown a dozen flowers including six daisies, 
and asked whether there are more daisies or more flowers, 
will reply, "There are more daisies", or, "it is the same 
because there are six on one side and six on the other."^ 
The child thinks the flowers are what are left after the 
daisies, and cannot distinguish part-part relationships 
from part-whole relationships, which requires the capacity 
of reversibility--from, the parts back to the whole from 
which they came. By age nine, the child can do this 
easily.
Interactive Development. Parallel to rhe decentering 
that takes place in the child’s cognitive development is 
a corresponding decentering in interactive development. 
Instead of incorporating only concrete expectations, actions 
and consequences from the social structure, the developing 
child begins to form generalized expectations that are 
reciprocally shared with important reference persons. The 
child begins to share the perspectives and attitudes of 
the surrounding culture. These general perspectives and 
attitudes become the context within which the child under­
stands and interprets its actions.
Mead names this general perspective in which everyone 
participates, the "generalized other." The generalized 
other is not simply the combined attitudes and perspectives
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of all the individuals in the culture. Rather, these atti­
tudes and perspectives exist independently of individuals 
in the sense that individuals incorporate and take part 
in them. These alternative perspectives represent different 
ways of responding to situations, objects and events in 
our experience. They are different ways to do things, 
different possible organizations of events. They comprise 
the norms and values of the culture. The generalized 
other, or community perspective has an external objectivity. 
Yet it evolves and is transformed in the>'process of social 
interaction. Individual perspectives grow out of it.
Social interaction is possible because each actor 
can anticipate the responses of other actors in particular 
situations. Each person takes the attitudes of the others 
in terms of a generalization of their perspectives. In 
concrete interaction, the individual implicitly takes the 
role of the others while overtly performing his or her own 
role. The capacity to take the role of others in this 
way results in the general perspective of any actor in a 
comparable situation--the perspective of the generalized 
other.
In Stage II the child becomes more integrated into the 
social structure by beginning to learn these generalized 
expectations, norms and roles of social interaction. 
Similarly, the individual begins to differentiate particular 
expectations and actions from general norms and particular
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actors (including him or herself) from anonymous roles. 
Speaking and acting intentional subjects are thereby differ­
entiated from perceptible and manipulable things.
This increased generalization and differentiation of 
perspective allows an increasing decentralization of ego 
development. The child learns to play social roles and to 
take part in social interaction. It gradually learns what 
that part is as defined by sex and position in the family 
and other elements of society. The child locates itself 
in the social life world and begins to develop a role 
identity. The unity of self is based on membership in a 
particular social structure and internalized and intersub- 
jectively shared norms and roles. The child's perspective 
has expanded from the limitations of its own ego to that of 
the generalized other so that development in this stage is 
sociocentric.
Motivational Development. Stage II represents the 
oedipal phase of psychosexual development: the child must
assimilate the social structure of the family. The child's 
needs are met subject to the approval of primary reference 
persons. The child must learn to interpret its needs within 
the norms of the f a m i l y  social structure. It is thereby 
freed of the egocentric bond to its own gratification in 
terms of concrete desires and aversions, Motives for action 
become culturally interpreted needs, Satisfaction of these
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needs depends on adherence to socially recognized expecta­
tions . The child thus learns to distinguish socially- 
sanctioned conduct from its own interests, duty from mere 
impulse or desire. However, since the child can now make 
these distinctions, it can pursue its own interests 
strategically within the constraints of social norms and 
values.
Linguistic Development. During this second stage of 
development the child gains a mastery of natural language.
In the first place there is an integration of speech and 
cognition so that the child's cognitive operations become 
linguistically organized. The child can now refer to situa­
tions different from the situation at hand. It becomes 
possible to use language independent of the concrete action 
context. The child can now differentiate the propositional 
content of its utterances from what it is trying to do with 
the utterance in relation to the listener. Language becomes 
an independent medium over against the speaker, the 
normative structure of society and the world of external 
nature. This happens in a way that allows the child to 
emphasize the propositional content, the interpersonal 
relationship, or the expressive aspect, so that the child 
can choose among cognitive, interactive and expressive uses 
of speech. This capacity is acquired by mastering the sys­
tems of constative, regulative and expressive speech acts.
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Finally, the child learns to differentiate two refer­
ence systems. One reference system is for categorizing 
the objects of an objectified reality--of things and events 
that are accessible through instrumental action. The other 
reference system is for a nonobjectified reality of social 
life experienced through interpersonal communication.
Summary. In summary, the key structural feature in the 
transition from egocentric to sociocentric development of 
Stage II is the ability of the child to take on the perspec­
tive of an anonymous observer. The child acquires a 
decentered perception of reality and is able to respond with 
increased reflexivity, generalization and differentiation.
Cognitively, the child has reached the level of con­
crete operations and, interactively, has incorporated the 
norms, roles and generalized behavior expectations of 
the immediate culture to form a role identity. The child's 
actions are motivated by culturally interpreted needs and 
both cognitive operations and social interaction have 
become linguistically organized.
Stage III: Universalistic Ego Development
Cognitive Development. In the third stage, beginning 
about age twelve, cognitive development matures into the 
capacity for formal operations. The logic acquired and 
internalized in relation to concrete actions are now 
developed at a propositional level. The operations
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themselves become linguistically organized. We enter a 
stage of operations on operations, by casting these opera­
tions into propositional form. For example, the child 
learns to combine the operations involved in weight and 
volume to yield the ratio of density--an operation on oper­
ations .
Most importantly at this stage, with the ability to 
linguistically formulate and work with sets of operations, 
the child can now begin to abstract himself from concrete 
operations on physical objects in his immediate presence.
The child learns to work with hypothetical states of 
affairs represented by statements, propositions and hypothe­
ses that can be verbally expressed. Previous to Stage III 
a child is limited in possibilities to the direct extension 
of what is actually present in his sensory experience--to 
immediate concrete reality. The capacity for formal opera­
tions allows the child to consider hypothetical states of 
affairs to formulate new possibilities and to accept and 
discard hypotheses in his mind.
Interactive Development. With the acquisition of for­
mal operational thought, an additional degree of decentering 
takes place. The individual can now become detached to a 
degree from the inherited views of nature and the roles, 
norms and values of society. It becomes possible to con­
sider them hypothetically, Habermas explains,
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Until then, the epistemic ego, bound to concrete 
operations, confronted an objectivated nature; and 
the practical ego, immersed in group perspectives, 
was dissolved in quasi-natural systems of norms.
But as soon as the youth no longer naively accepts 
the validity claims contained in assertions and 
norms, he can transcend the objectivism of a given 
nature and explain the given from contingent 
boundary conditions in the light of hypotheses; 
and he can burst the sociocentrism of a traditional 
order and can understand (and if necessary criticize) 
existing norms as mere conventions in the light of 
principles.8
The individual comes to see that a person's perspective of 
nature is relative to the progress of science and the system 
of social norms is relative to social interaction. He or 
she begins to learn and acquire principles that can be 
used to critically evaluate and generate norms. In this 
process the individual gradually acquires an autonomous ego 
identity.
During this time the youth learns the important dis­
tinction between norms, on the one hand, and prin­
ciples according to which we can generate norms, on 
the other. Such principles can serve as standards 
for criticizing and justifying existing norms; to 
one who judges on principle, all binding norms 
must appear as mere conventions ... the ego can no 
longer identify with itself through particular 
roles and existing norms...it must retract its 
identity, so to speak, behind the line of all par­
ticular roles and norms, and stabilize it only 
through the abstract ability to present itself 
in all situations as the one who can satisfy the 
requirements of consistency even in the face of 
incompatible role expectations ....The ego identity 
of the adult confirms itself in the ability to con­
struct new identities and simultaneously to inte­
grate them with those overcome, so as to organize 
oneself and ones interactions in an unmistakable 
life history,9
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Through the various stages of ego development the 
individual has gradually incorporated increasingly compre­
hensive segments of the social structure: from concrete
actions, to generalized behavior expectations, to princi­
ples for justifying norms. Thus development moves through 
three stages characterized by increasing reflexivity. 
Individual behavior expectations in Stage I become reflexive 
in Stage II: expectations are mutually expectable. These
reciprocal expectations become reflexive in Stage III in 
the form of standardized norms. That is, norms are tested 
for their generlizability. Interactive competence has pro­
gressed to the stage where the individual can achieve 
rational autonomy and an ego identity.
Motivational Development. At Stage III the individual 
reaches the adolescent stage of psychosexual development.
The child must grow out of the specific social structure of 
the family to become an adult in the larger society. It 
thus repeats at a higher level the decentering that took 
place in Stage II with the dissolution of natural identity 
and the formation of a role identity related to the family.
The child's needs that were interpreted and integrated 
into the social structure reflected in the family, are now 
treated hypothetically. It becomes possible to discover, 
shape and modify the individual's needs and interests in 
reciprocal interaction— what Habermas calls the discursive
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formation of the will. The critique and justification of 
needs can itself achieve a motivating force. Motives for 
action can now include principles. Action is guided not 
merely by existing norms and values but by norms that are 
in principle justifiable. The individual's need fulfill­
ment is integrated into the process of discursive will for­
mation and the discovery of generalizable interests.
Linguistic Development. With formal operational 
thought the individual can now participate in pure discourse 
or argumentation. Speech and cognition become completely 
differentiated. The speaker only cannot separate cognitive, 
interactive and expressive uses of speech to thematize a 
particular dimension, but can now question or treat hypo­
thetically the validity of the claims to truth, legitimacy 
and authenticity implicit in speech acts.
The propositional content can be abstracted from 
assertions and treated as hypothetical states of affairs 
which may or may not be factual. The question can be re­
solved discursively.
The speaker can also abstract communication from the 
practical context of ongoing interaction in which relation­
ships are being formed, to consider hypothetically the 
legitimacy of a norm or standard reflected in a proposed 
interaction. The proposed relationship and its normative 
context are thematized. The problematic norm is isolated
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and tested for rightness; the needs and interests at stake 
are examined for their generalizability.
Habermas does not consider the claim to authenticity 
to be discursively redeemable. Rather it is tested through 
the consistency of actions, expressions and gestures over a 
period of time.
The experiential domains of external nature, society 
and inner nature, with respect to which the ego is differ­
entiated, are thematically represented in the representa­
tive, interactive and expressive uses of speech. The valid­
ity of such expressions is tacitly assumed in ordinary 
interaction. With the acquisition of hypothetical thought 
these "regions" of experience are expressed under the possi­
bility of their repudiation. This implies that the individ­
ual has learned to differentiate the "modalities of being, 
that is, he or she can distinguish being (that which really 
is) from mere appearance, what is from what ought to be, 
and essence (the individuated self) from its appearances.
Summary. In Stage III, the individual attains an 
additional degree of decentering and autonomy in the form 
of hypothetical thought. In cognitive development, the 
individual reaches the level of formal operations, the 
capacity to perform cognitive operations hypothetically. 
Interactively, the individual learns to treat norms, roles 
and values hypothetically and incorporates principles and 
reflexive norms from the social structure to form an ego
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identity. Needs, too, can be considered hypothetically so 
that actions are motivated by universalized need interpre­
tations gained through discourse. Finally, the individual 
can hypothetically consider the validity claims of truth, 
legitimacy, and authenticity inherent in linguistic expres­
sions .
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It is my belief that much of educational theory and 
practice is based on and hampered by a restricted concep­
tion of rationality. Trends in education such as the 
behavioral objectives movement, the competency movement, 
the. behavior modification movement, the accountability 
movement, natural system models, strategic decision models, 
and research, development, dissemination and evaluation 
(RDD&E) models all suffer from a common failing: they are
based on an objectifying and instrumental perspective that 
splits educational entities into subject and object and 
means and ends. From curriculum development to the dissemi­
nation of innovative programs, educational practice is 
repleat with assumptions that not only reduce our humanity, 
deprive us of autonomy and responsibility, and divest our 
actions of moral import, but stand in the way of effective 
human development and genuine social progress as well.
This is particularly true of inquiry in education for 
educational research and evaluation have modeled themselves 
after the empirical-analytic sciences. Much of inquiry in 
education is derived from the theory and methods of
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psychology and social psychology which themselves are based 
on positivistic conceptions of rationality.
The dominance of positivistic conceptions of rational­
ity could lead Hay Brodbeck to the following assertion in 
an article on "Logic and Scientific Method in Research on 
Teaching" in the prestigious Handbook of Research on 
Teaching:
The language of science, devoid of greetings, 
exclamations, questions, and commands, consists 
wholly of declarative sentences. By means of 
them, the scientist talks about the world.
These sentences may be as simple and qualitative 
as the statement that ice is cold or as complica­
ted and quantitative as the Newtonian law of 
attraction. *■
By limiting the language of science to declarative sentences 
about the world, scientific inquiry is reduced to the 
objectifying, technical realm. Interactive and expressive 
uses of language are barred from scientific rationality 
except as they are reducable in some way to the representa­
tive function. Excluded are the personal and interpersonal 
dimensions of experience and human understanding.
Similarly, in the article that follows Brodbeck's, 
"Paradigms for Research on Teaching," the editor of the 
Handbook, N.L. Gage, defines teaching as "any interpersonal 
influence aimed at changing the ways in which other persons 
can or will behave," and defines research as "activity aimed
at increasing our power to understand, predict, and control
2
events of a given kind." Only the word "understand" keeps
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Gage's definitions from completely reducing teaching, and 
inquiry on teaching, to the technical realm.
The same picture holds for educational evaluation, 
the focus of my own professional involvement with educa­
tional inquiry. In this Chapter I want to further illus­
trate the dominance of the empirical-analytic framework 
in educational inquiry by considering eight prevailing 
models of evaluation. I explore the relation between these 
evaluation models and the theory of inquiry developed in 
this study by comparing these models with the three forms of 
inquiry, empirical-analytic, hermeneutic, and critical.
Following this analysis, I explore some methodological 
implications of the theory of inquiry by briefly illustra­
ting how one might conduct an evaluation using this frame­
work. I take as my example the workshop on conflict I used 
in Chapter I to illustrate the difficulties I experienced in 
relation to the inadequacies of prevailing conceptions of 
rationality.
Predominant Evaluation Models
To illustrate the prevailing paradigm, I choose evalu­
ation inquiry primarily because I am most familar with that 
form of inquiry in education. Additionally, evaluation 
illustrates the problematic place of values and practical 
interests in the inquiry process. With educational research 
reduced to empirical-analytic inquiry, it is easier to
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overlook the place of values in the inquiry process; with 
evaluation it is not possible. In spite of this, the 
dominant perspectives still offer considerable enertia to 
the recognition of the place of values in educational evalu­
ation.
In 1974, Bernstein and Freeman published a study
sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation in which they
reviewed the quality of 236 evaluation studies directly
3
funded by agencies of the federal government in 1970. The 
standards of quality they used are simply a quantitative 
operationalization of the preodominant evaluation research 
paradigm.
Table 2 shows the criteria they used and the code by 
which these criteria were quantified. Inspection of this 
table reveals that Bernstein and Freeman limited their 
attention to the following aspects of the evaluation studies 
they reviewed: the nature of the research design, the
representativeness of the sample, the sampling plan, the 
type and nature of data analysis and the quality of measure­
ment procedure. These are the same considerations that re­
ceive the most attention from any standard textbook on edu­
cational research. The highest ratings are given to 
experimental designs using multivariate statistics on the 
quantitative analysis of adequate measures drawn from a 
representative random sample. The criteria for measures
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TABLE 2
Bernstein and Freeman Codings of Evaluation Quality Variables^
Variable Measuring Some Aspect of 
Evaluation Quality
Coding Scheme (where higher coding 
number represents higher quality)
1. Nature of Research Design 0 = Descriptive Study
1 - Comparative, longitudinal or
cross-sectional studies with­
out randomisation or control
2 = Experimental designs without
both randomization or control
3 ■ Experimental designs with
randomization and control
2. Representativeness of the 
Sample
0 - Haphazardly drawn samples
1 ■ Moderately representative
3. Sampling
4. Type of Data Analysis
0 “ Non-systematic, non-random,
non-systematic random, and 
random or non-random cluster 
samples
1 = Stratified random, simple
random, or all (i.e. universe)
0 ™ No statistics, ratings or
impressions
1 " Narratives or imnressionis-
• tic summaries
2 “ Rating from qualitative data
3 ° Simple descriptive statis­
tics
4 •* Multivariate statistics
5. Nature of Data Analysis 0 “ Qualitative Analyses
1 « Evenly divided between quali­
tative and quantative analy­
ses
2 = Quantitative analyses
6. Quality of Measurement 
Procedures
0 ° Inadequate Measurement
1 *> Adequate
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are those of adequate content validity from Kerlinger in 
Foundations of Behavioral Research.^  Patton, in reviewing 
Bernstein and Freeman’s study concludes with the following 
statement:
While there can be some argument about the 
reasons for the dominance of the natural science 
model in educational social scientific research, 
the fact of the dominance cannot be seriously 
doubted. The issue for us is that the very domi­
nance of The Scientific Method in evaluation 
research appears to have cut off the great 
majority of its practitioners from serious consid­
eration of any alternative "'research paradigm~
The label "research" has come to mean the equiva- 
lent of employing The Scientific Method— of work­
ing within the dominant paradigm.6
It is true that in recent years evaluation theorists 
have attempted to delineate a broad range of evaluation 
models appropriate for a wider range of evaluation func­
tions, assumptions and perspectives. At the same time, 
however, it remains true that positivistic influences still 
dominate evaluation methodology and the prevailing models 
are predisposed toward positivistic theories of knowlege 
and values. To illustrate this bias I will review eight 
evaluation paradigms and contrast them with empirical-analy- 
tic, hermeneutic and critical inquiry.
Systems Analysis Models. In this approach evaluation 
is generally initiated by high level administrators and 
managers in order to improve and justify large scale social 
action programs. Value judgments are made by specialists 
and top level administrators on the basis of efficiency in
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the production of social services, quality control and 
accountability. These judgments are justified by empirical 
evidence of the attainment of expected results.
The logic of inquiry consists in the reduction of the 
evaluatum to a causal relationship between program inputs 
and output variables. Agreement is presupposed on the 
choice of a few output measures which must meet classical 
measurement criteria. Program alternatives are treated as 
planned variations and must meet classical criteria of the 
internal and external validity of experiments. Through 
homogeneous scaling, all variables are reduced into a 
quantitative model such as regression analysis. Program 
alternatives are systematically compared through cost bene­
fit analysis and the most efficient alternative is judged 
most valuable.
Goal Attainment Models. Evaluation is generally 
initiated by administrators charged with responsibility 
for the success of educational programs, sometimes at the 
request of funding agencies or public officials. Evaluation 
focuses on the achievement of prespecified instructional 
goals in order to facilitate effective curriculum design 
and instruction, as well as to hold educators accountable 
for student learning. Value judgments are based on empiri­
cal evidence of student performance meeting prespecified 
standards.
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The subject of goal based evaluation is the effective­
ness of instructional activities. The logic of inquiry 
treats the evaluatum as a cause whose effect is the 
students' performance. The desired post instructional 
status of the learner is described and, for evaluation 
purposes, reduced to indices meeting the standards of 
criterion referenced measurement. Since instruction is 
judged against these measures, it must be demonstrated 
that the instruction itself':and not something else produced 
the results obtained. In other words a causal relationship 
should be shown to exist between instruction and student 
performance. Therefore evaluation designs should approxi­
mate as closely as possible the criteria of classical 
experimental designs for external and internal validity. 
Value judgments are based on the extent to which educational 
programs lead to (in a causal sense) learner behavior which 
meets stipulated performance standards.
Both the systems analysis and goal attainment models 
are consistent with the empirical-analytic form of inquiry. 
Both are guided by the cognitive interest in technical con­
trol. Both assume the problematic situation to be a lack of 
technically tested rules for behavior that would produce 
desired effects. Finally, both take place in the behavioral 
system of instrumental action in which the evaluatum is 
conceived as a means which should take advantage of natural
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empirical regularities and thereby lead to a subjective 
end which has, in turn, been objectified into quantitative 
indices. They therefore aim at the discovery of the 
pertinent empirical laws or relations. Knowledge claims in 
each case are justified by appeal to the appropriate stan­
dards of empirical research which, in turn, depend on the 
success of instrumental operations.
Decision Making Models. Evaluations are conducted 
to provide administrators with useful information for 
judging decision alternatives, including accountability 
decisions. An evaluation generally addresses a complete 
educational program and can focus on the program’s goals, 
development, process or results. The formal theoretical 
foundation for these models is based on synoptic decision 
making models "which assume complete delineation of decision 
alternatives, complete delineation of criteria on which the 
alternatives are to be judged, and complete assessment of
Q
each alternative on each criterion." In practice, however, 
the evaluations tend to be less formal.
The evaluation consists in clarifying decision alter­
natives, delineating the information needed, obtaining this 
information and applying it to the decision tasks. The 
information required will generally be different for each 
stage or aspect of the program being evaluated. Examples 
of methods include needs assessments, questionnaires, inter­
views and criterion referenced tests. Panel visits,
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advocate teams and PERT analysis are also sometimes used.
The basic goal is to obtain that information which is both 
feasible and useful in making the required decisions. The 
information acquired represents a factual claim and is 
expected to meet scientific criteria of internal and 
external validity, reliability, and objectivity. However, 
traditional causal-comparative and experimental designs are 
generally believed to have limited applicability in decision 
models. Value judgments are based on empirical evidence of 
anticipated results or of conditions that support a particu­
lar course of action.
I believe that decisions models of evaluation can best 
be characterized as practical deliberation supported very 
strongly by empirical inquiry, with most of the actual 
evaluation following the procedures and standards of empiri­
cal inquiry. Hermeneutic inquiry is not necessarily exluded 
and may enter in as a case study or ethnographic description 
of a program. Panel visits and advocate team approaches 
take on a hermeneutic quality.
Goal Free Models, Goal free evaluations usually 
address particular products or programs which are sponsored 
by private or public funding agencies and then developed by 
an intermediate group or institution for public consumption. 
Evaluations are initiated by sponsors strictly for the 
benefit of consumers of these programs, Goal free
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evaluations, whether formative or summative, focus exclu­
sively on results or effects of the product or program, 
with no consideration given to the developer's goals or 
intentions so as to escape co-option and other difficul­
ties usually encountered in goal statements such as 
grandiose over-statement or vagueness and incompleteness.
This model is analogous to the approach used by the 
Consumer's Union or Ralph Nader.
The evaluation task is to discover the positive and 
negative effects of the program and compare these with
i
the results of competing options against a profile of 
demonstrated needs. Needs assessments sometimes provide the 
positive standard for judging the program. The information 
gained for this comparison is usually quantitative and must 
meet criteria of scientific validity and reliability. The 
identified needs are then treated as ends which the program 
should produce more efficiently than its competitors in 
order to receive a favorable judgment. Based on an instru­
mental model, the inquiry process seeks to relate the inter­
vention and a set of desirable effects discerned by the 
evaluator. Through experimental or "modus operandi" methods 
a causal relationship is sought. The modus operandi pro­
cedure, used by detectives, historians and anthropologists, 
established a configuration or "MO" of events from the 
"trail" left by the object that can be pieced together to 
build a "case" connecting a cause with an effect.
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While there is clearly an important role for empirical 
inquiry in goal free evaluation, I do not believe this model 
can be completely reduced to the empirical form. Qualita­
tive analysis and description are also important in the 
search for positive and negative effects. Since objectivity 
is not defined as intersubjective reliability in this frame­
work, "it is possible for a single observer, unaided by any 
psychometric instrument, to be more objective than a bat-
o
talion of observers loaded with reliable instruments," 
provided there is sufficient control of bias. The most 
important considerations are that the evaluation be guided 
by consumer interests and that irrelevant interests and 
other sources of error and bias be adequately controlled. 
Empirical evidence and rational argument are combined to 
build a case linking a program to its effects. The merit 
of the program is expressed in an overall summative judg­
ment that ranks it against its competitors in terms of 
consumer needs. Hermeneutic inquiry per se probably has 
limited use.
Art Criticism Models. Drawing on the traditions of 
art and literary criticism, Elliot Eisner has proposed a 
"connoisseurship" model of evaluation. This approach aims 
at helping "teachers and others in education learn to see 
and think about what they do."^ Connoisseurship is the 
art of perception that makes it possible to appreciate
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complex qualities and their relationships and to judge them 
against highly developed and sensitive standards. Such 
judgment requires a profound understanding and familiarity 
with the phenomena involved and with the standards of the 
tradition it represents. "If connoisseurship is the art 
of appreication," says Eisner, then "criticism is the art 
of disclosure.... the critic aims at providing a rendering 
in linguistic terms of what it is that he or she has encoun­
tered in such a way that others not possessing his level of 
connoisseurship can also enter into the work,"^ In Dewey's
words, "The end of criticism is reeducation of the percep-
12tion of the work of art;" in this vein, Eisner suggests 
that "the function of criticism is education. Its aim is 
to lift the veils that keep the eyes from seeing by pro­
viding a bridge needed by others to discern the qualities
13and relationships within some arena of activity." The 
bridge is often provided by literary devices such as 
metaphor, contrast, redundancy, and emphasis. The portrayal 
requires familiarity with the socio-cultural context of its 
audience and must be guided by a frame of reference usually 
developed and represented in some tradition. "Sheer des-
n  I
cription, unguided by value considerations, is rudderless." ■ 
In the classroom, criticism is the art of capturing 
what it is that is happening, the meaning and significance 
of actions in their cultural matrix, Criticism is itself
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judged on the bais of the quality of its illumination and 
its referential adequacy. The critic's audience should be 
able to see in the event what it is the critic has dis­
covered and described. Another criterion'is coherence: 
the critic's portrayal should organize the events in ques­
tion into a unified configuration that is clearly signifi­
cant relative to the purposes for the critique. The audi­
ence should have a kind of "aha" experience as insight 
develops and a pattern falls into place. Disputes are set­
tled through argument in reference to traditional standards.
While it is not developed into a systematic methodo­
logical form and is generally not regarded as scientific,
I believe that art criticism is the first evaluation model 
in our considerations that is clearly consistent with 
hermeneutic inquiry. Art criticism is guided by the interest 
in developing mutual understanding about a phenomena that 
can facilitate its progress and orient our actions in rela­
tion to it. It aims at expanding the horizon of our under­
standing. The interpretations it offers are judged by 
pragmatic and coherence norms. Value judgments are justi­
fied on the basis of traditional standards. The problematic 
situation is conceived as inadequate understanding that 
requires interpretation to orient and sustain purposeful 
action.all are characteristics of hermeneutic inquiry.
Professional Judgment Models, Many professions have 
developed procedures to insure the quality of their own
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programs and individual members. Qualified experts are 
called to make judgments about a particular activity or 
even an entire college. Examples include site visits to 
review federally funded programs, doctoral oral examinations, 
and accreditation agencies such as the North Central 
Association. Some explicit standards of judgment are 
developed through collective interaction of highly qualified 
and experienced professionals. The evaluation usually 
centers around these standards but in order to capitalize 
on the reviewers' expertise, much room is left to the tacit 
standards involved in making a wholistic qualitative 
assessment against the tradition of the profession.
Quality control is addressed by using multiple reviewers, 
traditionally established standards and employing profes­
sionals of recognized competence. The evaluation process 
is carried out in direct interaction with those under re­
view permitting judgments to be corrected through two-way 
communication. Procedures for appeal are made explicit.
Professional judgment models of evaluation exemplify 
a general process of practical deliberation in which no 
form of specialized inquiry tends to predominate. In 
some situations such as site reviews of publicly funded 
programs the results of empirical studies may play an 
important part in the deliberations. But the role of any 
systematically methodological inquiry will depend on the
184
tradition and norms of the institution and the kind of 
claims requiring justification.
Adversary Models. This approach uses quasi-legal 
procedures to present the pros and cons of a proposed course 
of action, or to compare alternative courses of action. 
Modeled on the form of an administrative hearing, advocates 
for opposing points of view present evidence, testimony 
and arguments to develop the best possible case from the 
perspective they represent. Bias is assumed and controlled 
by the adversary process where each side emphasizes the 
strengths of its own position and carefully notes and 
exploits weaknesses in the opponents' position. The audi­
ence or decision makers are then left to choose or judge 
for themselves.
Adversary evaluation represents a form of practical 
deliberation in which participants are partitioned into 
separate interest groups of equal power in relation to the 
issue being considered. A decision is made through nego­
tiation. The rationale of the model is not committed to 
any particular form of inquiry.
Transaction Models. What distinguishes these evalua­
tion models is that they tend to be more responsive to the 
actual concerns and issues of all groups legitimately 
involved in the activity concerned. Neither preconceived 
standards of science or tradition are used in the evaluation.
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Instead only those standards, values and interests actually 
held by the participants are represented. Evaluation 
compares the entire constellation of values actually per­
ceived in the program with the whole complex of expectations 
and standards actually held by all groups legitimately 
involved. The methods of investigation are chosen by 
their usefulness in obtaining information about these per­
ceptions and expectations for the program and to facilitate 
their comparison. There is much interaction between the 
various groups and between them and the evaluator. The 
evaluation depends heavily on informal case studies, obser­
vation and negotiation to arrive at an overall assessment.
Transactional models of evaluation tend to down play 
formal inquiry processes of any kind. In principle, however, 
any form of :v~ j may be found to be appropriate in a 
particular context. The overall process is one of practical 
deliberation in which validity claims are justified in many 
different ways according to the context.
Summary. Two of the three forms of inquiry identified 
by Habermas find some utilization in prevailing evaluation 
models. By far the most pervasive in actual use has been 
the empirical-analytic form of inquiry. Two models, systems 
analysis and goal based approaches, are strictly modeled on 
the logic of empirical inquiry. A case could probably be 
made that for a time it was considered the only form of 
scientific inquiry.
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While it has not found widespread use in evaluation, 
hermeneutic inquiry has come to be recognized as a viable 
method in the social sciences. The art criticism model of 
evaluation comes closest to a form of hermeneutic inquiry. 
Since it is modeled after the traditions of art and 
literary criticism, perhaps it should not, as Eisner sug­
gests, be regarded as scientific inquiry. But I think there 
are analogs to his proposal that are similar and yet still 
considered to be methods of scientific inquiry. For exam­
ple, consider naturalistic inquiry and ethnomethodology.
I will consider the relation between art and science
only by noting Dewey's statement: "Science states meanings;
15art expresses them." A meaningful statement provides 
direction for action that leads to an actual experience of 
that meaning, while an aesthetic or artistic expression 
constitutes an experience. A teacher in the classroom may 
be an artist, and teaching may be an art, but criticism and 
analysis of this experience is inquiry that can lead to 
practical and theoretical knowledge useful in guiding the 
activities of teaching. As long as justification is not 
limited to logical entailment, or conclusive empirical evi­
dence, the insights gained could be counted as knowledge.
Finally, it does not seem to me that any of the evalua­
tion models we considered make any reference to something 
like critical inquiry. Those models that set evaluation
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in the context of practical deliberation, such as the 
decision, professional judgment and transactional models, 
are not logically inconsistent with critical inquiry and 
could be expanded to include this form. It seems to me 
that even the possibility of practical deliberations pre­
supposes that certain conditions obtain and that only criti­
cal inquiry can address these conditions.
Application of the Theory of Inquiry
Because education includes natural, social, and indi­
vidual dimensions, inquiry in education must proceed from 
an integration of the material, interpersonal and personal 
perspectives. I have developed and explored three forms of 
inquiry based on these three guiding orientations. Each 
form of inquiry has a place in the study of education. The 
three forms of inquiry each provide knowledge that guides 
action in a unique way. Empirical-analytic inquiry provides 
knowlege of natural regularities that guides action instru- 
mentally. Hermeneutic inquiry provides practical knowledge 
of social uniformities that gives action a social orienta­
tion guided by common norms, traditions and understandings. 
Critical inquiry provides personal knowledge that can free 
action from unconscious forces and repressed motives.
Even when we emphasize one form of inquiry, the others 
will be implicitly involved. The three forms of inquiry 
inter-penetrate and the knowledge gained by one is subject 
to the critique of the others.
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Impirical-Analytic Inquiry, This form of inquiry can 
be used to look at a course of action in terms of its instru­
mental efficiency. It provides a background of technology and 
laws, of technically tested rules for behavior and universal 
relations among empirical variables, that can guide the 
choice of means to particular ends, permit predictions about the 
results of particular actions, or provide explanations of 
problematic events . The validity of beliefs or truth claims 
can be discursively tested against these empirical uniformities. 
Under this model, actions are guided by an empirical concept of 
rationality. In the words of Dewey: "How shall we employ what
we know to direct our practical behavior so as to test these be- .
liefs and make possible better ones? What shall we do to make
16objects having value more secure in existence?"
In Aristotle's framework, poesis was the production under 
the guidance of right reason, of useful and beautiful outcomes. 
In facilitating the search for correct means , empirical-analytic 
inquiry can help make education an art or techne in the classi­
cal sense. Our actions are then guided by right reason in 
the form of instrumental knowledge in the creation of the 
useful and the beautiful.
However, inquiry limited to the instrumental framework 
cannot do justice to the practical dimension of rational 
action. As we have seen, the technological orientation of 
social practice excludes the ethical and moral character of 
interpersonal and communicative action. It monologically
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excludes rational discourse from the clarification and 
resolution of practical questions. We need a logic and 
methodology of inquiry that facilitates rather than hinders 
our attempt to formulate basic concepts of communicative 
action in the realm of praxis. Social action is oriented 
by communicable meanings that are embedded in the collec­
tive expectations of social norms. Inquiry must have access 
to this intersubjectivity and, therefore, cannot limit" 
itself to the controlled observation and experimentation 
of the natural sciences.
Empirical-analytic inquiry is limited to objectified 
experience. Approaches to inquiry in education that try 
to follow the logic of empirical-analytic science are 
excluded by that same logic form seriously engaging the 
nonobjectified intentions, motives and meanings of the 
personal and interpersonal dimensions so central in educa­
tion. Inquiry must attend to the intersubjective meaning 
structures of participants in the educational process. 
Therefore, those approaches to inquiry are inadequate which 
exclude meaning as a basic category for inquiry.
Inquiry approaches constructed on the models of the 
behavioral sciences and based on behaviorism are inadequate 
in this regard. Yet, inquiry in education has attempted to 
follow the behavioral methods of psychology and social 
psychology. This approach treats the subjective contents
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of our experience (for example, intentions, motives and 
me.anings) as epiphenomena which have no independent effect 
on behavior and no explanatory value.
Hermeneutic Inquiry. This reduction of intentional 
action to behavior completely ignores the symbolically 
structured interaction that is basic to education and the 
ground of ethical conduct. To include the interpersonal 
dimension in inquiry, the investigator must participate in 
this interaction. A course of action must be understood 
from the perspective of the actor; intentions constitute 
behavior for human beings. The most elementary description 
of human behavior will contain at least implicit intentional 
elements or be completely devoid of significance. To grasp 
the meaning of social action, the investigator must work 
from the participant's own understanding of what is happen­
ing. The controlled observation of empirical-analytic 
science is supplemented with interactive dialogue in which 
the investigator hermeneutically interprets people's actions 
and expressions. These first-level interpretations, through 
which the participants themselves understand their actions, 
can then be reconstructed by the investigator in the light 
of the purposes of the inquiry.
The starting point for inquiry is the problematic sit­
uation of disturbed or incomplete understanding,. Hermeneutic 
inquiry attempts to assimilate an unclear or foreign inter­
action.
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The process of practical deliberations depends on and 
takes place within an intersubjectivity of mutual under­
standing among participants. If a course of action is 
not adequately represented within this horizon of under­
standing then a decision cannot reflect the reality of the 
individuals invested in that course of action. In general, 
hermeneutic inquiry can facilitate normative resolution in 
practical deliberations by enlarging the frame of reference 
of participants to include the course of action as a life 
expression.
There are occasions when a course of action is not 
adequately understood and this gap in understanding inhibits 
communication and resolution in practical deliberations.
Many complex social innovations have been initiated in 
education. When evaluated through quantitative empirical 
methods no significant effects have been demonstrated. Yet 
often enough these studies have not provided a truly sensi­
tive and emphathic understanding of the program and what it 
contributes to the people involved. The lack of statisti­
cally significant output measures does not demonstrate 
that nothing of value was gained, nor that the program was 
not worth its investment. A sensitive observer, skilled 
in hermeneutic methods, can give a richly textured and 
coherent representation of a program from its own frame of 
reference. An illuminating rendering of the program will
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provide a bridge to the participants in the deliberation 
process, enlarging their frame of reference and permitting 
them to see more clearly the qualities and relationships 
of the program.
Narrative accounts of interactions are appropriate 
data for hermeneutic inquiry. The elements of the descrip­
tion form a coherent pattern that brings insight into the 
nature of the problematic situation. Objective observation 
for prediction and control is replaced by interpretive 
characterization for mutual understanding. The knowlege 
gained is practical in the sense that it represents a 
reorientation of the cognitive, interactive, and motivational 
dimensions of the meaning of the situation so that the 
insight acquires the power to motivate actions congruent 
with this reoriented cognitive and interactive structure.
This knowledge becomes part of our personality in the form 
of a pattern of understanding that dialectically assimilates, 
and adapts to, our future perceptions, interactions and 
actions.
Critical Inquiry. This form of inquiry focuses on the 
identification of distorted communication and its source and 
on its transformation into open communication. It is a 
self-healing process that aims at freeing interaction from 
unconscious domination of selective interests in the form 
of rationalization and ideology". It thereby aims at
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establishing the conditions that allow for the formation of 
a community of autonomous and responsible beings, of indi­
viduals who can create and freely participate in norms to 
guide their conduct. It aims at enlightened action, action 
animated with shared purpose and the ethical significance 
of mutually created and mutually maintained norms that can 
truly address the welfare of the community because they are 
based on genuine human needs.
The Conflict Workshop: An Illustration
Detailed application of this theory of inquiry to 
particular educational problems would vary according to 
the context of application and is beyond the scope of my 
study. However, I would like to briefly explore the appli­
cation of this theory to one of the situations that was, 
in a sense, the problematic context for the inquiry of my 
dissertation--the development and evaluation of the con­
flict workshop to which I referred in Chapter I . This 
analysis is very tentative and is meant to be only sugges­
tive, but it may help illustrate the application of the 
theory of inquiry to a particular kind of educational prob­
lem- -the development of experiential learning programs.
From the perspective of this theory of inquiry the 
workshop as a set of learning experiences will be seen as 
a developmental process that proceeds simultaneously along 
cognitive, interactive, and motivational dimensions. This
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perspective becomes persuasive once we recognize the rela­
tionships between human evolution, development, inquiry 
and cognitive interests, All human life depends on three 
fundamental interests which aim toward technical control, 
practical orientation, and individuated autonomy. These 
three ’’anthropologically deep-seated interests" assimilate 
human evolution, development and experience to themselves. 
Inquiry continues these evolutionary and developmental 
processes at an institutionally-specialized level.
Inquiry recapitulates ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny 
as organized by the technical, practical, and emancipatory 
cognitive interests. Each process is a different level of 
self-formative process.
These three categories define universal structures 
which provide a normative basis for inquiry--in our case 
for the development of an integrated series of learning 
experiences.
Our aim is to create learning experiences that lead to 
a reorganization of ourselves along cognitive, interactive 
and motivational dimensions so that we can respond more 
successfully in relation to the three corresponding realms 
of experience--nature, society and our own needs.
In relation to the motivational dimension, our goal 
is to become more aware of our own needs and the motives 
for our actions--to grow toward greater autonomy and respon­
sibility in recognizing our needs and fulfilling them.
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In relation to the cognitive and interactive dimensions, 
our aim is to grow in competence for meeting these needs 
through more successful instrumental and communicative 
actions--to gain the foresight to anticipate the conse­
quences of our actions.
Our actions will become more congruent with conscious 
motives and our motives will become more grounded in 
genuine needs.
One way to see this process of developmental recon­
struction is to think of ourselves as dynamic patterns with 
cognitive, interactive, and motivational dimensions, each 
dimension constellated into a particular structure at a 
given time. This pattern of ourselves is in dialectical 
interaction with both nature and society, informing and 
formed by our experience of these two realms.
Of particular importance in this context is the 
dialectical relation between this pattern of ourselves and 
other patterns in the form of other persons and their ideas 
and activities. Through the workshop experience these 
patterns transact in ways planned to facilitate growth as 
specified above..
I want to divide the overall process of creating this 
workshop into three tasks, each building and being guided 
by its own emerging structure or pattern: (a) developing
and formulating the content of the workshop, (b) developing
196
the teaching process, that is, designing the learning
activities and conducting the workshop, and (c) designing
and conducting the evaluation of the workshop. The patterns
that emerge and guide these three tasks are the content
theory, the teaching theory, and the inquiry theory,
respectively. These three tasks occur simultaneously and
the three theories interpenetrate, dialectically transform-
17ing each other. I would like to consider each in turn.
Content Theory. The content of the workshop consists 
of a pattern of understanding regarding some problematic 
situation. In our example we have an organized set of 
ideas, a theory, if you will, about conflict and responding 
to conflict situations. This theory is a pattern of under­
standing developed and formulated by people in social inter­
action. Under the belief that this pattern of understanding 
can be useful to others, it is made the content of a learn­
ing experience.
In the workshop experience, participants will adapt 
and assimilate this pattern, incorporating it into their 
own structure to some extent ranging from complete rejec­
tion to complete integration. In this process, the partici­
pants' own cognitive, interactive, and motivational pattern 
is reconstructed in relation to the workshop content as 
suggested above.
Teaching Theory. The teaching task is to develop a 
theory of how to structure participants' interaction with
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the workshop content so as to facilitate their growth in 
the ways intended. Guided by this theory, the teaching 
task is to design an integrated series of learning activi­
ties that support participants' reciprocal reconstruction 
in a way that is responsive to the autonomy arid responsi­
bility of the learner, the ethical nature of human inter­
action, and the developmental nature of learning.
As an__illustration I suggest the following general 
form. I believe it is potentially compatible with the 
three conditions referred to iri the preceding paragraph.
1. The particpants are introduced to the problematic 
context in which the content theory has relevance. In the 
case of our example concerning conflict, we might use a 
simple role play situation involving conflict. This pro­
vides an experiential base in which participants can begin 
to observe and understand their own patterns of responding.
A structure should be provided to support this kind of 
observation and analysis. For example, participants might 
be asked to respond in writing to key questions about their 
experience and to share their responses with each other.
This insures that participants will have the opportunity to 
use their own material,
2. The content theory is made available to participants
through some appropriate media such as theory papers, films, 
recordings, lectures or lecturettes, texts, workbooks, 
slides, discussions, etc.
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3. Participants are provided with opportunities to 
act in relevant problematic contexts on the basis of their 
self-understanding gained from previous experience and the 
content theory. For integrated learning to take place,
the crucial element is the participants1 ability (supported 
by the workshop structure) to see or to be aware of what 
they are doing. This awareness includes cognitive (or 
descriptive), interactive, and motivational dimensions.
To see in this context means to be able to acknowledge 
(at least to ourselves) the real motives for our actions, 
and to be in touch with the situational context, our own 
and others' actions and expressions, and the meaning of 
these actions and expressions in light of our motives and 
the situation.
4. In the process of acting on the basis of their 
perceived motives and their present conceptions, partici­
pants have the opportunity to experience the consequences 
of their actions. This, again, requires that they be aware 
of, or said more proactively, that they make contact with 
what is happening as described in the previous step. The 
workshop structure can support this kind of contact.
5. Participants are given the opportunity to describe 
and evalute their actions and conceptions in the light of 
their motives, the consequences they experienced, the 
content theory and their own and others' emerging recon­
structions. A teaching structure is provided which supports
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participants' describing what they did and what happened, 
and then individually and interactively evaluating these 
actions and consequences. For example, participant's might 
be asked to describe what they liked and disliked, what 
they would keep and throw away,
6. Participants are provided with the opportunity to 
further integrate and generalize the emerging pattern of 
understanding by projecting it onto other relevant situa­
tions they typically encounter, This might take the form
of anticipating what they would do similarly and differently 
another time in the same or similar situations. In this 
process, their experience in this situation becomes meta­
phor for the next.
7. This process of (1) experience, (2) theory, (3) 
action, (4) consequences, (5) description, evaluat:_on and 
reconstruction, and (6) integration and generalization 
recycles through new contexts and new elements of the con­
tent theory in such a way as to provide an integrated over­
all design.
The crucial aspects of this process are providing 
support for participants in contacting their experience and 
in reconstructing their understanding and the meaning of 
this experience along cognitive, interactive and motiva­
tional dimensions of development.
Generally, this means that participants must be able to 
make contact with their experience in the face of a certain
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amount of resistance to doing so. The resistance encoun­
tered is the motivational component of meanings attached 
to the situation expressing repressed needs and motives.
That is, we cannot afford to acknowledge some motives that 
do, indeed, guide our actions and we reconstruct our under­
standing of our motives and actions to maintain self- 
identity. If the learning experience is to provide support 
for the motivational dimension of development, it must have 
a structure which supports the critical reconstruction of 
our conceptions about our motives and actions. Only when 
we gain access to our true motives can we pursue genuine 
needs in functional ways. Such self-knowledge is a precon­
dition, if not a defining characterization, of autonomy and 
responsibility. As we have seen, ethical interaction, as 
well, depends on our true needs and motives.
The interactive dimension of development is furthered 
through the interpersonal process of evaluation and recon­
struction. In this process participants are dialectically 
forming the intersubjectivity of mutually acknowledged 
meanings and norms that, in turn, guide their further inter­
action. As this interaction approaches the conditions of 
the ideal speech situation, the intersubjectivity takes on 
the quality of a rational general will. This quality 
of intersubjectivity imparts ethical significance on their 
conduct.
The cognitive dimension of development is not empha­
sized in this kind of workshop as it would be in, for 
example, a course in logic or physics.
Inquiry Theory. Inquiry is focused on the development, 
formulation and evaluation of the content theory and the 
teaching theory and design.
The experience of all participants in the teaching- 
learning situation is crucial to the development of these 
two theories. This experience provides a continuous test 
of these theories against the constraints of reality in the 
form of nature, society and our own needs. Experience 
within each of these frames of reference is assimilated 
to the structure of the content theory. Simultaneously, the 
content theory is adapted to realities of experience in 
each realm that resist incorporation. The same is true for 
the teaching theory and the experience of those implementing 
it.
This inquiry process is essentially hermeneutic, but 
has critical dimensions. The task is to build a pattern of 
patterns--a congruent argument that articulates the patterns 
of the content theory and the teaching theory, characterizes 
the experience of the people in the teaching-learning situ­
ation, and offers a reformulation of content and teaching 
theories based on that experience.
To do this, the investigator must thoroughly under­
stand the content theory and teaching theory and must gain
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access to the personal and interpersonal experience of par­
ticipants in the teaching-learning situation. The investi­
gator seeks both to understand this experience from the 
participants' own perspective, and then to interpret this 
experience in relation to the purposes of the workshop.
The principle goal is an insightful account that makes this 
experience intelligible in light of the instructional con­
tent and the teaching methods. The investigator explores 
participants' use of the teaching design and conceptual 
content in understanding and integrating their own experi­
ence in relation to the focus of instruction. Through the 
"circle of interpretation," he or she develops a sensitive 
and emphathetic representation of the teaching-learning 
process in all its richness, detail and complexity, and 
builds an overall pattern of understanding that integrates 
the variability of peoples' personal and interpersonal 
experience into a coherent whole.
The data for such inquiry are participants' actions and 
expressions--interpersonal communications in all their 
varied forms. The investigator seeks any appropriate means 
for objectivating and objectifying peoples' experience. He 
or she taps participant's subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
through participant observation, interviews, audio and video 
taping, reviewing taped episodes with participants, question­
naires, written responses to key questions, participants'
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work samples, expressive drawings, metaphorical expressions, 
free writing exercises, formal observation, informal dis­
cussion, simulations, Q-sorts, role plays, psychodrama, 
and many other methods.
Participants' subjectivity will be most available 
and most vived in face to face interaction. Through 
communicative interaction, the investigator and the partici­
pants in the teaching-learning situation dialectically 
form a shared pattern of understanding of the workshop 
experience. This pattern is incorporated into the investi­
gator and is objectified in the accumulated data.
Through this pattern of understanding and the acquired 
data, the investigator must develop, formulate and communi­
cate a convincing story, a story that builds our under­
standing of the phenomena investigated, that gives us in­
insight into what happened and foresight concerning 
future actions. This story must account for people's 
experience in relation to the content and teaching theories 
and the realities of nature, society and their own needs, 
and must stand the test of further experience in these 
realms. It must capture and portray the participants' 
growth along the cognitive, interactive, and motivational 
dimensions of development.
The investigator's account is evaluated by the quality 
of its illumination, the force of its insight and fruitful­
ness of its foresight. It is judged by the cogency,
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coherence, comprehensiveness and efficiency of its argu­
ments in portraying and accounting for peoples’ experience 
so that we can see more clearly and act more congruently.
The investigator has the task of creating an inter­
personal relationship of understanding— of hermeneutically 
expanding the horizon of understanding to include the work­
shop experience. This involves communicative action and the 
interactive use of language. The dimensions along which 
understanding takes place become focal points for justifi­
cation. Symbolic expressions must be intelligible in 
relation to the linguistic and extra-linguistic inter­
subjectivity. Propositions must be true in relation to 
our experience of nature. Proposed interactions and their 
guiding norms must be appropriate in relation to universali- 
zable interests. Intentional expressions must be authentic 
in relation to genuine needs. The investigator must not only 
maintain the perforative attitude of a participant in 
interpersonal communication, but must raise and discursively 
support the validity claims implicit in the various theories 
and accounts.
The dimension of critical inquiry in the theory is con­
cerned with uncovering systematic distortions in the 
intersubjectivity of the teaching-learning situation. Whereas
hermeneutic inquiry seeks to disclose the meanings, motives 
and intentions of participants' interactions from their own
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perspective, critical inquiry examines the structure of this 
intersubjectivity. Do participants (including the instruc­
tors or facilitators) have equal chances to put forward, 
refute and defend assertions, to initiate and oppose inter­
personal relationships and norms for action, and to offer 
and question expressions of attitudes, feelings and inten­
tions? To what extent do imbalances in the power and 
authority structure distort the symmetry of opportunities 
to engage in these various kinds of speech acts, To what 
extent do repressed needs and unacknowledged motives distort 
communication and prevent ’’witting” conduct? How well does 
the workshop structure provide the conditions for an ideal 
speech situation and support the formation of an open inter­
subjectivity? How well does this structure support partici­
pants 1 reconstruction of their actions and experience to 
better understand their real needs and motives?
Perhaps I can illustrate the focus of critical inquiry 
with an example. In a summer workshop on teacher self- 
evaluation, I observed two participants who seemed to resist 
active involvement in the workshop activities. During 
structured interactions and informal discussions, they were 
critical of the ideas and activites of the workshop and they 
rated them low on evaluation questionnaires and rating 
scales. All evidence seemd to indicate that they perceived 
the workshop to be of little value.
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Yet their attitude was evident from the beginning of 
the workshop on the first day--before they had experienced 
much of the design--and contrasted rather sharply with the 
attitudes of other participants. They seemed predisposed 
for a negative experience.
As I became better acquainted with these participants,
I shared my impressions and asked them if they would be 
willing to elaborate on theirs. Again, their responses 
seemed to reinforce the view that the workshop experience 
was not very useful to them. At one point I asked how they 
became involved in the course, their reasons for coming and 
what they hoped to gain. This time, it became clear that 
they had been pressured by a superior into attending the 
workshop against their own desires not to attend. They 
felt resentful and preferred to invest as little as possible. 
As we pursued this discussion it became obvious that their 
perceptions of the usefulness of the workshop had little to 
do with the workshop itself and everything to do with their 
resentment in having to be there.
Their conduct and experience could better be understood 
as an expression of this previously hidden resentment. The 
use of authority in requiring their attendance introduced 
a distortion into the intersubjectivity of the workshop.
They did not feel free to express their genuine interests 
and their actions were guided by unacknowledged motives, It 
seems likely that their experience may have affected those
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they worked with to decrease the value of their experience 
as well. And, until the resistance these participants 
projected onto the workshop content, methods and facilita­
tors was disclosed for what it was, the evaluation of the 
workshop itself remained distorted.
Critical inquiry focuses on such systematically dis­
torted communication. It aims at. analytically reconstruct­
ing the ongoing formation of our experience to free interac­
tion from hidden motives and selective interests.
Conclusion
I believe that Habermas' social theory of knowledge 
and his theory of communicative competence can provide an 
important framework for expanding inquiry beyond its narrow 
preoccupation with empirical methods. It provides a way 
to fit specialized inquiry processes within a larger frame­
work of practical deliberation. Empirical-analytic inquiry 
can provide us with knowlege of patterns in the natural 
world that we can use to achieve human purposes. But over 
reliance on empirical understanding tends to substitute 
technology for enlightened action. Hermeneutic inquiry can 
provide us with interpretations that enlarge our frame of 
reference, orient our actions with respect to each other and 
bind us into community. But over-reliance on hermeneutic 
understanding tends to substitute tradition for enlightened 
action. Only critical inquiry can free us from ideologically
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frozen relations of dependence so that the dialogue of 
autonomous and responsible human beings can take place.
Taken together these inquiry forms can facilitate our appre­
hension of reality from any grame of reference, natural, 
social or personal.
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